

FLEXIBILITY AND LIMITATION IN STEPPE FORMATIONS

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS HERITAGE

Politics, Society and Economy

EDITED BY

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VOLUME 15



FLEXIBILITY AND LIMITATION IN STEPPE FORMATIONS

The Kerait Khanate and Chinggis Khan

BY

İSENBIKE TOGAN



BRILL
LEIDEN · NEW YORK · KÖLN
1998

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Togan, İsenbike.

Flexibility and limitation in steppe formations : the Kerait Khanate and Ghinggis Khan / by İsenbike Togan.

p. cm. — (The Ottoman Empire and its heritage, ISSN 1380-6076 ; v. 15)

Includes index.

ISBN 9004108025 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. Asia, Central—History. 2. Turkic peoples—History. 3. Genghis Khan, 1162-1227. I. Title. II. Series.

DK858.T64 1998

958—dc21

97-42285

CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Togan, İsenbike:

Flexibility and limitation in Steppe formations : the Kerait Khanate and Ghinggis Khan / by İsenbike Togan. - Leiden ; New York ; Köln : Brill, 1998

(The Ottoman Empire and its heritage ; Vol. 15)

ISBN 90-04-10802-5

ISSN 1380-6076

ISBN 90 04 10802 5

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many friends have been generous with their time and enthusiastic in their spirit in providing conscious support for this work and my efforts to compare the Mongolian and Ottoman empires. These were mostly Ottomanists who were also my friends. But most importantly they represented an open minded approach and a readiness for comparison. Professor Halil İnalcık has always been supportive of my studies of the Mongolian Empire and encouraged me in my comparisons with the Ottoman empire and in the publication of the present study, as he has a long-standing interest in the Mongolian, Ilkhanid and Central Asian Turkish heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Over the years Suraiya Faroqhi shared her work and views with me and provided an informal groundwork for comparative history. She followed the development of this study from its inception to the last stages, read different parts of it and recommended the work for publication. Cornell Fleischer, then director of the Center for the Study of Islamic Societies and Civilizations and the History Department at Washington University in Saint Louis supported my research activities and prolonged my stay at the university so that eventually I was able to finish the rough draft of the manuscript. Long hours of discussions with him provided the fuel for the continuation of the writing of the manuscript. In the enthusiastic atmosphere prevalent at that center Ahmet Karamustafa and Fatemeh Keshavarz were generous in providing bibliographical help and aiding me in the translations from the Persian as well as in generous comments. George Hatch, James Shih and Lynda Shaffer discussed especially aspects of Chapter Two and provided useful comments which I tried to incorporate into the study. Robert Hegel and other China scholars at Washington University were always ready for discussions of textual passages and problems of Chinese history. Here I also would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Qiao Xiao-long for long hours of discussions on how Inner Asian history is reflected in Chinese novels and for his generous time in going over translations from the Chinese.

It was also Inner Asianists like Francis Cleaves, Morris Rossabi, Beatrice F. Manz, Şinasi Tekin and Omeljan Pritsak who read different parts of the book at various stages in its progress and encouraged me to continue. After my return to Middle East Technical University (METU) Huricihan İslamoğlu always provided a ready ear to discuss problems of developmental and comparative history. With her interest in the problems of history and historiography she was an encouraging and enthusiastic companion for me

when I was trying to bring the manuscript to a close. I also owe thanks to David Adams and Geoffrey Summers for reading through some of the earlier versions of the text for the English. Here I also would like to thank Filiz Çağman of the Topkapı Sarayı Library for helping me with the selection of miniatures incorporated into the book. The Harvard-Yenching Institute has kindly given permission for the quotations from Francis W. Cleaves' work. One of the reproductions has been incorporated by the courtesy of Bibliothèque nationale de France.

I was fortunate that Sharon Baştuğ, an anthropologist dealing with problems of Inner Asian history at METU, was willing to undertake the task of editing the manuscript. She was also generous with her views and comments on the tribal world, which I incorporated into the work. The joy that I experienced during those hours has been memorable. My gratitude, on the other hand, is beyond description. I also would like to extend my sincere thanks to my former students Debbie Pfeifer and Nurten Kılıç who provided me with help and support during different stages of the preparation of the book. Without the enthusiastic support of Evrim Binbaş, graduate student and fellow member of the History Department at METU, this book could not have been prepared in this final form. He was always there with assistance and a smiling face.

Ankara
15 July 1997

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BSOAS</i>	<i>Bulletin of Oriental and African Studies</i>
<i>CAJ</i>	<i>Central Asiatic Journal</i>
<i>IJMES</i>	<i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i>
<i>JAHA</i>	<i>Journal of Asian History</i>
<i>JAS</i>	<i>Journal of Asian Studies</i>
<i>JESHO</i>	<i>Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient</i>
<i>LS</i>	<i>Liao-shih</i>
<i>MNT</i>	<i>Secret History of the Mongols (Mongghol-un ni'ucha tobcha'an)</i>
<i>MSC</i>	<i>Meng-wu-erh shih-chi</i>
<i>MTPL</i>	<i>Meng-ta pei-lu</i>
<i>R/A</i>	Rashīd al-Dīn, <i>Jāmī' al-Tawārīkh</i> . Vol. I. Translated by A. A. Alizadeh.
<i>R/SL</i>	Rashīd al-Dīn, <i>Sbornik Letopisei</i> . Vol. I-1. Translated by L. A. Khetagurov.
<i>R/T</i>	Rashīd al-Dīn, <i>Jāmī' al-Tawārīkh</i> . Edited by Bahman Karimi.
<i>RCK</i>	Ratchnevsky, <i>Činggis Khan. Sein Leben und Wirken</i> .
<i>SWCCL</i>	<i>Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng-lu</i>
<i>TP</i>	T'oung Pao
<i>UAJb</i>	<i>Ural-altaische Jahrbücher</i>
<i>YS</i>	<i>Yüan-shih</i>
<i>ZDMG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i>

NOTES ON TRANSCRIPTION

Mongolian names and terms have been transcribed in their Middle Mongolian form in accordance with the system employed by Francis Woodman Cleaves in his *The Secret History of the Mongols*. The only deviations are these:

č is ch
š is sh
γ is gh
j̄ is j

In order to use the same letters for the Persian, Arabic, Ottoman and Chaghatai Turkish, the following transcription has been used:

ā	ā	خ	kh	ض	ḍ	م	m
ب	b	د	d	ط	ṭ	ن	n
پ	p	ذ	z	ظ	ẓ	و	v, ū, ö, o, u, ü
ت	t	ر	r	ع	‘	ه	h
ث	th	ز	z	غ	gh	ی	y, ī, ı, i
ج	j	س	s	ق	q		
چ	ch	ش	sh	ک	k		
ح	ḥ	ص	ṣ	ل	l		

For Chinese terms the Wade-Giles system have been used. However, in cases where place names in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) are mentioned the postal code form in the *Pinyin* has been given, for example Xinjiang for Hsin-chiang. Also for names such as Kyrghyz, the modern form has been used rather than earlier transcriptions. Any term that has been incorporated into the *Oxford English Dictionary* has been used in that form, ulama instead of ‘ulamā’. No attempt has been made to normalize spellings used in quotations.

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INTRODUCTION

This study grew out of questions that I asked when I was an undergraduate. The late Turkish historian Zeki Velidi Togan stated in one of the lectures at the University of Istanbul that Chinggis Khan emerged at the end of a long historical process that lasted through the eleventh and the twelfth centuries during which major religions came to a clash with each other along the trade routes between China and Turkestan. I remember that my first reaction was to ask what kind of a relation there was between religion and trade. I also wanted to know more about these people who were combining these two separate pursuits. In those days of the “modern” world—in fact this was a lecture given 15 January 1963—religion and trade were regarded as two distinct avenues. One was regarded as purely spiritual, and the other as purely material. In my quest to understand the complex situation of the eleventh and twelfth centuries in Asia, the answer seemed to be located in the tribes who had sometimes mysterious, sometimes exotic, sometimes familiar names. I felt if I knew more about the tribes then perhaps I could understand why they combined these seemingly different pursuits of religion and trade.

It was my interest in tribes that eventually took me to Harvard University. There, I became involved with the Mongols; at first more than I had wanted. It was during the first semester of my graduate study in one of the classes of Joseph Fletcher that I developed a penchant for comparative history. As the history of the Mongols unfolded in class, I was asking questions about the Turks. These questions about the history of the Turks eventually led me to comparisons between the Mongolian and the Ottoman empires.

It was again in one of Joseph Fletcher’s classes that I asked why in the fifteenth century we encountered new names like Kazakh, Özbek, Ordos and Tümed? What happened to these peoples whom I had been trying to follow in the footsteps of traditionalism and conservatism, as people who were only trying to preserve their old and valuable traditions? What had happened to them that they appeared under new names? It was also during that period that I met Professor Edward Keenan. In a brief encounter I told him that I eventually wanted to write a tribal history. He in his turn asked me whether I wanted to write a dynamic or descriptive history. I answered saying a dynamic one but then I did not know what dynamism in tribal history meant. All I knew was that I did not like the static, descriptive ap-

proach. The seemingly “revolutionary” attitude of the tribes of changing names provided that dynamism; the present study of the background of these developments is the outcome. It is by following the name changes in confederations that I encountered the continuities at the micro level. The familiar names of earlier confederations appeared later in history as names of subtribes and lineages.

Later in life I lived in the Sudan and did research among the nomadic tribes of the Eastern Sudan. There I encountered the different perspectives of the tribal and governmental points of view. I wanted to use this experience of exploring different perspectives in the reading of Inner Asian texts. So I set out to understand the setting in the twelfth century in which the Mongolian Empire came into being from texts familiar to me. This could be done only by trying to reconstruct pre-imperial tribal history although the nomadic tribes of the twelfth century have not left to us documents that would give their own view point. Yet my contention is that tribal histories can be reconstructed for the twelfth century, once we are clear about the vantage point and bias of our sources.

The aim of this study is twofold. If the metaphor is permitted, it first seeks to distinguish between the zenith of a mountain and the hills on which it rests and secondly to distinguish between the hills themselves. If the creation of the Mongolian Empire is a zenith from the Mongolian and also from the Inner Asian point of view, then I believe that it is crucial for our understanding to distinguish the features of the Chinggisid state from the pre-Chinggisid tribal order. Within that spirit this study does not compare the Chinggisid Empire to other nomadic empires, but seeks for paths of transformation from the previous tribal order to the state based on an army of conquest.

The history of the Mongolian Empire is rich in terms of source materials, so that these paths of transformation can be examined in the context of different sources and cultures. Like any empire, it harbored many nations and peoples; however, its Turkish component was of considerable importance from the beginning. Additionally, it left its mark on the four successor states as well as on other formations which flourished in the aftermath of the Mongolian Empire, the Ottomans being one of them. As the question of whether the Mongolian Empire was unique in terms of Asian history or whether it represented one its phases has not been resolved, it seemed worthwhile to examine the circumstances that brought about the empire from a non-imperial angle. The outcome of this study suggests that it was not unique, but, on the contrary, an example of transformation from localist to universalist concerns.

Such a transformation from localist to universalist concerns can also be observed in the rise of the Ottoman Empire, an empire that provides a

fruitful area of comparison for the Mongolian Empire, both in terms of their quasi-common heritage and also, as empires in the rise of which nomads played a significant role. For these reasons, I have been comparing the Mongolian and the Ottoman Empires as “empires” for some time. The present study suggests that a comparison in the pre-empire settings would be worthwhile. It seems that as Inner Asian history of the twelfth century has been overshadowed by Chinggis Khan’s performance in the thirteenth century, Anatolian history of the fourteenth century has been overshadowed by the Ottoman dominance. Once we remove our focus from the zenith and look at the hills on which the mountain rests, then it becomes apparent that the setting of the hills, in our case the paths of transformation are comparable. Such a comparison paves the way for future studies in terms of the relationship between political and economic transformation. The Mongolian Empire emerged out of struggles in the political and economic sphere; the winners were those who were able to anticipate the emerging economic networks in transcontinental trade. The Ottomans, on the other hand, rose in a setting with well-established economic networks. Having established themselves on a firmer economic base they strove to have economic activities gain premium over political activities so that it was to the advantage of smaller communities to recognize their leadership. Therefore they could concentrate more fully on the intricacies of the political competition and could establish long lasting institutions. Some of these institutions had forerunners in the Mongolian empire, but their lifespan has been short.

Such a comparison of the pre-empire setting shows us that the circumstances that led to the formation of the Mongolian Empire were not unique. The Mongols faced the same problems that other Inner Asian empires experienced. This problem was the challenge to assert themselves against the background of both economic and political problems. These problems could not find long lasting solutions both because of the nature of the internal and external structures. Internally, as an outcome of the tribal background, there was no separation between the economic and political spheres. Externally, they were repeatedly faced with the commercial policies of sedentary states and empires favoring state control over trade. Fighting on both fronts made them ephemeral. The Ottomans, on the other hand, emerged as victors out of a competition between other *beylik* (principalities) where the groundwork in economics had been laid down earlier by the Seljuqid and Mongolian Empires. This groundwork was both in terms of commercial networks and a symbiosis of sedentary and nomadic populations. Different peoples who came under the Ottoman rule lived under their own names and customs; later they appeared as nation states in the dissolution of the empire. The names of these nations were not new and unheard. In accomplishing all this, the Ottomans were exceptional for their own time,

and the Mongolian Empire was not. The successful Ottoman experience was later repeated in the settings of Central Asia and India.

The Mongolian Empire, on the other hand, had long-lasting repercussions, both positive and negative. They were successful in bringing together tribal people of diverse backgrounds under one “imperial” umbrella. Yet, because the empire did not prove long lasting, these diverse populations showed their displeasure, and we see them appearing under new names and identities. Names like Kazakh, Uzbek, Noghai all came into existence in the aftermath of the Mongolian Empire. Yet these people were not newcomers to the world. An examination of their historical composition shows that former tribal names continued to live as names of subtribal lineage or clan groups.

One of these former tribal and later clan names was and still is Kerait. Today, the Keraites are to be found among the Mongols of Mongolia, and among the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, Mongolia and China. There are also some among the Bashkortos in Bashkortostan (Russian Federation). Some of the Kerait arrived in Turkey in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as members of the Mongolian armies. There are also those who came to Turkey as refugees from China in the early 1950s. Today they are usually referred to as Kirei.

The Kerait were an important tribe in the twelfth century having played a role in the perpetuation of the legends of Prester John. Their leader was the lord and master of Chinggis Khan who built his state and empire on the ashes of the Keraites whom he destroyed. While he destroyed them as a politically functioning kin group he took their princesses as brides for himself and for his sons. Sorqaghtani Beki who raised all her sons to be rulers was a Kerait princess. She had married Chinggis Khan’s youngest son. In fact her sons ruled all over Asia, in Inner Asia, Iran and China. Möngke Qa’an who was visited by William Rubruck, Hülegü Khan who brought the Caliphate in Baghdad to an end, and Khubilai Khan who is known to the western reader through Cooleridge’s poem and Marco Polo’s account were all sons of this Kerait princess.

The present study is not about the Keraites in the ruling family, who are well known in their new identity as members of Chinggis Khan’s dynasty. This study aims to contextualize and to historicize the Kerait whom we normally dismiss as marginal and tribal, or merely as losers. Following the story and the history of the Kerait from the eleventh to the thirteenth century we will witness the destruction of the tribal world order and the establishment of a new universal order where there was no room for tribal identities. Tribal identity was not raised even in the highest echelons, the imperial family.

Within that understanding the individual chapters of this study focus on alternating periods. One is the age of tribalism in the eleventh and especially twelfth centuries, the other is the period of detribalization in the thirteenth century. Chapter One introduces the problem of destruction and re-emergence of tribal, ethnic, local identities while trying to keep the reader alerted to the problems of yet another dissolution, that of the former Soviet Union. The same periods can also be characterized as alternating phases of localism and universalism. A predominance of economic concerns and preponderance of supra-spiritual rule that comes close to secularism seems to be the tendency under the universalist empire of the thirteenth century. The dissolution of the universalist empire brought about the re-emergence of new tribal identities bringing forth another localist phase in the fourteenth century. This re-emergence is being referred to as retribalization in this study. The ability of the Inner Asian tribal people to change and to fit into different political structures at the macro level and to survive and to continue through universalist and localist phases contributed to the title of this book, *Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations*.

The circumstances that led to the detribalization policies of the thirteenth century are presented in descending order from macro to micro settings, first in the historical setting of Asia in general and second in the particular tribal setting. Chapter Two examines the setting of the twelfth century Asia including China, Inner Asia and the Near East. There we also become aware of the quests of Muslim merchants for a new order that would make trading in all these regions possible. Joseph Fletcher's "horizontal continuities" and the tradition set by F. Braudel have been guidelines for these comparisons.

Reading through the text we realize that while economic or political factors changed, there was also a major shift from the shifting loyalties of the tribal world to "loyalty" to a ruler under a dynastic state. Chapter Three, which is the history of the Kerait, is an attempt to look at the world of Chinggis Khan's empire from the vantage point of tribes whom we consider wrongly as marginal. While major works on the Mongols view the Mongolian Empire from the outside from the sedentary view perspective, this book attempts to look from within, following a tribe's history. While in general, tribes are seen only as Chinggis Khan's adversaries or allies, Chapter Three deals with tribal history taking them out of the light of Chinggis Khan and trying to see them in their own right. This is another way of writing "unequals" back into history. This chapter displays to us the bottlenecks in Inner Asian tribal society. These were tendencies of aristocratization and opposition shown by the same people towards centralization. Aristocrats who were constantly functioning within shifting alliances seem to have presented impediments towards statehood. As these

aristocrats functioned politically within shifting alliances, on a personal and emotional level they displayed loyalties of kinship or sworn brotherhood. The fact that the same person could function both within shifting alliances and show strong loyalties is a dichotomy that we seem to have difficulty in understanding. This difficulty arises because our loyalties are geared politically towards the nation state. We know from Roy Mottahe-deh's work how loyalties of shifting alliances worked in the Middle Eastern urban setting prior to the events encountered in this study. This chapter on shifting alliances then deals with similar phenomena in the tribal setting of pre-thirteenth century Inner Asia.

Chapter Four deals with the shift of loyalties from tribal affiliations to the ruler, in this case Chinggis Khan. He represented the new order, the new universalist world view, the *jasagh* or the *yasa*. This chapter especially emphasizes how Chinggis Khan was able to introduce the new order which was of a revolutionary nature by combining the new with the old. In fact it was his personal skill that made him emerge as the Qahan who was ordained by Eternal Heaven, while earlier he had been seen merely as a leader of the Mongols who had revolted. During this period of change members of former tribes found themselves in a new world in which also the fervent of former religiosity was superseded by the supra-religious policies of the new order. Lev Gumilev has followed the destruction of that religiosity by Chinggis Khan in his *In Search for an Imaginary Kingdom*. He did this by following the Naiman, another tribe who were Nestorian Christians like the Kerait. In fact, the fate of Christianity in Inner Asia was to be disappearance. Islam took over in the central and western regions and Buddhism in the east. But identity continued through tribal, subtribal affiliations.

Another approach has seen the tribes of the steppe not only as marginal but also as isolated. The recent anthropological work of Colin Renfrew has shown us the importance of small group interaction and that the interaction with larger centers was of crucial importance for the rise of later economic and political formations. Within a similar understanding, the Epilogue shows that the tribes in Inner Asia were neither marginal nor isolated and that they interacted with different centers. As a result Chinggis Khan's empire did not emerge out of nowhere. The empire he created was built no doubt with his own charisma and skill but on a foundation that escapes us if we read history only from the vantage point of a sedentary civilization and its written sources. The role of the oral literature in the transmission of political, economic and cultural traditions has been and is still very strong in Inner Asia. The best illustration of this tradition is to be found in Francis Cleaves' translation of the *Secret History of the Mongols* where we feel the force of oral traditions in the poetical style of King James' English. Only by

bringing together these various aspects can we understand the problems of the Inner Asian world today. The present book aims to contribute to our understanding of identity in Inner Asia in a continuum of visible and latent continuities and also of discontinuities by contextualizing and historicizing the marginal as well as the mainstream.

It is a fact that the state and later the empire of Chinggis Khan emerged as the victor out of the twelfth century competitive atmosphere. The Keraites studied in Chapter Three were the losers, but in the short term; so were the Naiman discussed passionately by Lev Gumilev. Yet, in the long run, it is the Kerait and the Naiman who are still well and alive in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Bashkortostan (Russian Federation), China, Mongolia and Turkey.

Disregarding these developments, some scholars tend to speak of Central Asian identity as newly emerging. However, before we achieve an understanding of continuities and discontinuities we cannot make an assessment of identity in Central Asia. Moreover, what we see sometimes as discontinuity is often a latent continuity. Our views of the tribal, the marginal, the primitive do not assign an equal place to these groups in terms of world history; they also compel us not to see the latent continuities, because they are not visible. In the twentieth century we have examined non-western societies mostly on the basis of what was visible in sight or in print. Therefore we see these societies sometimes as incapable of or not ready for certain traits that we take for granted in the western world. The present study claims to fill a gap in respect to these visible and latent continuities.

For a long time in the twentieth century it was fashionable to regard our times as the most progressive age and to use our own times' value judgments when dealing with the past and especially with aspects of the past which did not find approval in our own times. The vicissitudes of the tribal world in past history were such an enigma for us, but an enigma that we did not really try to understand. In this respect our sources, which also represent views of governments, have been supportive of our value judgments because they shared the same concerns of governmental and state interests with us today. These problems arise because historians of the twentieth century tend to read historical texts from the vantage point of a "nation state" with supposedly *one* national identity. However, we also need to take into account aspects of dual or multiple identities that have been and are still prevalent.

In trying to get out of this vicious circle of values, assumptions and the limitations of sources, I have not started with a grand scheme as to how things should be understood. Instead I have concentrated on passages that seemed to be ill-placed in texts and tried to understand both the reasons for this placement as well as the meaning of these passages.

Although the stand taken in this study has been like Gumilev to analyze the puzzling passages and to understand them in their own terms, our starting points being different, interpretations also vary. Lev Gumilev was interested in the fade of Christianity and the Naimans. I, in my turn, focused on the Kerait and the nature of the power struggles, in order to understand continuity and change. I followed methods employed by Francis W. Cleaves for reading texts. For him reading texts did not mean only using only philological tools and methods to let the text speak for itself. It also meant reconstructing the historical context. This process then needed to be followed by an attempt to understand the text not only as piece of workmanship and skill and scholarship but as something telling us about the sentiments, ideas, ideals of human beings. It was the person emerging from the text that made reading texts with Francis W. Cleaves so exciting. Following this method, I encountered the conflicts and tensions of those times and tried to show the complexity of a situation that we usually regard as primitive. I hope that I have been able to transmit some of this to my readers.

CHAPTER ONE

PATTERNS OF UNIVERSALISM AND LOCALISM IN INNER ASIA

After the unsuccessful coup of August 1991, when the Communist Party was disbanded in the USSR and the Peoples Deputies in Soviet Congress yielded rule to the Republics and voted themselves out of power on Sept. 5, 1991, Sergei Stankevich, a historian and a senior adviser to Boris N. Yeltsin, was asked for a precedent in Russian history. The answer was "If we try to find a historical parallel, I would probably say the liberation from the Mongol yoke. Of course this time it was not Mongol but ideological, and it lasted not for 300 years but for 73 years."

Although this assessment is from a nationalist Russian perspective, and sees in the Mongolian Empire an ethnic identity, the parallel drawn is not completely out of place. In the aftermath of the Soviet Empire we can draw parallels between the Soviet and the Mongolian Empires from the vantage point of recurring patterns of universalism and localism in Asian and specifically Inner Asian history, so that the past can serve to raise different questions than we are asking now.

Today as we approach the end of the twentieth century, we witness the closing of an era of "empires" and the opening of a new age with "many local identities" which appear in the form of independence or former "Soviet," now Russian style sovereignty of the "nationalities" or capitalist free world style rise of ethnicity or tribalism. It is noteworthy that at the commemoration of the quinentennial of 1492, the United States and Canada also had their share in these developments. I will refer to these trends as localism. However, they all emerge under the globalism of the international market place. As the prevalent literature on globalization and localization shows, at present we are encountering both of these simultaneously. Today we see localization as a way leading to regional integration and then to globalization.¹

Localism became entrenched in the Eurasian world in the sixteenth century and the vestiges of the earlier universalism disappeared. At this time, in place of the former all-encompassing "laws" of the Mongols local laws and codes emerged. The universalism of the Mongols was replaced by an emphasis on

¹ Recently Arif Esin has discussed the implications of globalization in the world and localization in Europe within the limits of the European Economic Community and its implications for Turkey in *Dünyada Globalizasyon ve Avrupa Topluluğunun Sanayi Politikası-Türkiye'ye Etkiler*. İstanbul, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, 1992.

local political culture in the rising regional empires: the Ottomans in Western Asia, the Safavids in Iran, the Özbeks in Central Asia, the Eastern Chaghatai (or the Şaʿīdiyya State) in Eastern Turkestan (the present Xinjiang, PRC), the Oirat or the Zunghar Empires in the steppes of Inner Asia, the Eastern Mongols in present-day Mongolia, the Timurids (Moghol) in India, Ming China in the east and the Russian Empire in the northwest.

This regionalization, which is attested especially in differences of religious affiliation, marked the whole of Eurasia from the west to the east. The regional differences have been handed down to us in codifications that reflect both customary laws and religious affiliations. The emergence of regionally formulated and written codifications in lands where the laws, edicts, and promulgations of Chinggis Khan had carried universal claims (though they had been shaped and reshaped by oral traditions) marked the dividing line between the earlier universalism and the regionalization of the later centuries.

When we speak of regional empires, we think of the Ottomans, the Safavids, the Timurids in India (Moghol), the Russian and the Chinese Empires. However, their emergence and consolidation as regional empires, distinct from others, was a gradual process that we see in the aftermath of the Mongolian Empire. The first moves towards localization were seen in the emergence of new tribes and principalities at the time of dissolution of the Mongolian Empire (mid-fourteenth century). These were then followed by Inner Asian regional states and empires, all without a common agenda other than being localized. In a way this was localization in politics.² In the third stage, in the sixteenth century and thereafter, differences in religion or in sects within the same religion became very distinct markers in the regional empires. Boundaries drawn along religious lines became stronger as they emphasized localization in the spiritual world. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century all these localist concerns gave way to more universal concerns in the form of modernity in the west, and socialism and communism in the east; Inner Asia came under the influence of communism. Thus the distinguishing spiritual barriers were, so to speak, lifted, and the whole region was remolded under the umbrella of secularism with two differing methods of “modernity,” capitalism in the west and socialism (communism) in the east, with major differences between them.³

Some cultures were modern, others were trying to be modern, participating in the so-called “modernization process.” Modernity and the road to modernity, i.e. modernization, was monopolized by the West. The Western

² The localization of concerns in the political, economic and spiritual spheres of Central Asian life has been vividly described by Robert McChesney in his *Waqf in Central Asia. Four Hundreds Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

³ For a similar assessment see Roland Robertson, *Globalization*. London: Sage, 1992 (p.50).

order rested on the rights of the individual, free enterprise and private trade. The Eastern order on the other hand, rested on state enterprise and state commerce, banning all private trade, where, practically, similarities between the former USSR and the Mongolian Empire end. The Mongolian Empire in the thirteenth century had flourished on the trade routes and within its network of international trade. However, a comparison between the universalist concerns of the twentieth century and that of the Mongolian Empire is still not out of place. If we accept that the twentieth century has been universalist in its secularism (modernity) choosing different roads (capitalist or socialist), then we can speak further of major differences in emphasis between these roads. The differences in political culture, between these roads, such as democracy or totalitarian regimes, are well known.

While in the west everyone was conscious of the relationship between individualism, free trade and democracy, in cultures where modernization was the ongoing process the emphasis was on political culture "democracy." In the "eastern block" socialism, on the other hand, economics, the redistribution of resources and profits to the masses was emphasized. As democracy rested on the support of the individual, the individual in turn was supported by rights of private property. This tradition continued to be the basis of the western civilization in the twentieth century. However, the ideological rhetoric addressing outsiders (those aspiring to modernity), especially in the Middle East, emphasized not property but democracy. The concept of private property/ownership entrenched in Islam would not find supporters in the Middle East, whereas democracy did as it was novel and needed. Thus the emphasis differed according to local conditions. Therefore in the USSR, not the autocracy of the state, but its claim on redistribution, not the loss of individual rights but the collective consciousness was emphasized. After centuries of "individual" rights of the nobility, the right of the individual was apparently not tolerated. In essence one could say that everyone aspired to modernity but chose different roads and methods and different goals according to their own needs.

In the West emphasis on political culture "democracy" was to continue to flourish and eventually⁴ make its economic philosophy acceptable as the "market system," as *the* valid system. The economic system of socialism, on the other hand, disintegrated. This happened probably also because it did not have a political philosophy beyond a practice of totalitarianism and repression from a center. However, the nature of the breakup of the USSR was due not only to economic pressure and totalitarianism, but also to the emergence of local political pressures in opposition to the decision making mechanism of the center with its universalist (internationalist) claims. In other words, the reaction

⁴ The spread of international corporations after the 1975-80's is an illustration of this development.

to an all-powerful center that aimed to erase local cultural distinctions was stronger than any reaction to totalitarianism. That is why we are still faced with local totalitarian models.⁵ The tendency toward globalization within the international market economy is shared by many irrespective of their style of politics. Yet local distinctions become more and more visible in spiritual, religious overtones.

Unlike the present where globalization, universalism and localization are in coexistence, in the past we encounter universalism and localism in alternating phases. We see the predominance of economic concerns under a universalist empire, the thirteenth century World System,⁶ which functioned for the most part due to the role the Mongols played in it. We might say that in the Mongolian empire we witness the preponderance of supra-spiritual rule or even secularism under a universalist empire. When the empire dissolved in the fourteenth century, the ranging concerns were not “economic” even though it was the economic system that was ruined; the concerns were political and spiritual. Within the political concerns of independent, autonomous decision making mechanisms (of tribes and principalities), the cultural and spiritual ties of the localist political climate were emphasized and there was a revival of religious traditions under localism.

A closer look at the patterns of “revival” in the past and present compels us to acknowledge that what is being revived is localism expressed politically and spiritually. Here we will not dwell on the present but concentrate on Inner Asian continuities which appear as concerns of identity in Inner Asian history after the thirteenth century. We see these concerns in all three areas of life in social life, in politics and in economics. But still the main divider remains spiritual life. While before the Mongolian Empire the spiritual dividers were between Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity and Islam, after the supra-religious age of the Mongolian Empire Nestorian Christianity ceased to play a role. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the division was definitely between various denominations of Buddhism and Islam. Until the twentieth century when socialism/communism and secularism/atheism were to lift the spiritual barriers between the “former” Buddhists and Muslims, the division remained along religious lines. This division was also going to define the respective societies along social, political and economic lines.

In analyzing these patterns of universalism and localism in Asian and in particular in Inner Asian history, the thirteenth century attracts our attention especially because of the shift that these patterns take. Instead of alternating

⁵ This is especially true for the models that emerge in discussions on present Central Asia in the form of the “Chinese Model,” which emphasizes the dominance of economic liberalization over political liberty.

⁶ For the thirteenth century World System see Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

phases there was a long period of localism with its phases of retribalization and regionalization. Thereafter universalism and localism did not follow each other closely in alternate terms as in the preceding period. When placing the thirteenth century at such a nodal point within the two millennia, we observe that three distinct notions have permeated human relations. These were a) notions of a “society of open advancement” for individuals in the social sphere vis-à-vis aristocratic trends, b) notions of power-sharing and making room for local and regional powers vis-à-vis concentration of power, c) “redistribution”⁷ as a way of life in the ideological sphere vis-à-vis tendencies towards accumulation and centralization. In this sense, redistribution was not perceived purely as an economic practice but as an ideology which would incorporate power-sharing and individual advancement.

Among the tribally organized pastoral nomads of the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, not wealth but power was regarded as permanent. Since wealth, that is animal wealth was ephemeral—it could easily be lost if one’s herd was decimated—to ensure the continuity of life and rule, the power of the leader or ruler could not be based on the possession of wealth. In earlier centuries the ideology of rule had been such that political power had to be derived from divine will, and the right to rule had been considered the property of a family that had the consent and the blessing (*qut*) of Heaven (*Tengri*). But the general sentiment was for sharing and limiting the concentration of power among humans and this was done through the redistributive ideology. Within such an understanding, “limitation of political power” will be referred to as “power-sharing”⁸ in the following pages. On the other hand, given the vast regions in which the tribally organized populations roamed, the existence of a multitude of centers of decision making and distribution of wealth is self evident. These redistributive practices⁹ differed from those of Karl Polanyi¹⁰ by their multitude of centers. Sometimes one could see also that power-sharing and redistributive practices worked in a spirit of interdependence.¹¹ Lastly, one could also speak of power-sharing and redistribution between the spheres of political and spiritual leadership, a

⁷ For the concept of “redistribution” in the Inner Asian context see note 13 below.

⁸ The underlying current in Chapter Three below is the power-sharing that was to be witnessed in the twelfth century.

⁹ An illustration of redistributive practices without power-sharing is to be found in Chapter Four.

¹⁰ For Karl Polanyi’s views as expressed in 1957 see, “Economy as an Instituted Process,” *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*. Chicago: The Macmillan Company Gateway Edition, 1971 (pp. 243-270) and “Redistribution: the State Sphere in Eighteenth-Century Dahomey,” in *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies. Essays of Karl Polanyi*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968 (pp. 207-237).

¹¹ Interdependence created by the harmonious working of power-sharing and redistribution is exemplified in Chapter Two in the case of the Qarakhanids.

feature that is referred to as “dual kingship” in historical literature.¹² Dual kingship is a phenomenon which would find its end due to concentration of power or accumulation of resources.¹³

I will be arguing that it is the combination and the separation of these factors—as stated in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter—that caused the bottlenecks in Inner Asian history leading to alternating phases of universalism and localism. Whereas universalism distinguished itself with supra-spiritual or secular tendencies, localism has been and is saturated with spiritual and religious overtones. The flexibility¹⁴ that the Inner Asian formations show in coping with these differing phases and bottlenecks will be the story of this book. The specific examples will come from the period of the Mongolian Empire.

This book is then an attempt to contextualize the Mongolian World Empire in a historical setting so that we can look at it within its proper historical dimensions. We can not deal with the Mongols out of historical context. They did not emerge out of nowhere nor did they disappear completely; it was the dissolution of the empire that took place, not of the people. This is an attempt to look at the Mongolian World Empire not as a unique case¹⁵ or as the zenith of Inner Asian history but as one of its phases; hence, the title of the book *Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations*. In this formation both Mongols and Inner Asian Turks participated and the underlying idea is that “flexibility,” i.e. the ability to handle change¹⁶ was the driving force in steppe formations and a decisive factor in the Mongolian World Empire’s response to earlier problems. Yet limitations that the new order brought paved the way for

¹² For dual kingship see Chapter Two note 76 and 124; Chapter Three, note 186 and Chapter Four, note 85 below.

¹³ Chapter Four below presents an example for the end of power-sharing between the spiritual and the political realms, see especially note 68.

¹⁴ For flexibility in the history of the Early (Kök)Türk see Michael R. Drompp, “Supernumerary Sovereigns: Superfluidity and Mutability in the Elite Power Structure of the Early Turks (Tu-jüe),” in Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks (eds.), *Rulers from the Steppe*. Los Angeles: Ethnographies Press, 1991 (pp. 92-115) and for flexibility in the history of the Turks in general see Peter B. Golden, “Empires of the Steppes: The Turkic Nomads of the Pre-Islamic Eurasian Steppes-Ethnogenesis and the Shaping of the Steppe Imperial Tradition,” to appear in a volume of collected essays by Tetragon, Istanbul. See also his *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992 (pp. 3-4). On flexibility in Ottoman administration see Suraiya Faruqi, “Towns, Agriculture and the State in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Anatolia,” *JESHO* 33(1990).2:125-56.

¹⁵ Thomas J. Barfield has a very interesting argument for seeing the Mongolian Empire as a unique case. *The Perilous Frontier*. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

¹⁶ For this definition of flexibility as used by Barnhill (1979) I am indebted to my former student M. Özlem Çelik. L. R. Barnhill in his “Healthy Family Systems,” *The Family Coordinator* 28(1979).94-100 apparently (I was not able consult the article directly) uses this concept to identify dimensions of healthy family functioning. Here in this work I have used the term to identify continuity. In essence both of the approaches try to understand how systems achieve perseverance and continuity. I have used J. C. Hansen & l’Abate, *Approaches to Family Therapy*. New York: MacMillan, 1982 (pp. 33-34).

the fourteenth century response of the people in their opting for localism and tribal rule that lead to the demise of the World Empire. Furthermore, we can say that the Mongols freed themselves of the “Mongol yoke,” which in the context of that time can also be understood as “the imperial yoke.”

From the vantage point of Inner Asian history we may call this localized response “retribalization,”¹⁷ a reemergence of new tribal groupings leading to new population movements. This process occurred all along the nomadic belt of Inner Asia extending into the then Qipchaq steppes and the Near East. Seen from the perspective of nomadic Inner Asia, this was not a negative development; on the contrary it was a reemergence, or reassertion, of tribal structures. Seen from the perspective of urban history, this was a period when we witness the abandonment of some cities, a development that can be interpreted as a movement of populations away from the cities. But this did not happen on an overwhelming scale. Instead the cities also developed their own “urban tribes,” the Sufi orders of Islam. It is starting from this period that merchant and artisan guilds and Sufi orders worked in collaboration.

In relation to Inner Asia, I will try to put the process leading to alternating phases of localism and universalism in a larger historical context within the following stages:¹⁸

1. Tribalization away from confederative empires (840-1206) with decentralization and localized claims, resulting in a system in which each component was autonomous yet interdependent, as were the tribes, as well as merchants. That these autonomous units were interdependent and not isolated can also be seen in terms of their social, political and commercial relations, that is in terms of “peer polity interaction.”
2. Detribalization in a centralized army of conquest: the Mongolian World Empire (1206-1368) with universalist claims working as a system in which merchants collaborated with the universalist political power of the nomads.
3. Retribalization in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with decentralization away from the “imperial yoke” and reemergence of localism in the form of steppe tribes and Sufi orders (urban tribes), a development under which merchants operated in collaboration with the Sufi orders and brought the markets to the steppe tribes. In West Asia it was in this atmosphere that the Ottomans competed with the other *beyliks* in Anatolia by drawing the merchants as well as the ulama and the Sufi orders into their own inclusive system, their world order. But the Ottomans were operating in an environment where the groundwork in economics, in terms of commercial networks, had been laid down in the Seljuqid times. Therefore, Ottoman efforts concentrated more on politics and tried to inhibit retribalization after their own consolidation.

¹⁷ Peter Golden (1992:5) refers to this development as regrouping, re-forming.

¹⁸ For a different interpretation of history in which external factors play an important role see Peter Golden's discussion (1992:6-12).

This development was not a cyclical process but a matter of choice involving the conflicts of redistribution of resources and sharing of political power, expressed by a single term in the local parlance: by *ülüş* in Turkish and *qubi* in Mongolian, both meaning share.¹⁹ In fact prior to the Mongolian Empire, the ruling ideology emphasized not personal share (*qubi*, *ülüş*) but share of “the charisma which is imparted (distributed or sent) from Heaven—the Deity to human beings, especially the sovereigns” (*ülüg*, *qut-ülüg*).²⁰ In a change from *ülüg* (share allotted by Heaven) to *ülüş* (share among members of a dynastic family) we witness the development away from predestination towards the active participation of individuals within the ruling strata. Below I will give a short outline of these developments.

In the thirteenth century shareholders of power compromised political power for greater or more steady economic resources and for a society open to talent (army, bureaucracy). In the fourteenth century, however, local powers reasserted themselves politically at the expense of economic rewards, resulting in retribalization with the emergence of completely new names: Tümed, Ordos, Qalqa, Kazakh, Dughlat, Qushchi, Idechi, Özbek, Noghai, and like the Tekelu many smaller subsections of the Oghuz and Türkmen. These new tribes comprised old clans which had come together in a new political formation.

In other words, retribalization in the fourteenth century transformed Inner Asian society from a society in which careers were open to talent (Mongolian Empire) into a society in which leadership—with local leadership reasserting itself—became open to talent, irrespective of one’s background: Temür among the Western Chaghataids, Qamer al-Dīn Dughlat among the Eastern Chaghataids, Esen among the Western Mongols and Mamai, Edigü²¹ in the Golden Horde were examples of this movement which brought non-Chinggisids to rule. Of course, the Ottomans were a great landmark in this process which brought people of non-aristocratic origins to power. In spite of these changes, the former ideology, legitimization under the rule of the Chinggisid clan, prevailed as a symbol of open advancement, so that both Chinggisids and non-Chinggisids emerged as legitimate rulers. However, it was only the Ottomans who succeeded in holding on to the claim of legitimate rule as non-Chinggisids. In this endeavour they availed

¹⁹ The implications of the *ülüş* in Inner Asian history have been discussed by Zeki Velidi Togan in his *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş* (2nd. edition). Istanbul, 1970 (pp.285-301).

²⁰ Mori Masao, “The T’u-chüeh Concept of Sovereign,” *Acta Asiatica* 41(1981).76-94 (p.74).

²¹ İsenbike Togan, “Altınordu Çözülürken: Kırım’a giden Yol,” to be published in the Proceedings of *Türk Rus İlişkilerinde Dün Bugün Sempozyumu*. Ankara, Turkey, 12-14 December 1992. Devin DeWeese describes this phenomenon in the person of Edigü who successfully challenged the power of the khans. Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994 (p. 340).

themselves of Islamic institutions. In the new world, not only the origin of rulers but also political formations themselves became diverse so that both centralization (by the non-Chinggisids) and decentralization (by Chinggisids) became possible. All these varied forms had their place under the order called “*yasa*” or “*jasagh*” and the custom of governance called “*töre*” or “*törö*.” In other words *yasa* or *jasagh* prevailed becoming all inclusive, inclusive of new forms, as long as there was agreement on the political and economic aspects of life. The flexibility thus achieved contributed to the richness of a political culture with an open society among both the nomads and the sedentary. However, the discourse of the *yasa/jasagh* showed its limitations. The discourse²² was not all inclusive; it required conformity to the dynastic culture. The society was open as long as one was in conformity with the Chinggisid ideology of the “Golden Dynasty” descended from the “Golden Seed” of Chinggis Khan.²³ In Inner Asian history the ideology of the open society started to assert itself with Islam²⁴ in the tenth century, as distinct from Buddhism, and became established after 1206 with the Mongolian Empire. Now let us look further back.

Earlier, before 840, there were the empires of the Huns (Hsiung-nu), the early Türk and the Uighur, all empires of the steppe that did not try to invade and conquer sedentary regions of China, India or the Near East. These were empires based on confederations living in the steppe regions with a charismatic supra-tribal leadership superimposed on them: the Ashina²⁵ clan. The Qaghans, the rulers, were believed to be endowed with *qut* that was imparted (distributed) to them by *Tengri*, “Heaven-the Deity.”²⁶ In other words *qut* was their share from Heaven (*ülüg*).²⁷ In these confederative empires Heaven-the Deity played a decisive role as a “vital force” for rule.²⁸ However, these notions of predestination did not lead to the concept of one

²² An example of an inclusive process of law making where the discourse itself, also inclusive, was the early American one. See David Thomas Konig, *Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex County, 1629-1692*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

²³ Note that the Ottomans did not conform to the Chinggisid discourse, but created their own discourse within Islam.

²⁴ İsenbike Togan, “Flexibility in Political Culture: Turks and Islam,” to be published by Tetragon, Istanbul.

²⁵ Christopher Beckwith is inclined to see *arsilan* “lion” in the name A-shih-na. See *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987 (pp. 206-208).

²⁶ Mori Masao, 1981:69.

²⁷ Mori Masao, 1981:69,74. According to Dursun Yıldırım *ülüg* was given to the ruler by lifting him up towards Heaven. “Köktürk Çağında Tanrı mı Tanrılar mı Vardı,” *IV. Milletlerarası Türk Halk Kültürü Kongresi Bildirileri*. Ankara: Devran Matbaası, 1992 (351-361).

²⁸ Mori Masao, 1981:75.

legitimate ruler as in China. In the steppe, different forms of power-sharing rather than absolutism were the norm. The Qaghans were kept in check and balance by the leadership (*beg*) who more and more tended to grow into aristocratic estates with elements of predestination. Eventually these developments brought a reaction from below.

This reaction came with the destruction of the Uighur empire by the Kyrgyz in 840. The Kyrgyz, who later in history never aspired to dominate others but insisted on their own independence and freedom, were forerunners in a period in which not empires but small states, kingdoms, and tribes ruled. This phenomenon which lasted until 1206 was evident even in the peripheries of Inner Asia: China and the Near East.²⁹

In the west, the Qarakhanids and the Seljuqs found new solutions under Islam with its emphasis on the equality of all believers. At about the same time, the Qarakhitai were asserting a non-Islamic multi-religious unity and rule. But all these were only partial solutions. After the tenth century Inner Asia remained partitioned, divided among small powers that competed among themselves. To the east of the Qarakhanids and the Qarakhitai were the Uighur, the Tangut (Hsi-hsia), the Liao, the Chin and the Sung. To the north of them were located the numerous tribes of Inner Asia. The west also can be seen under a similar light; here I am thinking of the Qipchaq, the Khazar, the Bulghar, the Rus and all the Crusading armies.

These localized forces all asserted their own identity both politically and, on the basis of this local identity and power, they also asserted themselves economically along the trade routes. In fact, they all competed in a spirit of coexistence over the newly (since Islam) established trade routes that led towards the centers of Islam in West Asia and to China in East Asia. The Muslim merchants gained precedence over others and spread their communities towards the east. The Qarakhitai, who after 1124 came to Central Asia with the support of the northern tribes, can be seen as the first organized reaction to these developments that had pushed the northern tribes to the periphery. In the wake of the thirteenth century, Muslim merchants searched for outlets that would combine wealth and power and thus provide stability to trade and trade routes and open up China trade for them.

Competition over trade routes and local appropriation of surplus trade pushed the tribal populations in the northern parts of Inner Asia to the periphery. Among the tribes there was no consensus on how to come to a solution. They were structurally different and had therefore different aims. Among these we can see two major types:

²⁹ Gumilev sees a desertification in the steppe and a desertion of the steppe by tribal people and says that in relation to 861-960 "the fact that the written sources mention no state on the territory of Mongolia in the tenth century is evidence of the formation here of desert." See his *Searches for an Imaginary Kingdom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987 (p. 63).

A. Tribes that had many chiefs: these wanted to retain the decentralized acephalous character as a system in which each small entity had individual access to resources and to political power. In other words, they supported redistribution of resources and sharing of political power (*ülüş* and *qubi*). Qonggirad, Ikires, Mangghud were examples of such tribes. In cases where there was a common leader, he headed the conglomeration of separate tribes without trying to bring structural changes to them. Such leaders were called Gür Khan, "Universal Khan." The anti-Caesars, Jamugha and Jaqa Gambu, the "Hidden Hero" of Chapter Three were such leaders.

B. This idea, however, was not shared among all tribes. The Kerait and the Naiman were organized in such a manner that they had hereditary leaders who called themselves *khan* and in whose kingdoms a limited process of centralization could be seen (central administration, military families). The Kerait, who later became the dominant group among the Kazakhs, were at this time known in the west through the legends of Prester John.

In the twelfth century the Kerait and the Naiman began to reassert themselves more and more in the Altai region, Mongolia and the frontiers of northern China to the dismay of the decentralized tribes.

It is out of this confrontation and conflict that Chinggis Khan emerged. This confrontation and conflict also provided the texture of the competitive atmosphere. By using the age-old method of establishing himself with a "retinue,"³⁰ he created his own polity as a third and overwhelmingly popular alternative. Turkish groups of Uighurs and Önggüds joined him in support of this alternative.³¹ Significantly, he was also joined by Muslim merchants.³² Thus two completely separate groups, dissatisfied members of tribes in Mongolia and Muslim merchants of Transoxiana, saw in him the man who would provide solutions to their problems.

In his army of conquest, comprising both features of equality and hierarchy, the more or less egalitarian tribes (Qonggirad, Ikires, Mangghud) with many leaders and the subject tribes (Barin, Süldüs, Jalayir) were incorporated into larger units so that their cohesion was partially maintained.

³⁰ Retinue is referred to as *bölüg* or *çete* in Turkish and *nöker>nökör* in Mongolian. The role of "retinue" in the state building process among the Turks and the Mongols has been discussed by Halil İnalcık, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* III/IV(1979-1980).445-466,450-451 and n.17. Cornell Fleischer's forthcoming study deals with the same issue in the context of sixteenth century Central Asia, "Companions to a King Errant: Babur and his Lieutenants to the Conquest of Kabul," a paper prepared for publication in Stephen F. Dale (ed.), *Babur and the Society and Culture of Central Asia*. For *bölüg* see Halil İnalcık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* I(1980).2:71-79.

³¹ See Morris Rossabi, "The Legacy of the Mongols," in Beatrice F. Manz (ed.), *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1994 (pp. 27 and 43, note. 2).

³² An illustration of this interest in the China trade is the presence of Muslim merchants like Jabar Qoje, that is Ja'far Khoja, among the early companions of young Temüjin. Francis Woodman Cleaves published a list of these early participants in his "The Historicity of the *Baljuna* Covenant," *HJAS* 18(1955).357-421.

They became the inner core units of the otherwise non-tribal army of conquest.³³ The tribes with hereditary rulers (Kerait, Naiman, Tatar) were scattered into different units.

The members of the army of conquest identified with the interests of the empire. Kinship lost its dynamic role in society, shed its political and economic components and became a social and cultural phenomenon. In China members of core units used their own names to replace their clan names. Although clans and tribes ceased to be dynamic elements in society, they remained as important elements of heritage and identity so that we almost always know from which tribe a specific person came. In other words, “tribalism,” the once dynamic element, was pushed into the background where it remained as a reserve identity. These universalistic trends were accompanied by the active participation of Muslim merchants in government and finance, who thus acquired wealth and power for themselves. In the tribal sphere these two (wealth and power) were not separated. Therefore, here in the tribal atmosphere of Mongolia, the Muslim merchants from Transoxiana found a fertile ground for their quest. As long as wealth and power remained intertwined, both members of the army (through success and booty) and the merchants pursued their own parochial interests. The articulation of these two parochial interests under the umbrella of supra-religious policies reinforced the universalist world order.

In their search for stability for the new order that they created, the Mongolian rulers and their Turco-Mongolian descendants, attempted to introduce monopolization of power to a people whose traditions had been shaped by power-sharing. However, to be able to achieve this end, they had to create a trade-off and this they did by increasing the redistributive “share” in economic terms. By the time of Möngke Qa’an the Mongols had created a separation between politics and economy. They then introduced a trade-off between politics and economy. Princes, notables and commanders could obtain greater shares by giving up political control. This development also effected the standing of Muslim merchants. As representatives of wealth they were deprived of their access to power channels. However, they remained as a force in the service of power, subordinated to power. As a next step, the political power of the members of the ruling class was divided up into military and civilian components, and only members of the dynasty retained hereditary rights of keeping power and wealth together—a development which was the anti-thesis of the “democratic” movement that had brought about the army of conquest. There was reaction to these developments on both fronts. In China, Muslim merchants were ousted violently by the increasing civil bureaucratic elements who favored separation of wealth

³³ For the non-tribal features of Chinggis Khan’s army of conquest see Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*. Berkeley: California University Press, 1987 (pp. 116-143 and 189-216).

from power and military from the civil (a basic view of Chinese political culture). On the Inner Asian front, on the other hand, the separation of wealth and power was the forerunner of the rift between the steppe and the sown. The subsequent separation of the civil from the military, deprived the people of the steppe of political and economic participation at the state level and precipitated the later retribalization movements. Yet basic redistributive rights in the economic sphere could not be tampered with because they were so much a part of the world view although there were some attempts to bring a change in that direction.

By the fourteenth century kinship had reemerged as a political factor, resulting in the formation of new tribes, the *ayimagh*. Although we see the formation of *ayimagh* (*oymak*³⁴ in Turkish) along the nomadic belt of Eurasia, it is mostly from China that we have detailed information on the formation of these groups. The formation of these new groups, that is the process of retribalization, was possible because the underlying principles of steppe society, redistributive economics and power-sharing politics, had not changed. It was on the basis of the redistributive world view and customary rights ingrained in the traditional system of kinship and inheritance that retribalization occurred. Retribalization in this case meant the acquisition of political rights and attaching to them the economic rights of the familial culture and the traditional world view. The prevalent feature of this time was not so much redistribution as the localization of political power which was shared within specific localities, whether mobile or fixed, tribal or urban, and expressed in a spiritual way. This process was repeated in so many different forms (tribal, urban, Sufi orders, merchant and artisan guilds) that we can say that it was shared as a common spirit on a macro scale. With the localization of political decision making, political centers were deprived of participants, a process which seems to have had its repercussions in the economic sphere as well. There were no centers trying to coordinate and dictate economic activities. As a result the flow of economic activities between the steppe and the sown changed. Instead of nomads coming to and pressuring markets, or establishing a hegemony over merchants, reducing or elevating them to state merchants or traders in encampment markets (*ordu bāzār*), now traders became itinerant merchants visiting nomadic communities. During this period of emancipation from the yoke of a central state power, we see these merchants trying new routes and “ways” of doing business in their affiliation with the Sufi orders called “way” (*tarīqa*) in Arabic.³⁵

³⁴ Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*. Vol. I. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963 (No.61, pp.182-186).

³⁵ Earlier in history the Sogdians had carried out similar activities. They were connected to a political entity, the city states of Sogdiana and their nobles. The itinerant merchants of the

Steppe society, on the other hand, regained its traditional political practices of power-sharing through redistributive rights in the economic sphere. This was not, however, a return to the earlier tribal days of the ninth to twelfth centuries. At this time after the thirteenth century ways parted in the steppe. As mentioned earlier the dividing factor was spiritual and religious. Under various denominations of Buddhism the proponents of stability gained the upper hand and resisted change. As a consequence aristocratic trends became dominant in a society where men became divided into nobles, commoners, retainers and dependents. Women, on the other hand, regained the power that they had lost under the “changes” of the thirteenth century.³⁶

Among the Inner Asians who opted for Islam, on the other hand, avenues of advancement and upward mobility were left open; eventually all became Turkish speaking. Thus we could say that the peoples of the steppes (the Muslim Turkish peoples)³⁷ retained the values that the Mongolian Empire had brought to them, in terms of an open society without nobility. For them the Mongolian Empire had served its purpose. Therefore, *jasagh*, the new order of the early Mongolian Empire, came to symbolize the confluence of political solutions under the ideology of an open society. In the post-Mongolian period, then, redistribution became the dominant economic mechanism in a society which stressed open advancement.³⁸ Thus, redistribution became an ideology with its economic, political and social components fully in place.

In the fourteenth century, retribalization removed populations from participation in a centralized society, creating a new localization of groups which involved new movements of people. Retribalization occurred concomitantly with many other developments:

1. Disenchantment with the trade-offs of the earlier order in which improvement in economic gains did not compensate for the lack of political control especially when economic gains took a negative trend.

fifteenth century and thereafter were not connected to political entities. They functioned within networks of spiritual communities that had innumerable connections across political boundaries.

³⁶ Isenbike Togan “Jealousy as an Impediment against Law and Order,” (forthcoming).

³⁷ Throughout this study in the articulation of Islam with Inner Asian societies the concept of “equality” is emphasized. When eventually these Muslim Inner Asians all ended up speaking Turkish, what was emphasized with Muslim Turkishness was the articulation of notions of hierarchy that were prevalent among Turkish speaking groups with equality. A forerunner of this articulation was the Mongolian Empire of Chinggis Khan which is examined in Chapter Four of this book. However, it was short-lived in contrast to the articulation under Islam.

³⁸ This they tried to do without interfering too much with the role that women played in the society. Yet from a women's perspective this period under Islam presents variations and problems.

2. Change of trade routes.
3. The Black Death which decimated populations.
4. A rejuvenation of Islam in the fourteenth century which led to massive conversions and to a more homogeneously Muslim population somewhat later a revival of Lamaistic Buddhism in the east. Thus the fates of Mongolian and Turkish speaking populations became separated by religious affiliations.
5. Retribalization also resulted in a re-segregation along nomad-sedentary, religious and linguistic lines.

This re-segregation, however, did not result in the dominance of one group over the other. On the contrary it was marked by coexistence, albeit in a somewhat competitive and fluid environment. This picture changed later with the establishment of regional empires when competitive units acquired more or less defined boundaries in the sixteenth century.

Retribalization had some negative effects on urban life as can be seen from the abandonment of urban sites. Yet as the institutionalization of the Sufi Orders (the aspect of institutionalization that I refer to as urban tribes) and the shelter and protection they provided to merchants show, after these developments, urban centers took on a definite character with merchant and artisan guilds, tombs and tomb complexes of Sufi masters and saints, and religious hostels.

On the whole, retribalization definitely had positive effects on political culture. This positive aspect, the impact of retribalization on political culture, was to be the most important and long lasting feature of Inner Asian civilization for Turkish speaking Muslims, both nomad and sedentary. By the impact on political culture I mean both the emphasis on redistribution and on power-sharing (*ülüşh, qubı*) with traditions of deliberation (*kengesh, quriltai*) for the individual members of the communities. Retribalization effected political culture in terms of the social origins of leadership; during this time we encounter people of non-aristocratic origins as leaders. This leadership, based on local roots, strove for coexistence with the old and the new and with each other so that local tribal leaders either governed outright or became the second shaft of the cart of governance, as illustrated by the statement of the Qarachu Beg of the Shirin (Crimea) to the Russian Tsar: "Are there not two shafts to a cart? The right shaft is my Lord, the Khan, the left shaft am I, with my brothers and children."³⁹

This resilience of the Inner Asian cultures and the flexibility they show in adapting themselves to circumstances and also in molding the circumstances to fit their own needs is the story of this book. We can only understand this flexibility in terms of the continuities of Inner Asian history. For this purpose three aspects are emphasized as continuities in Inner Asian history after the

³⁹ İsenbike Togan, "Altınordu Çözülürken."

thirteenth century: (1) notions of a “society of open advancement” for individuals, (2) power-sharing in the political sphere, and (3) “redistribution” not purely as an economic practice but as an ideology which would incorporate power-sharing and individual advancement. The argument is that it is the combination and the separation of these that created bottlenecks in Inner Asian history leading to alternating phases of universalism and localism.

In the localist order of the ninth to twelfth centuries there were power-sharing and redistribution but also aristocratic trends. This was also a time that was spiritually varied, rich and yet not antagonistic but coexistentialist. In the universalist order of the Mongolian Empire there was redistribution and open advancement but no power-sharing. This was not a spiritual but a more secular age. It is only after the retribalization movements in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries that the new Turco-Mongolian order under Islam achieved redistribution, power-sharing and open advancement at the same time, thus firmly establishing itself in ideological terms. All this happened during the localist phase. The expression of this articulation was characterized by strong religious overtones. Therefore our sources of this period are more of a hagiographic rather than “historical” nature. They do not tell us so much about the material side of life in its social, political and economic facets but speak more of the spiritual dimensions of life and of what people used to feel (rather than think) about these issues.

All these developments had their beginnings in the process starting with the competitive atmosphere of the tenth to twelfth centuries. The workings and the methods of the survivors and the victors of these competitions, the Mongolian Empire and later the Ottoman Empire following the Mongolian not only wiped out the hierarchical ordering of the former tribal world but also supplied the Turco-Mongolian world with two new dynasties and concepts of legitimacy and rule, replacing the former principles of rule by Heavenly origins. In other words one could say that there were three main dynasties in the history of the Turks: the pre-Chinggisid Ashina (*arsilan*), the Chinggisid and the Ottoman.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ The Mongols, on the other hand, continued with the Chinggisid line (to be exact, with the descendants of Khubilai). Later incarnations of Buddha as *qutughtu* took their place as parallel rulers. The Western Mongols (Zunghars) experimented with the clan of Chinggis Khan, i.e. the Borjigid. This experiment lasted for about a century and a half.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SETTING: PRELUDE TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

At the two ends of the “civilized” world, the Near East and China, the eleventh and twelfth centuries mark the time when, faced with many “foreigners” roaming in their regions, both of these societies, the Islamic and the Confucian, reached a consensus in their political ideology as to how to deal with them. These views were the culmination of the experiences of the two centuries from 900 to 1100. Parallel to these developments in political ideology we also witness an explosion of merchant activities as if any boundaries there might have been had been erased. In general, independent commercial activities were becoming a feature of these centuries with one major difference: under Islam they found new legitimization as “free trade.”¹

Under Confucianism no such venture can be seen. In China where ideology shaped power, neither political ideology nor politics was willing to come to grips with commercial activities. Commerce was thriving on its own without being sanctioned by ideology.² The situation was as described by James T. C. Liu:³

One may describe Sung China as having an absolutist head, a bureaucratic body, and many plebeian hands and feet. By and large, the bureaucratic ruling class imposed regulations on and took advantage of the economic progress. It would not allow merchants or merchant interests to have a strong voice in determining policies.

In comparison to earlier times, merchants under the Sung had become quite active and powerful. By the second half of the twelfth century, merchants had started to play a significant role in government monopolies. The attitude of the officials towards commerce changed from earlier condemnation to

¹ Baber Johansen, “The Bankrupter’s Contract,” a paper presented at the Center for the Study of Islamic Societies and Civilizations at Washington University at St. Louis, 1991.

² Shiba Yoshinobu, “Sung Foreign Trade: its Scope and Organization,” in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China Among Equals*. Berkeley: California University Press, 1983 (pp. 89-115) and Shiba Yoshinobu, *Commerce and Society in Sung China*. Translated by Marc Elvin Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1972.

The thriving of commerce under the Sung and how this effected the status of merchants and merchant families has been vividly described by Laurence J. C. Ma in his *Commercial Development and Urban Change in Sung China (960-1279)*. Michigan Geographical Publication No.6. Department of Geography, University of Michigan, 1971 (pp. 118-140).

³ James T. C. Liu, *China Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988 (p. viii).

approval. Bureaucrats also started to express sentiments such as “agriculture is the basis of the state, but commerce can bring wealth to the state.”⁴ In spite of these positive developments, neither the merchants nor the craftsmen formed a visible economic force; the latter were forced to serve the government and the former submissively cooperated with it.⁵ As a result they did not have a voice in governmental decision making processes.⁶

Inner Asia, on the other hand, was rampant with issues of diversity. Over the previous 200 years the region had witnessed massive migrations, mostly from east to west but also from west to east. Many people had become mobile, unattached and settled elsewhere. In Inner Asia itself there were many local solutions to each issue. This diversity can be seen in terms of political formations, religions, languages and ethnic groups.⁷ Nothing was settled, no political ideology was ruling; there was only coexistence, but the main feature of coexistence was to keep balances between different interest groups, inside as well as with the outside. When the balancing mechanisms failed, there was dissatisfaction in Inner Asia; we see this both in Muslim Central Asia (western Inner Asia) and Eastern Turkestan (the Tarim Basin) and in Mongolia (eastern Inner Asia). In the western part dissatisfaction came from Muslim merchants,⁸ in the east from tribesmen. The former reacted against a general instability that was blocking the way to the markets

⁴ Ma, 1971:137 and 125.

⁵ Ma, 1971:137 and 127.

⁶ There is no consensus among China scholars in the United States on these issues. While some like James T. C. Liu consider the state as restricting merchant activities, others like Lynda Shaffer, George Hatch and James Shih are very critical of Liu and other scholars whose view of merchants and trade in China does not reflect the complexities of the Chinese situation. Lynda Shaffer says that “western educated China scholars’ view of merchants and trade in China was colored by the nineteenth century ‘free trade’ crusade of the opium dealers. Because the Chinese government was so obstinate with western shippers, China scholars assume that the government was obstinate with its own merchants on all fronts” (letter dated Jan 5, 1993). James Shih, on the other hand, maintains that a large amount of commercial transaction was carried out by people as part of daily life and that they are not taken into consideration when one deals with restrictions against merchants in the literature (personal communication).

My concern here is to point out differences between China, Inner Asia and the Muslim Near East in the twelfth century. Merchant participation in politics was not an issue in twelfth century China. This continued to be the case and merchant power met great resistance in the thirteenth century.

⁷ Peter Golden in his article on the “The Karakhanids and Early Islam,” in Denis Sinor (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*. Cambridge University Press, 1990 (pp. 343-370) gives a good illustration of this diversity.

⁸ Muslim merchants had connections everywhere in Asia. Barthold says. “In the 12th century representatives of the Muslim military caste were to be found in the service both of the Polovtsian khans in Southern Russia and of the Manchurian rulers in Northern China.” V.V. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*. Transl. by V. and T. Minorsky. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962 (Vol. I: 31).

Recent studies on the Muslim merchants in collaboration with the Mongols are: İ. Togan (1984), Allsen (1989) and Endicott-West (1989).

of China. The tribesmen, on the other hand, reacted to the rigid stratification of the society that was blocking local leadership and decision making.

The Mongols emerged in the thirteenth century with a universalist approach to these local problems. They did this first by transforming neutral, unaffiliated Muslim merchants into partners and by providing them with tools of political participation. Second, they introduced conscription (Chapter Four) to the populations on the move being discussed in Chapters Two and Three. In achieving this end, they did not tamper with the diversity of belief systems, languages, peoples; instead they placed their own dynastic tradition above everything and everybody. This dynastic tradition was supported by the formerly tribal people who were now reorganized into an army of conquest in which advancement was open to talent. The Mongols called this universalist approach to world order *jasagh* (Chapter Four). When the universalist approach outlived itself in terms of its goals, again local solutions became supreme in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries at a time when the Muslim merchants also found a solution of a more permanent nature under the aegis of Sufi brotherhoods that functioned like “urban tribes.”⁹

Leaving the details of these developments to the following chapters, in the present chapter, I will present a general picture leading to these developments in Inner Asia as a study of merchants who traveled to foreign countries and of “foreigners” (tribesmen) migrating into settled regions. This brief story is, in the end, the story of the Muslim merchant in Inner Asia. We see the changes involving the merchants and trade starting with the Islamic conquests in Central Asia when (i) the Sogdian merchants gave way to Muslim traders in the west (ii) the Uighurs used of this change to their own advantage (iii) and Inner Asia was divided into two along religious lines, the Muslim and the infidel. The Qarakhitai pushed into Muslim Central Asia as a non-Muslim political power, providing an access to non-Muslim traders, the Uighurs. The Qarakhitai were both foreigners and non-Muslims, and as such they were never incorporated into the political pantheon of the historians.¹⁰ Therefore, it was not the non-Muslim Qarakhitai but the Muslim Qarakhaniids, themselves partially foreigners, who brought practical solutions to government and trade. These solutions can only be appreciated against a background of the Chinese and Islamic ideas about foreigners and

⁹ The closest description of “urban tribes” is in the form of *fāʾifa* rendered as “faction” by Roy Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. Lately Jürgen Paul has applied this concept of faction to the Naqshbandiyya at the time of Khoja Ahrār “Forming a Faction: The *Himāyat* System of Khwaja Ahrar” *IJMES* 23(Nov. 1991):4:533-548. See also his recent book, *Die politische und soziale Bedeutung der Naqshbandiyya in Mittelasien im 15. Jahrhundert*. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991.

¹⁰ The Mongolian conquests will change this picture as we see from Juvainī and Rashīd al-Dīn in the west and early Ming historians in the east.

government and of the general trends in the twelfth century. The Qarakhanid solutions to government, emphasizing power-sharing and redistribution, were inadequate in the presence of aristocratic trends reinforcing localism, increasing regional rivalry and bringing about a general instability. It was also this general instability, which blocked trade with China, that brought the Muslim merchants into action to join the Mongols on the eve of the thirteenth century.

On the Continent: Sogdians give way to Muslim traders

In the vast regions of the Eurasian continent, the major link between various points had always been trade. Trade was under constant pressure as far as trade routes and traders were concerned. For a long time trade was concentrated in the hands of the Sogdian merchants¹¹ who carried on the trade between China, India, Iran and the Roman west. Their bases were the city states along the western part of the Silk Route, which had come into being as a result of the efforts of many unknown merchants. As independent merchants of small Zoroastrian and Manichaean colonies they handled the transportation of goods and conducted the transactions. "Divided into principalities, the Sogdians never felt the need for an imperialist state ..." ¹² Contemporary studies have likened their social organization both to the city states of ancient Greece and to European feudalism.¹³ All of these descriptions speak of a society that was not centralized, a feature that is also displayed by the

¹¹ There is no special study in English on the activities of the Sogdian merchants. It is still a task ahead of us. There are references at *passim* in works dealing with this early period. For such a description see Hans Wilhelm Haussig, *Die Geschichte Zentralasiens und der Seidenstrasse in vorislamischer Zeit*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, 1983.

Still the best descriptions are to be attained from published source material such as: Olaf Hansen, *Berliner sogdische Texte II. Bruchstücke der grossen Sammelhandschrift C 2*. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 1954. Nr. 15. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1954; Hans Reichelt, *Die sogdischen Handschriftenreste des Britischen Museums*. In Umschrift und mit Übersetzung. II. Teil. *Die nicht-buddhistischen Texte*. Mit 9 Tafeln und Nachtrag zu den buddhistischen Texten. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1931; J. Harmatta, (ed.), *Prolegomena to the Sources on the History of Pre-Islamic Central Asia*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1979; W. Sundermann, "Die mittelpersischen und parthischen Turfantexte als Quellen zur Geschichte des vorislamischen Zentralasiens," in J. Harmatta, *Prolegomena*, pp.143-151; J. Harmatta, "Sogdian Sources for the History of Pre-Islamic Central Asia," in J. Harmatta, *Prolegomena*, pp.153-165.

For the references of Sogdian texts I am indebted to Professor Şinasi Tekin. The following studies on the archeology and art of that period are indispensable: Guitty Azarpay (ed.), *Sogdian Painting. The Pictorial Epic in Oriental Art*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981; A.M. Belenitzki, *Mittelasien. Kunst der Sogden*, Leipzig: Veb E.A. Seeman Buch- und Kunstverlag, 1980.

¹² "Central Asia: the Archeological Background," in James Hughes (ed.), *The World Atlas of Archeology* (English translation of *Le Grand Atlas de l'archéologie*). New York: Portland House, 1985 (p. 234).

¹³ Guitty Azarpay, 1981:19-26.

structure of the excavated cities like Penjikent and Afrasyāb.¹⁴ The society on the whole was also divided into nobles, merchants who sometimes are also referred to as “merchant-princes,”¹⁵ and commoners. The Sogdian merchants were the masters of intercontinental trade. The city states around the Tarim Basin on the other hand were inhabited by indigenous populations with their own itinerant merchants. They were in closer connection with India and Buddhism played a major role in these cities. However it was the Sogdians from Transoxiana who introduced their cultural and religious preferences into the steppe.

Because the steppe people were widely scattered, it made much more sense for the merchants to deal with groups who could handle the collection and the redistribution of the trade goods. As these goods were in general luxury items, the groups the merchants would encounter were the ruling elite of the steppe who played a major role in encounters with the outside world. These leaders had control over the pooling and redistribution of goods. Thus through these contacts, Manichaeism and Buddhism had already made their appearance among the elite in the steppe when Islam was introduced in the west.¹⁶ By this time the empire of the Early Türk (550-744) which extended from the north of China to the north of Byzantium had broken up and control of transcontinental trade was divided between three different Turkic speaking groups: the Oghuz, the Qarluq and the Uighurs.¹⁷

However, the trade routes, which had acquired a northerly shift under the auspices of the Turkish Empire, retained their northerly interest, followed by the spread of new religions: Judaism north of the Caspian among the well-known Jewish Khazars and Nestorian Christianity among the not so well-known Ghuzz or Oghuz. Christianity gradually spread in the ensuing centuries to the peoples inhabiting the regions to the east of them, from the Seven Rivers Region (Jetisu) to Lake Baikal in Mongolia and the Ordos region to the south.¹⁸

¹⁴ Azarpay, 1981:21 and A. M. Belenitzki, 1980 and L. I. Al'baum, *Jivopis' Afrasiaba*. Tashkent, 1975.

¹⁵ Christopher I. Beckwith, 1987:67 n. 78.

¹⁶ Peter Golden, 1990:349, 343-353.

¹⁷ The Oghuz (the Ghuzz) were located between the Caspian and Isfijāb (present Chimkent in Kazakhstan), the Qarluq near Ferghane as far as 30 days to the east of it and the Toquzoghuz/Uighur in the east, in present Mongolia.

¹⁸ Christianity was spread among the Kimek in the Altai, and among the Naiman, Kerait in Mongolia. The Christian al-Shariyya (the Salur), the Qun and the later Önggüd were all in the Ordos region. For a recent treatment of the subject see Haussig, 1983:219-231 and pp. 280-281. However W. Barthold, *Zur Geschichte Christentums in Mittel-Asien bis zur mongolischen Eroberung*. Tübingen und Leipzig, 1901 and P. Pelliot, “Chrétien d'Asie Centrale,” *2e sér XV TP* (1914).623-644 are the classic studies on Christianity in Inner Asia. Also V. Minorsky (ed.), *Sharaf al-Zamān Ṭāhir Marvazī on China, the Turks and India*. London, 1942. contains very important information on the tenth to twelfth centuries.

Then in the middle of the eighth century a new commercial power rose in the west: the Abbasids. Islam was from the beginning closely related to commercial circles in Mecca that had been in the midst of the trade routes which ran between India, Yemen and the Near East. The rise of the Abbasids as a political power with strong commercial interests resulted in the emergence of new centers that had important consequences for the flow of trade. This was especially visible in the Indian-African sea trade. Not only were the Yemenites eliminated from political participation, but Yemen itself became peripheral. The African trade shifted from the sea to overland. In this case North Africa became the transit route and Egypt was at the crossroads of this trade.¹⁹

In Africa and in Asia the new trade routes were accompanied by the spread of the new creed. As Islam has never been only a system of beliefs but has a judicio-religious community as its base, soon these communities were accompanied by political structures embodying Islam. This was especially important for the merchants who under an Islamic polity would be liable to a toll amounting to the 2.5% of the value of their merchandise, whereas non-Muslims would be liable to a 5% tax.²⁰ The tolls for the Muslims were based on the practice of paying alms (*zakāt*) to the needy.²¹

Under the Abbasids the frontiers of Islam expanded further to the east. Central Asia came under Arab rule. Although at the beginning some of the Sogdian merchant princes joined the Arabs by converting to Islam, the two groups could not get along.²² Eventually in 721 some Sogdian nobles who renounced Islam started a revolt with Türgish²³ support; this revolt was crushed in 722 to be able to maintain Arab control in Transoxiana. "Three to seven thousand nobles and commoners" were killed. "Only the merchants were spared, for 'with them was immense wealth which they had brought from China'."²⁴ Sogdian merchants gradually lost their place to the Muslim merchants who started to frequent the new routes. These routes, connecting India with Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, were soon occupied by the Muslim dynasties of the Samanids (892-999), the Ghaznavids (997-1186), the Qara-

¹⁹ R. Rodvink, *Historical Atlas of the Muslim Peoples*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957 (pp. 16-17).

²⁰ See S. D. Goitein, "Rise of Middle Eastern Bourgeoisie in Early Islamic Times," in *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968 (p.232). Originally published in *Journal of World History* 3(1957).583-604.

²¹ See Joseph Schacht, "Zakāt," in *Encyclopedia of Islam* Vol. 8 (pp. 1202-5).

²² Beckwith, 1987:67.

²³ The Türgish were a new alliance that had materialized towards the end of the seventh century; these Turkish tribes had taken control of the Western Turkish lands (Beckwith, 1987:62 and 84-107).

²⁴ Beckwith, 1987: 94 and n.55.

khanids (840-1212) and the Ghurids.²⁵ While on the western end Byzantium was gradually being replaced by the Seljuq Empire in Asia Minor, the China trade had not yet passed into Muslim hands, nor would it in the near future.

In the west the Volga Bulgars had converted to Islam in the ninth²⁶ century so that a part of the fur trade was now in Muslim hands.²⁷ In the east, a great deal of the fur trade was still concentrated to the north and north east of the Tianshan range and remained in non-Muslim hands. Muslim geography from the middle of the ninth century²⁸ down to the thirteenth century devoted a great deal of attention to these remote 'regions of the world' always emphasizing information on the trading interests of the inhabitants and the available products.²⁹ With this kind of information a great deal of the northern trade could be diverted through new routes³⁰ into Muslim Khorezmia, Transoxiana and then to the Near East. Until the twelfth century, the frontiers of Islam ran somewhat through the middle of the Tianshan range, the west being inhabited by the Muslim Qarakhanids, and Qarluq, and the east inhabited by the Uighur and the so-called Kāfir Turks.³¹

On the Steppe: the Uighurs replace the Sogdians in the east

The Kāfir Turks, i.e. the infidel Turks as they were called by the Muslim historians of the time, were in some cases unspecified Christian or shamanistic tribal groups who appeared in waves at the eastern gates of the Qarakhanids. Other Kāfir Turks were the descendants of the Manichaeo-Buddhistic Uighurs, some of whom were also Christian now,³² who had built a strong empire (744-840) on the northeastern end of the transcontinental trade routes.³³ It is noteworthy that shortly after the destruction of the Transoxianan strongholds (722 AD) of their Sogdian merchants, the Eastern

²⁵ For the Ghurids who were established on the borderlands between India and Inner Asia see C. E. Bosworth, "Ghūrīds," in *EP*, Vol. II (pp. 1099-1106) and the local account by Jūzjānī by Major H. G. Raverty (trans.), *Tabakat-i naṣiri: A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia by the Maulāna, Minhāj-ud-Dīn, Abū-ʿUmar ʿUsmān*. 2 vols. London, 1881 (Vol. I: 300-507).

²⁶ Zeki Velidi Togan, 1970 (2nd. edition): 58.

²⁷ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Ibn Faḍlān's Reisebericht*. Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, 1939.

²⁸ For examples, Ibn Khūrdāzbeh who around 840 A.D. wrote his *Kitāb-i Masālik vaʾl-mamālik* ("Book of Roads and Countries"), published by de Goeje in abbreviated form in 1889 as *Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum*.

²⁹ In this regard one need only compare the contents of Marvazī's (see Minorsky, 1942) chapters on India, Ethiopians, Turks and China.

³⁰ Barthold, 1901:17-18; Golden, 1990:349-350.

³¹ Minorsky, 1942:14-18. Sultan Sanjar in a letter of July 1133, speaks of the Kāfir who had come "from the farthestmost part of Turkestan." See Barthold, 1962, I:27.

³² Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*. 4th ed. Philadelphia, Penn.: E. J. G. Gibb Memorial Trust, 1968: 388 from Carpini.

³³ See Colin Mackerras's overview, "Uighurs," in Denis Sinor (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*. Cambridge University Press 1990 (pp. 317-342).

Turkish Empire came to an end. Driving the last ruler of the Eastern Turks from the Mongolian steppes, the Uighurs held the strategically important region centered around the sacred Ötüken mountains (744 A.D.).³⁴ Having lost Transoxiana and the Sogdian connections in the west to the Arabs, the Uighurs' attention was focused in the east; shortly after the establishment of their rule they became involved in the politics of China. By giving assistance to the T'ang Dynasty in pacifying the An Lu-shan rebellion, they became firmly established as the military power on which China was dependent. Consequently they were also able to dictate the terms of commercial relations. In these dealings they continued to make use of the Sogdians who had settled in these regions under the Turkish rule.³⁵ However, they were not only engaged in active commerce with China—the silk and horse trade—they were also handsomely located as far as the fur and musk trade was concerned. The Uighurs seemed even to hold a monopoly on the musk trade. We know that sometime in the second half of the ninth century Arab merchants were traveling from Kucha to the then Kyrghyz capital at the sources of the Yenisey. This was a route used also by the Tibetans. On their way back, for fear of the raids of the Uighurs, these merchants had to be escorted by the Kyrghyz down to the Qarluq country in the Seven Rivers Region.³⁶ Later in 840 the Kyrghyz destroyed the Uighur Empire and occupied their country. However they did not show an interest in attracting traders.³⁷ Thereafter these areas, which later became known as Mongolia, did not witness any strong political rule. They had been an administrative center and an end station for traders but they developed into a peripheral area where only sporadic visits of traders were to be seen. However, even these visits were not without results as we will see.

From the populations dispersed after the fall of the Uighur Empire, some of the Uighurs migrated to the southwest and settled around Turfan and Gansu.³⁸ They continued to use their old trading networks, became settled and came to control the China trade. They were joined by other anti-Muslim

³⁴ For the importance of Ötüken for imperial formations see Larry W. Moses "A Theoretical Approach to the Process of Inner Asian Confederation," *Études Mongoles* 5(1976):113-122.

³⁵ Edwin G. Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," *TP* 41(1952):317-356.

³⁶ Barthold, 1901:17,39. Ts'ai Wen-shen, *Li Te-yü'nün Mektuplarına göre Uyğurlar*. Taipei, 1967 (p.42).

³⁷ Thomas J. Barfield, 1989.

³⁸ For the Kan-chou Uighurs see Elizabeth Pinks, *Die Uiguren von Kan-chou in der Frühen Sung-Zeit (960-1028)*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1968 and Gülçin Çandarlıoğlu, *Sarı Uyğurlar ve Kansu Bölgesi Kabileleri*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Istanbul, Faculty of Letters, History Department. Istanbul, 1967. The Turfan Uighurs had been studied by Annemarie v. Gabain, *Das uigurische Königreich von Chotscho 850-1250*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1961. See also Emel Esin, *Antecedents and Development of Buddhist and Manichean Turkish Art in Eastern Turkestan and Kansu*. Handbook of the Turkish Culture, Supplement to Volume II, Istanbul, 1967.

Turkish groups who had migrated from the west, because they were against circumcision according to one account.³⁹ The lands of these Uighur groups were regarded by Muslim geographers as parts of China.⁴⁰

In fact, the most easterly of them, the Gansu Uighurs developed friendly relations with the new northern Chinese powers, the Kitan⁴¹ (the Liao Dynasty (907-1124) with whom they were also related by marriage ties. All these trading Uighur principalities retained their hold on the China trade up to the thirteenth century. This is a sign of remarkable stability in a period which was full of strife and in a region that was at the crossroads of tribal migrations. With the establishment of a new political power in each century, there was a new redistribution of rights and privileges in pasture lands, and some of the non-privileged groups were left out of redistribution. After the migration of the Uighurs in 840 each century saw a wave of migration from the east to the west. But in spite of the dislocation of many groups around them, the Uighurs retained the position they had secured at the beginning of the tenth century. We know that the Kitans after ousting the Kyrghyz from Mongolia invited the Uighurs back to their homeland, but the latter declined the offer and remained in their new homeland.⁴² Having lost their Sogdian connections to the west, their old homeland did not present any new prospects, whereas in their new homeland they were able to cultivate both the Sogdian and the Chinese connections. With their Kitan (Liao) connections the Uighurs were increasingly replacing the Sogdians in the east as traders. But apparently they themselves encountered difficulties in traveling into Muslim lands until the rule of the Qarakhitai in the twelfth century, as all accounts speak of Muslim merchants visiting their lands but not visa versa.⁴³ Furthermore, we know that in 1027, an Uighur ruler sent a letter to Maḥmūd of Ghazne asking for friendship and good relations. However he received an unfavorable answer referring to the difference in religions. Marvazī, our source, says further “moved as he was by his strong believe in Islam, he did not find it possible to grant what was requested with regard to the establishment of sincere relations and correspondence and he dismissed the envoys, saying to them: ‘Peace and truce are possible only so far as to prevent war and fighting. There is no faith uniting us that we should be in close relations. Great distances create security for both of us against any perfidy. I have no

³⁹ These were the al-Shari of Marvazī, also known as Basmil by the name of their chief (Minorsky, 1942:19). See also for the Salur<Salar in Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar (810-1212) Ders Notları*. Istanbul, 1966-67 (mimeograph) p.20, also pp. 48-49. Minorsky, 1942: 18-20. Other Kāfir Turks were the ancestors of the Kerait, the Naiman who bore Uighur titles even in the twelfth century.

⁴⁰ Minorsky, 1942: 18-20.

⁴¹ For a brief overview see Herbert Franke, 1990: 400-410.

⁴² Minorsky, 1942:78-79.

⁴³ Minorsky, 1942:14-29.

need of close relations with you until you accept Islam. And that is all.”⁴⁴ Although this was not an attitude shared by all Muslim rulers and marriage connections had been established between the Liao and the Qarakhanids,⁴⁵ the Uighur-Ghaznavid encounter is illustrative of the difficulties that the Uighurs were facing as on-Muslims.

Increased Localism and Competition

By the beginning of the twelfth century political power in East Asia and the eastern parts of Inner Asia was localized as in the preceding centuries, and, as such, diverse. The Near East as well as Central Asia was increasingly coming under the rule of the Seljuqs, who were previously of the nomadic Ghuzz and who had converted to Islam.⁴⁶

The new localism of East Asia brought about competition over resources, both natural and commercial. It seems that competition never extended to manpower, as evidenced by the waves of migration. A new redistribution of resources left some people out of the race. They had no recourse but to migrate and create for themselves a new world. By the beginning of the tenth century this competitive and unstable situation extended into China. The glorious T'ang rule came to an end. The brief Five Dynasties period (907-960) symbolizing the disruption of stability was followed by the Sung (960-1126) in the south and the proto-Mongolian Kitan in the north who extended their rule far into Mongolia. With the establishment of a new power on the frontiers of traditional China some of the tribes in this area were pushed out as we learn from the accounts of the Muslim geographers who encountered these people in their new habitats in the west.⁴⁷

Meanwhile a new political power emerged on the fringes of the China trade, interfering with the Uighur monopoly of this eastern trade. This was the Hsi-hsia/Tangut state which came into being to the west of the Yellow River around 982 but was formalized as a state and dynasty in 1032.⁴⁸ By 1029 the Yellow Uighurs (Shira Yugur) in the Gansu region had to succumb to Tangut supremacy.⁴⁹ The establishment of the Tangut state in a key position in terms of the China trade did not change the direction of the trade

⁴⁴ Minorsky, 1942:20 and see also pp. 76-79 for Minorsky's comments.

⁴⁵ Minorsky, 1942:20.

⁴⁶ Seljuqs in Central Asia are briefly discussed by Peter Golden 1990: 361-370.

⁴⁷ For instance the Qay as mentioned by Marvazī (Minorsky, 1942:30).

⁴⁸ The Kingdom of the Tanguts or the Hsi-hsia was founded in 1032 in the Alashan and Gansu region. But the foundation was preceded by a period of early consolidation from 982 on. The name of the founder of the dynasty was Li Yüan-hao. The capital was Hsing-ch'ing, in the present Ningxia, Peoples Republic of China (PRC). See Ruth Wilton Dunnell, "*Tanguts and the Tangut State of Ta Hsia*." Ph.D. Dissertation. Princeton, 1983. The Tangut kingdom was finally destroyed by Chinggis Khan in 1227.

⁴⁹ Minorsky, 1942:73.

routes; it only legitimized squeezing the wealthy Uighur merchants who had to pass through Tangut territory in their commercial pursuits. "Merchants from the Tarim Basin traveled north through the Liao territory, or south to Ch'ing-t'ang (Hsi-ning), bypassing Ho-hsi"⁵⁰ in order to evade the Tanguts. When the Tanguts who were an admixture of diverse elements of Tibetan, Turkish and Mongolian stock⁵¹ established themselves west of the Yellow River (the Qasi, or Ho-hsi), they forced the Qun (of the Qipchaq group) to migrate to the north of Khorezmia and to the Qipchaq steppes, a region named after them.⁵² Muslim geographers tell us that the Qun were Christians when they left these regions. The Christian influence in the Ordos region continued into later centuries, as evident from the thirteenth century Nestorian Önggüds, allies of Chinggis Khan.⁵³ After the establishment of the Tangut state the close relationship that had existed for more than a century and a half between the Uighurs and the Kitan court was cut off by the Tangut. In addition, Kitan rule encountered a severe blow from the Jürchen, who emerged in 1115 with a new dynasty, the Chin, which would last until 1234.

The non-Muslim Qarakhitai Push into Muslim Central Asia

These developments led to the flight of Yeh-lü Ta-shih (1124), a member of the Kitan ruling family, to the west and to the subsequent rise of the Qarakhitai in Central Asia (1131). Yeh-lü Ta-shih was heartily supported by at least eighteen of the northern tribes who were not satisfied with the new redistribution of resources under the Chin. The White Tatars⁵⁴ of whom the Nestorian Önggüd were a part, were the first to rally to the side of Yeh-lü

⁵⁰ Dunnell, 1983:110. The relationships between the Liao and the Uighur, the Tangut and the Sung and how these effected trade and commerce have been vividly portrayed by Ruth Dunnell in her work (1983). This is an indispensable work for the understanding of the multi-centered imperial order of East Asia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

⁵¹ Dunnell, 1983:40, 48, 16-62. At this juncture it is appropriate to note that Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī refers to "Tübüt" (Tibetans) as a large tribe in the lands of the Turks. He further says that "they are bordered on the East by Šīn, on the west by Qišmīr, on the north by Uighur, and on the south by the Indian Sea." Robert Dankoff and James Kelly, *Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī. Compendium of the Turkic Dialects*. 3 vols. Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures: 7. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982 (Vol. I: 276, No. 179). However, as Ruth Dunnell shows the Tübüt were the earlier "Toba" (Dunnell, 1983:36-50). See also William Woodville Rockhill, *The Journey of William Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World, 1253-1255*. London, 1900 (p.150).

⁵² These migrations have been studied by P. Pelliot in "À propos des Comans," *JA* I (1920). 125-185. See also Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, pp. 25-27, 29-30.

Moreover they seem to be responsible for the migration of 'seven kings with 700,000 horsemen' in 1046 who came into the Kashghar region by way of Tibet via Khotan. This information comes from a Syriac chronicle quoted in Bar Haebreus. See Gustav Oppert, *Der Presbyter Johannes in Saga und Geschichte*. Berlin, 1864 (p. 91).

⁵³ See P. Pelliot, "Chrétien d'Asie Centrale et d'extrême orient," *T'oung Pao* 15(1914). 622-644.

⁵⁴ See Chapter Four below.

Ta-shih with active support. Their leader demonstrated his support by presenting Yeh-lü Ta-shih with 400 horses, 20 camels and 1000 sheep.⁵⁵ Their relationship was so friendly that the Tatars refused to sell horses to Chin China.⁵⁶ The eighteen tribes who seem to extend far into Mongolia, contributed 10,000 well-trained soldiers.⁵⁷ The new ruler who in 1124 had escaped from his homeland with 200 horsemen was by 1129 already in possession of an army. In the meantime he had adopted the title of 'universal ruler' (Gür Khan) indicating the cosmopolitan character of his subjects.⁵⁸ The support of the tribes did not only stem from their dislike of the Chin. They had been promised by the new Gür Khan that he would make the riches of the west available to them. He had "proclaimed his intention of turning westward and rallying the various barbarian peoples to his assistance in order to defy the enemy [Chin] and regain his old territory [Liao]."⁵⁹ A year later the same promise was extended to the Uighurs when the Gür Khan wanted to pass through their territory on his way to the west. The Uighur ruler in his turn "welcomed him in his residence where the guests feasted for three days. On the occasion of Yeh-lü Ta-shih's departure the ruler offered him 600 horses, 100 camels and 3,000 sheep. He also delivered some of his descendants as hostages and accompanied him beyond the borders of his country."⁶⁰ The Uighurs of Qocho were careful not to take sides, in order not to sever their relationship with the Chin and later in 1131 delivered to the Chin some of Yeh-lü Ta-shih's fighters whom they had captured.⁶¹

The detailed account given above is to illustrate that the Qarakhitai adventurer Yeh-lü Ta-shih moved into the west with the support of the northern tribes. When we consider that at his strongest, he could muster at the most 50,000 men and in general 30,000 well trained men, we can see that this support was substantial although we should not take these numbers literally.⁶² However, we know that he was joined by the Qarluqs⁶³ who invited

⁵⁵ Their leader's name was Chonggur. The *Liao shih* speaks of White Tatars. Their location is given as Qara Müren, 200 *li* north of the former Öld Banner. Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, *History of Chinese Society. Liao (907-1125)*. New York, 1949 (p. 631 and notes 13,15).

⁵⁶ This happened in 1127. Upon an inquiry the Tatars sent their heir apparent to Yün-chung where he was detained. Only after that did the Tatars promise to guide the Chin forces if their heir apparent was returned. Wittfogel, 1949: 633.

⁵⁷ Wittfogel, 1949:635.

⁵⁸ See Chapter Three note 64.

⁵⁹ Wittfogel, 1949: 635.

⁶⁰ Wittfogel, 1949:635-636.

⁶¹ Wittfogel, 1949:636.

⁶² In most of our sources from this time we encounter forces of 30,000, sometimes also of 50,000, 13,000. Ruth Dunnell's study on the Tanguts show that the Tanguts were using a different number system. Their military units were 3, 13, 30, 50, 100, 150, 300. This system is based on 3 and 5. For the use of a system based on "3" among the tribal Oghuz see Z. V. Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p.47 and Minorsky, 1942: 29.

him into Transoxiana, because they were angry with the anti-tribal politics of Sultan Sanjar of the Seljuqs.⁶⁴ Joining forces with Yeh-lü Ta-shih was surely a prelude to the developments in the thirteenth century. It was perhaps the initial reaction of a people who felt that they were too much on the periphery of the turn that commercial activities were taking. The main thrust of commercial activities was coming from western Central Asia dominated by Muslim merchants who increasingly were operating under the patronage of Muslim Seljuqs and Qarakhanids. The Qarakhitai were pushing west as a non-Muslim power. They were successful in defeating the Seljuqs in 1141 in Qatwān. In spite of this victory, the hopes of the tribesmen who accompanied Yeh-lü Ta-shih in relation to partaking of the spoils of the west seem to have been short-lived. According to the scanty information we have, the tribes were under the tribal 'administration of the Gür Khan'.⁶⁵ Actually they were, on the whole, left to themselves. There seems to be no reason to assume a continuation of ties of subordination and administration. It seems that only the Uighur merchants could make use of the friendship they had established with Yeh-lü Ta-shih on his way to the west and frequent his domains.

The Tianshan mountains cut across the heart of Inner Asia dividing it into two distinct parts. The south, variously referred to also as the Tarim Basin, offered only one ecological use: oasis agriculture. The area north of the Tianshan, on the other hand, was suitable both for agriculture and animal husbandry. This was one of the original homelands of pastoral nomadism in terms of historical evolution. The competition that this area witnessed between agriculture and pastoral nomadism could only be resolved by power. Before the zenith of nomadic power, the time of the Mongolian conquests, there was never a clear domination of one over the other; there was a

The decimal system (the two hands) had been used in the steppe as a basis of army units of 10, 100, 1000, 10,000 since the Hsiung-nu. The Hsiung-nu employed an organization of tribal forces around a central government in terms of 4 (from 4 sides) and 12 and 24. Here, of course 3 plays an indirect role. In the twelfth century we see these two systems coexisting at the same time. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Chinggis Khan seems to have used the system of "3" in the tribal days and later after the establishment of the state, the decimal system. See also further below note 46 in Chapter Four.

⁶³ The Qarluqs were one of the 3 tribes that revolted against the Turks. After the fall of the Turkish Empire and the establishment of the Uighur Empire, the Qarluqs migrated in 745 (Beckwith, 1987:126 and n. 113) from their homelands in the Altai Region to the west and occupied the Seven Rivers Region (Jetisu). There the Qarluqs were in close collaboration with the Kyrgyz against the Uighur and had made an effort to divert the horizontally running trade routes to a more vertical slant, as we saw in the case of Arab and Tibetan merchants. Although they were not alone in this endeavor and were heartily supported by the partly Christian Ghuzz to the west of their habitat and the Kimek in the east (Altai region), the ensuing Kyrgyz conquest of the central lands belonging to the Uighurs slowed down these efforts. For a recent account of the Qarluqs see Golden, 1990:349-351; see also O. Pritsak, "Von den Karluk zu den Karakhaniden," *ZDMG* 101(1951).270-300.

⁶⁴ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p.90.

⁶⁵ Wittfogel and Feng, 1949.

pattern of coexistence. In the centuries preceding the Mongolian conquests, the pendulum seemed to swing more in favor of small kingdoms and principalities which associated themselves with sedentary interests. At the beginning of the twelfth century the overall picture showed a fragmented political structure consisting of principalities under Qarakhanid, Qarluq leadership in the west and under the Uighur Kingdoms of Beshbaliq and Qocho in the east. This fragmented picture was matched by the city states south of the Tianshan which were either independent or under Uighur or Qarakhanid suzerainty.

This fragmentation was brought to an end by the conquests of the Qarakhitai who had established themselves north of the Tianshan. Given the military technology of the time, the north was strategically more important than the south primarily because the south could not sustain an army based on cavalry. There was neither room nor resources to maintain a cavalry or an army based on pastoral nomads in the south.

The Qarakhitai proved themselves for and not against the agricultural use of the region. In fact, during their rule they intensified agricultural use in the region, a fact visible from irrigation canals that existed even during the time of Möngke Qa'an (1251-1259).⁶⁶ In other words, the Qarakhitai period was the height of agricultural dominance in the competition over the resources in northern Tianshan.⁶⁷ Although the Qarakhitai were ruling over an ethnically mixed subject population, they seem to have reserved control of the surplus for themselves. Our sources do not give us any indication that the Qarakhitai period represented a "centralization" and stabilization in which different ethnic groups and interests participated as was the case in the later Mongolian period. The Qarakhitai, on the contrary, seem to have remained as "conquerors" who were ruling. In this respect, however, according to Herbert Franke, Kitan domination differed from a Chinese type domination.⁶⁸

Sedentary peoples, who had supported the Qarakhitai like the Uighurs, do not seem to have achieved what they were looking for. Our sources give the

⁶⁶ Wilhelm Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*. Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamkunde, 1953 (p.191, n.405).

⁶⁷ A phase in the reverse starts with the Mongolian invasions and comes to an end with the conquests of Amir Temür, and the devastation [*takhrīb*] of Moghulistan, in N. Elias and E. D. Ross (trans.), *A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia, Being the Tarikh-i-Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat*. London, 1972. New impression of the original 1895 (p.42, 50). During this phase, Moghulistan, that is the north of the Tianshan, was left to the use of the nomads for almost three and a half centuries (1400-1750).

For a similar observation in relation to the north of China, see Paul Buell, "The Role of the Sino-Mongolian Frontier Zone in the Rise of Chinggis-Qan," in Henry G. Schwarz (ed.), *Studies on Mongolia. Proceedings of the First North American Conference on Mongolian Studies*. Bellingham, Washington: Western Washington University, 1979.

⁶⁸ Herbert Franke, 1990: 411.

impression that the Uighurs were free to travel as merchants into Qarakhitai lands but they did not achieve any kind of influence over policies. We can surmise that they were not satisfied with the circumstances. When Chinggis Khan's Mongols appeared on the horizon, the first thing the Uighurs wanted was to get rid of the representatives of the Qarakhitai administration. Secondly they made it clear from the beginning that any foes of Chinggis Khan were also their foes, so that nobody should take it for granted that they could pass through the Uighur country or live in it undisturbed. Thus their attitude was very different from the twelfth century when Yeh-lü Ta-shih was passing through. At that time they tried to maintain an outward neutrality. Their welcome of the Gür Khan was another sign of Qarakhanid-Uighur rivalry. This rivalry was not only based on control over trade routes; the conflicts were much more deeply rooted than that. The Muslim way of life meant greater participation of the "nomadic masses" in the process of Arabo-Islamic nomad-sedentary symbiosis. The non-Muslim way of life was still part of East Asian *Kulturkreis* with separation of the spheres of the nomads and the "civilized." It is evident that the spoils for the sedentary Uighurs were much greater in this *Kulturkreis*. From later developments in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries we can make some deductions and suggest that the Uighurs always remained subjects of the Qarakhitai but never became participants in the administration as they did under the Mongols. Instead of being able to avail themselves of the new spoils, they were being squeezed by the Qarakhitai administration.⁶⁹ In spite of their tolerant religious policy in which one group was not favoured over another, the Qarakhitai seem to have depended on their own kind for administration. The existence of Kitan mercenaries in Transoxiana⁷⁰ seems to have resulted from this ethnic preference.

The dissatisfaction of the Uighurs in the east and of the inhabitants of Kashgharia in the west is apparent in the former's alliance with the Mongols and the latter's killing of the Qarakhitai administrator.⁷¹ Our sources give us the impression that Uighuristan had become too small for the Uighurs, and that they were eager to have a voice in the decision making process whether it be in intercontinental trade or administration. In China especially their influence and power extended far into the fourteenth century. Between 1295 and 1368 we have information on 169 Uighurs being active of whom 47

⁶⁹ Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs in Turfan in the 13th Century," in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China Among Equals*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983 (pp. 243-280).

⁷⁰ Paul D. Buell, "Sino-Khitai Administration in Mongol Bukhara," *JAH* 13(1979), 121-151.

⁷¹ John Andrew Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror by 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini*. Translated from the text of Mirza Muhammad Qazvini. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958, 2 vols. (I: 44-45).

were administrators (*darughachi*).⁷² In the west Uighur scribes and Uighur script continued to be read until the end of the fifteenth century.⁷³

Dealing with Foreigners and Merchants who Travel into Foreign Areas

When we look at twelfth-century Asia as a whole, we see that, on the one hand, there was political fragmentation, with many actors, many languages and religions and on the other hand, there were a great number of people on the move. By 1071 the Seljuqs had settled in Anatolia, whereas later Melikshāh (1072-1092) extended his influence farther east entering Uzgend in present Kyrgyzstan and even sent some of his forces as far as Khotan according to one source.⁷⁴ The Salar, who had migrated west at the beginning of the eleventh century and were now among Melikshāh's forces, moved further east towards Gansu.⁷⁵ Two decades later the Jürchen were moving into North China and members of the 18 tribes supporting Yeh-lü Ta-shih were moving into Transoxiana. The Qıpchaq, who had been pushed westwards a century earlier when the Tangut state was formed, were now exercising tribal policies within their cooperation in the Khorezmshāh state (1092-1221). When the Qanglı Qıpchaq princess Terken Khatun married the Khorezmshāh, the Qanglı Qıpchaq tribes began to formally participate in Khorezmshāh politics. Between Khorezmshāh Mehemmed and his mother they exercised a "sharing of power" according to Inner Asian traditions of "dual kingship."⁷⁶ During all this time the Qarakhanids had continued to rule, no longer as nomadic rulers unifying the country, but as rulers of individual cities. This is also the time when the eastern Mediterranean was the

⁷² de Rachewiltz, 1983: 285.

⁷³ One of the best examples of this persistence has been published by Marie-Ross Séguy, *The Miraculous Journey of Mahomet. Miraj Nameh*. (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Manuscript Supplement Turc 190). London: The Sedon Press, 1977.

⁷⁴ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p.66.

⁷⁵ Zeki Velidi Togan, *ibid*.

⁷⁶ Dual kingship, sometimes also referred to in its German form as *Doppelkönigtum*, has been variously introduced and used by Zeki Velidi Togan (1939:271-295, §100a). A. Alföldi deals with this issue in a paper especially devoted to this subject ("Türklerde Çifte Krallık," in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*. Istanbul, 1943, pp.507-519). Omeljan Pritsak in his various articles on the Qarakhanids (see references) and Richard N. Frye (*Bukhara. The Medieval Achievement*. Oklahoma University Press, 1965, p.116) also allude to this concept.

For the details of this power-sharing among the Khorezmshāh see Barthold, 1968: 323-380 and İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Harzemşahlar Devleti Tarihi*. Ankara: TTK, 1984 (pp. 205-214).

I would like to thank the reviewer of the present study for the following references on dual kingship. K. Czegledy "Das sakrale Königtum bei den Steppenvölkern," *Numen* 13(1966).20-25. P. B. Golden "Khazaria and Judaism," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 3(1982).127-156, Omeljan Pritsak, "The Khazar Kingdom's Conversion to Judaism," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2(1978).261-281. These studies show that there is no unanimity as to the origins of dual kingship. The differences go back to the issue of whether the sacred or the profane issues had priority, or whether such a development was a product of an internal evolution or was introduced by the influence of external factors.

stage for Crusader activities against whom Saladin of Syria (Egypt) was fighting with his Turkish mercenaries. Mercenaries were everywhere and they were mostly of Turkish origin.

It is within this environment of political fragmentation and population movements that both the Muslim Near East and Confucian China tried to come to grips with an influx of foreigners. In both of these regions their experiences in their dealing with the outside world became decisive on the macro level. One of the issues was defining themselves and the prevalent political rule vis-à-vis the influx and the role of foreigners. This was especially true of those from Inner Asia who often ended up as rulers in the respective societies. On the basis of this reality in both regions major trends of political philosophy were outlined during this time. Within the respective fields of study this achievement is referred to as “orthodoxy” both in the east and western Asia, a development which is seen as having led to a stagnation in intellectual life.

The Islamic Solutions in the West

In western Asia these problems were resolved through a particular synthesis that was achieved mainly in two stages. In the first stage under early Islam small urban centers and small pastoral nomadic tribes became dependent on each other and thus brought about a symbiosis that was to shape the landscape.⁷⁷ While Islam expanded further east, the number of adherents, “clients,” increased. This symbiosis between the sedentary and the nomadic was then followed by mechanisms to accommodate the incoming foreigners who were brought either as “captives” or by purchase to the Islamic lands. These were mainly the institutions of *mamlūk* and, as an extension of it, the employment of mercenaries in the army.⁷⁸ These were mostly Turks from Central Asia.⁷⁹ After the successful conquests of the Seljuqs, in the political spectrum of the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, force was formally

⁷⁷ Joseph Fletcher, “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives,” *HJAS* 46(1986).11-50.

⁷⁸ On this complex issue of *mamlūks* see Frye, 1965:117-121 and C. E. Bosworth, “Barbarian Incursions: the Coming of the Turks into the Islamic World” in *Islamic Civilization 950-1150*, ed. by D. S. Richards (Oxford). Reprinted by Variorum in *The Medieval History of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia*. London, 1977.

⁷⁹ Frye, 1965:121 says that there were *mamlūks* from other groups too, but that the Turks kept their identity whereas others did not.

On many incidents, anecdotes involving “Turks” in the service of the Abbasid Caliphs see Mas’ūdī, *The Meadows of Gold. The Abbasids*. Translated and edited by Paul Lunde and Caroline Stone. London: Kegan Paul International, 1989. In this work written in 336 AH/947 AD they are referred to as Turks from Fergane and Ustrushana or as *mawālī* “clients.” We see them both as members of troops and also as commanders (228-9, 260-61, 288-89 298, 301-302 ff). As especially one incident shows they could refer to themselves easily as “I am a foreigner...He was speaking Arabic and I don’t know what he said” (p.289).

acknowledged and the usurper sultan was acknowledged as the one who had legitimate political authority, especially after 1055 when the Seljuqs conquered Baghdad.⁸⁰ As an outcome religious authority and temporal authority were spiritually legitimized by al-Ghazālī separately as imam (caliph) and sultan respectively. So that at the end of the twelfth century the Seljuqid Sultan Tughrul⁸¹

discoursed to the people to the following effect: “if the Caliph is the imām, then his constant occupation must be the performance of the namāz, as namāz is the foundation of the faith and the best of the deeds; his pre-eminence in this respect and the fact that he serves as an example for the people is sufficient for him. This is the true sovereignty; the interference of the Caliph in the affairs of temporal rule is senseless; they must be entrusted to the sultāns.”

Here in this setting pragmatic concerns and ideology reinforced each other. This was possible because Muslim society between the tenth to twelfth centuries consisted of independent units that worked in an interconnected form. All were united under Islam, but then every aspect of life was autonomous yet interdependent. Hodgson had seen in the processes taking place between 945-1118 “the establishment of an international civilization.”⁸² In spite of the rise of the Seljuqid Empire, there was not a well established concentration of power anywhere.⁸³ There was a balance that had been created in the tenth century by what Roy Mottahedeh calls, “overlapping loyalties.”⁸⁴ As a result the Muslim community (*umma*) which did not have political and military power was able to shape and reshape authority by consensus (*ijmāʿ*). The most important proponents of consensus (*ijmāʿ*) were the scholars, the ulama. Here in Islamdom “all sources of authority gained validity but not transgressing the concept of *sharīʿa*.”⁸⁵

In the tripartite solution to leadership imamate, sultan and ulama, it was the ulama whose position was defined as responsible for the performance of the religious and legal duties imposed by the *sharīʿa*.⁸⁶ Earlier the Abbasid caliphs had tried to secure their support, but they had remained as an undefined category. “Neither they nor the community ever had sufficient real

⁸⁰ Ann Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981 (pp. 103-129). The term sultan had been in use much earlier (Barthold 1968:271). But here we are talking about legitimization of the “usurper” as sultan.

⁸¹ Barthold, 1968: 347. There is an imaginary portrait of him in the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*. See illustrations Plate 1.

⁸² Marshall Hodgson, *Venture of Islam*. 3 vols. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974: II, Book 3 (3-360) is for the most part devoted to this process (see especially pp. 44-45 and 255).

⁸³ Hodgson 1974, II:44-45 says that Nizām al-Mulk, the famous vizier of the Seljuqids, wanted to establish a centralized government but without much success.

⁸⁴ Roy P. Mottahedeh, 1988:183.

⁸⁵ Hodgson 1974, II: 121.

⁸⁶ Ann K. S. Lambton, 1981: 115.

political power to transform their political function into that of an institution authorizing the day-to-day acts of government.”⁸⁷ Now, after al-Ghazālī’s formulations,

their principal political function was the interpretation of the *sharī‘a* in terms of the problems facing the community, and by their approval of the sultan’s choice of imam in the *bay‘a* (as interpreted by al-Ghazālī) and their *fatwas*, they expressed the functional authority of the *sharī‘a*. In short, in al-Ghazālī’s theory the imamate still stood for the whole of Islamic government, but it had been separated into three main elements, the imam, the sultan and the ‘ulamā’, each corresponding to some aspect of the authority behind Islamic government and each performing a function required by that authority.⁸⁸

When we look at this age more closely, we see that these formulations which were later going to be branded as orthodoxy because they brought about the acceptance of authority, emerged in the age of the Seljuqids, when the society was faced with the reality of the use of force in the Seljuqid conquests in the Middle East and their entrance to Baghdad upon the invitation of the caliph who acknowledged that force. Al-Ghazālī produced his works on government between 1096 and 1102.⁸⁹ A contemporary of al-Ghazālī was Nizām al-Mulk, the chief minister of the Seljuqids. He presented his *Siyāset-nāme* or *Tezkiret al-mulūk*⁹⁰ to the Seljuqid ruler Melikshāh (1072-1092), while al-Ghazālī provided intellectual legitimization of force, in the person of the sultan who was divinely endowed with justice and knowledge.⁹¹ Nizām al-Mulk elaborated the mechanism of justice. What we see here is that both of them acknowledge the sultan as the holder of just authority yet give credence to the consensus of the community and consultation with the ministers. Ann Lambton thinks that both of them, by their emphasis on the absolute power of the ruler and his unaccountability except to God, helped to perpetuate the fundamental disharmony between the ideal of Islam and the ideal of pre-Islamic Persia. These Islamic (and thus Near Eastern) traits that were developed during the period of the international civilization (945-1111) in the Hodgsonian sense came into being because they found a fertile place in the Inner Asian traditions that the Seljuqs brought with them. Both consensus in the tribal or the warband community and power-sharing were aspects that the Seljuqs were familiar with from their own background. However, they were not eager to duplicate these traditions in their own rule

⁸⁷ Lambton, 1981: 111 from L. Binder, “Al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Government” *The Muslim World* XLV, 3(1955):229-41 (pp. 229-30)

⁸⁸ Lambton, 1981:115 and Binder, 1955:240.

⁸⁹ Lambton, 1981:115.

⁹⁰ Nizām al-Mulk *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings*. Translated by Hubert Darke. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960.

⁹¹ Lambton, 1981:126. The term itself was used by Ghaznavid Maḥmūd, but the institutionalization of the term as signifying wordly rule is something that started with the Seljuqids.

and this was why they differed in their rule from earlier times and drifted away from the expectations of the Oghuz tribal groups who eventually were going to show their resentment by taking the Seljuqid ruler Sultan Sanjar and holding him prisoner from 1153 to 1157. But because the Seljuqid rule differed from the tribal Oghuz leadership, the Seljuqid rulers created something new with their traditions of consensus and power-sharing. They agreed to and accepted easily the consensus of the community (*ijmāʿ*) as a necessary condition of rule but also created an order in which the ulama, and the *ghulām* (as a buffer against the tribal establishment) became shareholders in power. Thus it was with the support of the ulama and the *ghulām* as representatives of local power⁹² that the sultan and his just authority were legitimized. Here we see one of the earliest articulations of the Inner Asian traditions with Islam where Iranian traditions of centralized rule also played an important role. The Seljuqs did not want to rule in the fashion of tribal power-sharing where power would be contested more or less on equal terms, in other words horizontally. Instead they used power-sharing methods in a more hierarchical (vertical) order. In this hierarchical order the sultan and the imam (caliph) were the centers. However it is to be noted that this was not a mono-centered world; on the contrary, there were two centers, reminding one of the Inner Asian traditions of “dual kingship,” resting on the consensus and support of the tribal populations. Here the duality rested on the consensus (*ijmāʿ*) of the urban community.

What was true for the society in general was also true for microcosms of society like the Sufi orders. Here also the authority of the saints was shaped by the consensus of the followers over generations of time so that Sufi orders were “really” established and organized after this consensus was reached.⁹³ Consensus could work as a decisive element and a driving force because it eventually shaped the judiciary discourse. But both the community and the judiciary functioned separately from political rule, military power, finance and economics.

In this institutionally fragmented but spiritually united atmosphere of the eleventh and twelfth centuries we witness the spirit and the ideas of the rising merchant class.⁹⁴ E. Ashtor says in his study that in the ninth century 60% of the theologians were merchants. At that time the merchant bourgeoisie (*kuttāb*) also shared power with the Turkish guards. However, they

⁹² Earlier *ghulām* in the days of the Abbasids had been Turks called *mamlūks*. Now that Turks were ruling, the *ghulām* were non-Turks coming from local populations.

⁹³ Fuad Köprülü calls this process “developing by social consciousness” *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar*. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 1984, 5th Printing (p.27).

At about the same time local saints were sanctioned, legitimized by the state in China. Valerie Hansen, *Changing Gods in Medieval China, 1127-1276*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

⁹⁴ S. D. Goitein, 1968: 219.

continued to be powerful and to influence the tide of affairs to the extent that in the tenth century merchants were more powerful than the viziers.⁹⁵ Later in the tenth to twelfth centuries they were not politically involved, but continued to be interested in becoming jurists.⁹⁶ Although they would not so much run governments, they would support governments by money lending.⁹⁷ Small businessmen, on the other hand, were able to form groups to protect their interests and “they were better able to resist extortionate demands by governments and others holding power.”⁹⁸ Thus under Islam mercantile activities were imbued with legal process so that merchants did not have the need to interfere directly in the political order⁹⁹ when they wanted change. As the judicial order operated separately from the political order, merchants were more interested in becoming jurists and in the outcome of judicial decisions. In order to change the commercial terms in their favor they needed resort neither to politics nor to arms. Politics and arms were matters of the local rulers and commanders who would employ mercenary armies. Merchants who devoted themselves to religious studies were instrumental in establishing a religious sanction for ideals of prosperity, success and a businesslike attitude. In the face of the fluidity of the political atmosphere, these values influenced the religious community to adopt safeguards for the life, prosperity and honor of the Muslim citizen.¹⁰⁰

The Case of East Asia

In East Asia this period witnessed the establishment of the “foreign” dynasties of the Liao, Chin and Hsi-hsia, together with the Uighur Kingdoms. As far as the Sung were concerned, although “foreigners” and foreign dynasties became “equals” in diplomacy with a necessarily pragmatic approach,¹⁰¹ this was not the case in ideology. In the ideological sphere, there was a rejection of foreigners and the force that came with them. There was no legitimization of the usurper nor of pragmatic approaches.¹⁰² Although dynasties came into being as a result of military victory, it was not force that was recognized. It was an accepted view that the founding fathers of dynasties were successful

⁹⁵ Goitein, 1968: 239.

⁹⁶ Baber Johansen, the above mentioned paper.

⁹⁷ Ann K. S. Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia*. New York: Bibliotheca Persica, 1988 (p. 329).

⁹⁸ Lambton, 1988:343.

⁹⁹ Goitein, 1968:219 and Hodgson, 1974, II :79, 108 and 119-125.

¹⁰⁰ Goitein, 1968: 219.

¹⁰¹ *China among Equals* is the main theme and the title of this important work edited by Morris Rossabi (1983). As Ruth Dunnell also emphasizes, the functioning of a fragmented East Asia is something that we have yet to understand (1983:268).

¹⁰² Hok-lam Chan, *Legitimation in Imperial China*. University of Washington Press, 1984 deals with these questions regarding the Jürchen, the Chin.

because they had the Mandate of Heaven and as such they were Sons of Heaven.

Under the early T'ang, official scholars came from the aristocratic scholar community while the military was manned by many foreigners.¹⁰³ There was a balance between remnants of the old aristocracy, foreigners and the new talent that came through the examinations. A reflection of this balance between the separate elements was especially to be seen in government. The Confucian scholars did not exert an all-powerful political influence. They were distinguished by their social style and by their dress. Even in the eighth and ninth centuries they remained "book-men" (*shu sheng*). They were known for their lack of experience in military matters. By the mid eighth century An Lu-shan's rebellion brought an end to Chinese dependence on foreigners in the military.¹⁰⁴ As a result there were no intermediary mechanisms to accommodate foreigners¹⁰⁵ nor were they wanted. At about the same time the scholarly community also went through a change.¹⁰⁶ In the course of the eighth century scholars became convinced that they had to control the military administration. "Their 'talents combined military and civil' (*ts'ai chien wen wu*), and they 'went out as generals and came in as chancellors' (*ch'u Chiang ju Hsiang*), as well as directing academic programs."¹⁰⁷

The Sung inherited these new traditions in which the scholars had become one of the contending partners in the administration of government. Furthermore, the T'ang aristocracy had also lost strength and declined. In

¹⁰³ For the military see E. G. Pulleyblank, "The An Lu-shan Rebellion and the Origins of Chronic Militarism in late T'ang China," in John Curtis Perry and L. Smith Bardwell (eds.), *Essays on T'ang Society*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976 (pp. 33-60).

¹⁰⁴ E. H. Schafer, *The Golden Peaches of Samarkand. A Study of T'ang Exotics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.

¹⁰⁵ In other words there was no institution like the *mamlūk* of the Muslim Near East. Here I would like to introduce Lynda Shaffer's views in this respect. In a letter dated January 5, 1993 she says:

...in arid areas pastoralism has always interpenetrated agricultural areas, a pattern that is absent in North China. This arrangement made it possible for Chinese to always draw a culturally sharp line between farming Han and pastoral others (I guess the Great Wall merely marks this line). It seems to me that the Chinese prejudice is not philosophical (Confucian) but cultural. In addition to considering anyone without a permanent address to be unreliable, they used to cringe at the thought of dairy products, mobile homes, and fur that wasn't covered over with silk. They also seem to be dubious about marital arrangements and other social customs. From the Sung dynasty on, of course, it was not so much Confucianism but the examination system that would have made power sharing with people on the frontiers difficult if not impossible.

¹⁰⁶ Jennifer Holmgren, "Imperial Marriage with Native Chinese and Non-Han State, Han to Ming," in Rubie S. Watson and Patricia Buckley Ebrey (eds.), *Marriage and Inequality in Chinese Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991 (pp. 58-96, especially, 73).

¹⁰⁷ David McMullen, *State and Scholars in T'ang China*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (p.9).

the new order of the Sung there was only the bureaucracy that was drawn from new talent. Under these circumstances what was aspired to was not the autonomy of the state's components, but the hierarchical subordination of the components to a state structure. Between the tenth and twelfth centuries we see the Sung striving to bring a greater degree of hierarchization or "vertical diversity" in the absence of the earlier horizontal "real" diversity. Impartial bureaucrats who owed their loyalty to the state became the guardians and masters of the new order. The hierarchical order and the Confucian philosophy, which emphasized hierarchy, reinforced each other. When philosophers like Chu Hsi emphasized the moral uplifting of the individual, they emphasized the conformity of the individual to the norms of this hierarchical society. It was a situation which is best summarized in James T.C. Liu's words: "[In] Sung China, it seems, politics in close relation to intellectual trends, occupied the central stage. They were not the full or direct reflections of economic interests."¹⁰⁸

In terms of legitimization, what was legitimized was the hierarchical nature of the order of things. Matters related to foreigners or to rulers of foreign origin could only be resolved by pragmatism.¹⁰⁹ Although the practical end result was the same, the difference between the legitimation and pragmatism was great in terms of their value for posterity. Pragmatism was the attitude of short term solutions to the exigencies of the time. Legitimization meant incorporation into the pantheon as a guideline for posterity. In this long range impact then Confucian philosophy, which had become state philosophy, shaped the law. Neither Wang An-shih who advocated state intervention nor Chu Hsi who emphasized the moral uplifting of the individual was thinking in terms of the "consensus of the community."

Because these views were not based on consensus, microcosms in the society did not reflect the macro order but displayed a diversity in structure and spirit. This diversity was then associated with Buddhism, Taoism, and popular culture, persuasions which on the whole came to be considered as part of the realm of the private. This tension between the private and the public, between the rational and the emotional, and the orthodox views and diversity became a source of the richness of the Chinese culture, emerging especially in the twelfth century.

The Confucian thinkers of the time by placing themselves above the private, above the popular culture, were not striving to create an atmosphere of orthodoxy. On the contrary they believed in the diversity of views and that the ruler should be in consultation with the sages of these different views.

¹⁰⁸ James T. C. Liu, 1988:viii.

¹⁰⁹ E. G. Pulleyblank, "Neo-Confucianism and Neo-Legalism in T'ang Intellectual Life, 755-805," in Arthur F. Wright (ed.), *Confucian Persuasion*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960 (pp. 77-114).

But they believed that there was only one “public” way, the Confucian way; diversity was condoned but it was Confucian diversity.¹¹⁰

All views had to fit a place in the hierarchical world. However, the situation was such that governments had to make use of short term pragmatism. They had to deal with the Liao, the Chin, the Hsi-hsia, and the Uighurs who were all at least partially Buddhist.¹¹¹ This pragmatism functioned, as it were, neither in consultation with the sages nor within the legitimate ideology. Functioning outside of the vestiges of ideology fostered Kao-tsung’s (1127-1162) autocratic tendencies resulting in a high degree of centralization and in increased state power and absolutism, a state of affairs which was possible by the exclusion of the ideology and ideologues. And when new trends in ideology were incorporated into the political structure in the wake of the Mongolian invasions,¹¹² it came to exclude other views.¹¹³ This trend towards autocracy and absolutism, combined with a more rigid, hierarchical order of society and the tensions between the public and private spheres mentioned above, did not give merchants the opportunities that the Muslim society in West and Central Asia offered. Yet merchants of the Sung were thriving in a setting that McNeill finds close to a world system.¹¹⁴ However, merchants were not part of the “public,” and neither were there efforts to accommodate them in the public sphere.¹¹⁵

By and large, the bureaucratic ruling class imposed regulations on and took advantage of the economic progress. It would not allow merchants and merchant interests to have a strong voice in determining policies. While some descendants of merchants through the vertical social mobility of the examination system did join the ruling class, they were by then assimilated into the scholar-official subculture, thereby ceasing to represent their family economic background.

Towards a Systematization of “Inclusiveness” in West Asia

What is interesting is that Caliph al-Nāṣir¹¹⁶ (1180-1225) who lived at about the same time as Sung Kao-tsung also brought a centralization in government. He brought homogeneity by incorporating different religious intellec-

¹¹⁰ Liu, 1988:135.

¹¹¹ These relations are portrayed in the various articles in Rossabi, 1983.

¹¹² Liu, 1988 :148.

¹¹³ Liu, 1988 :135-150.

¹¹⁴ Chou Chin-sheng, *An Economic History of China*. Translated by Edward H. Kaplan. Bellingham: Western Washington State College, 1974 (pp. 102-104) tells us how the Sung encouraged commerce by reducing taxation. As mentioned above these issues are taken up in detail by Laurence Ma, 1971. Janet Abu-Lughod, 1989:316-351 and William McNeill in his *In Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society. Since A.D. 1000*. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982) speak of the Sung in terms of the development of the world system.

¹¹⁵ Liu, 1988:viii.

¹¹⁶ Hodgson, 1974, II: 279-286.

tual views and making them part of the mainstream. His reforms were not so much related to governmental institutions, as he did not have much say in that sphere—although he tried. The words of the Seljuqid Sultan Tughrul quoted earlier were directed at him. One could say that he brought centralization to religious ideology, by enlarging the spectrum of what was seen as mainstream Sunni ideology. Parallel with the recognition of force and the legitimization of the usurper, we see in the “books of government” a development of causal relationships between the autonomous elements of government. This relationship, which did not change the autonomy of the elements, tied them together in what is called a “circle of equity” that we see in Islamic Mirrors for Princes.¹¹⁷

[G]ood government is secured by armed troops, armed troops are maintained with gold, gold is acquired through cultivation and cultivation sustained through payment of what is due to the peasantry by just dealing and fairness.

[T]he religion depends on the monarchy, the monarchy on the army, the army on supplies, supplies on prosperity, prosperity on justice.

We see that the essence of government was justice, as such then justice was above government. Although what sustained government was presented in a hierarchical form, it still was a circle, not a ladder with a bottom and a top.¹¹⁸ What is most important in this “circle of equity” is in my view not the place of justice or government, but that justice and government eventually depended on appeasing the peasantry so that they would be willing to contribute. In other words, the inclusion of the peasantry closed the circle. What is further interesting is that merchants, who were referred to as “men of affairs” in later “circles”, are not named here by their name, but one would look for them somewhere near “gold” or “supplies” as intermediaries. However, that “gold” or “silver” did not necessarily imply the existence of merchants we will see in relation to the Qarakhanids.

¹¹⁷ The best account of this literature is by Ann K. S. Lambton, “Islamic Mirrors for Princes,” in *La Persia nel Medioevo*. Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1971 (pp. 419–442). See also Ann K. S. Lambton, “The Theory of Kingship in the *Nasīhat al-Mulūk* of Ghazālī,” *The Islamic Quarterly* 1(1954):47–55.

The two quotations are from Kai Kā’ūs, *A Mirror for Princes: The Qābūs-nāma*. Translated by Reuben Levy. London: Cresset, 1951 (p.51) and from Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Ghazali’s Book of Counsel for Kings (Nasihat al-Muluk)*. Translated by F. R. Bagley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964 (p.69) respectively. *Qābūs-nāma* is from 1082, it is followed by Nizām al-Mulk’s *Siyāsat-nāma* (1092) translated by Darke (1960); Ghazālī’s *Nasīhat al-Mulūk* was written closely afterwards in 1106. This work has been translated by F. R. Bagley.

¹¹⁸ By a ladder with a bottom and top I am referring to the Confucian order. The mutation there is not in social classes but with ideas and values as expressed with *yin* and *yang*.

Qarakhanid Pragmatism and Ideals of Government

The Qarakhanids who emerged as a force from the Inner Asian Turkish tribes adopted Islam in 960 and formally replaced the Samanids in 999. As they embraced Islam and adapted themselves to settled life styles, they also brought their own customs of Inner Asian Turkish nomadism and steppe life to the Samanid lands as well as to the regions east of the Pamir, the present Xinjiang which owes its name as Eastern Turkestan to the prevalence of Qarakhanid institutions. The Qarakhanids were not the first Turkish speaking groups to settle in these lands. The Early Türks had extended their power into Transoxiana and destroyed Hephtalite power around 565. They also asserted their power over the "Sogdians as far as the Oxus River, which remained the boundary between the Sassanian Empire and the Türks."¹¹⁹ Archeological evidence from Ferghane and towns along the Syr Darya shows that populations were mixed and that there were both Iranians and Turks in these towns.¹²⁰ Thus settled Turkish speaking groups were not a novelty, they had been there since at least the Türk Empire if not earlier,¹²¹ but Muslim Turks were. As Richard Frye so aptly puts it, "the Muslim Turks accomplished what the pagan Turks could not have done—the conquest of the Samanid Kingdom".¹²² It was also for the same reason that these regions came to be known as Turkestan.¹²³

The Introduction of Inner Asian Traditions of Power-sharing and Redistribution

The influence of the Inner Asian traditions of the Qarakhanids was especially strong in two areas: the realms of power and wealth. In the realm of power they introduced traditions of power-sharing as an indigenous element of government so that there was always more than one ruler. They had a Khaqan ruling over the whole of the realm, who carried the epithet "Arslan" (lion), and a viceroy, the "Sherik Khaqan" who carried the epithet "Boghra" (Camel), a feature we refer to as "dual kingship."¹²⁴ We see this especially from extant coins. Until recent archeological excavations which have revealed materials pertaining to their cities and city life and their art and ceramics, Qarakhanid studies were more or less based on numismatics. What

¹¹⁹ Frye, 1964:112.

¹²⁰ Frye, 1964:115.

¹²¹ The existence of Turkic speaking groups before the "Türk Empire" has recently been taken up by Denis Sinor in "The Establishment and Dissolution of the Türk Empire," in Denis Sinor (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, Cambridge University Press, 1990 (pp. 285-316, especially pp. 285-287). The Turkish historian Zeki Velidi Togan was an early proponent of this idea (1970:7-37).

¹²² Frye, 1964:147.

¹²³ Barthold, "Turkestan," *Encyclopedia of Islam* Vol. 8 (pp. 895-6).

¹²⁴ See supra note 76; Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p. 62, 81.

intrigued scholars in the field¹²⁵ was that each city was issuing its own coins under a different prince or ruler who carried the title *Ilig*. On the basis of numismatics, it could be ascertained that the Qarakhanids were divided into eastern and western halves, the traditional dual Turkish rule with the leadership of the east being supreme (Balasaghun).

Besides power-sharing the Qarakhanids also introduced the system of Inner Asian style *iqṭāʿ*:¹²⁶ they granted lands to princes and tribal leaders to provide revenue for their army thus encouraging the development of a military and dynastic aristocracy.¹²⁷ Thus they encouraged decentralized local rule whether sedentary or nomadic. They were applying redistributive Inner Asian traditions in which the realm was regarded as being under the joint ownership of the dynastic family with members sharing power on the basis of their respective shares. In this respect they were just the opposite of the Samanids, an Iranian dynasty whose state was built on the principle of a single monarch of whom it was expected that he be a “good ‘landlord’ (*kātkhudā*) of his kingdom and care for its outward welfare; for the cutting of the canals and underground conduits ...”¹²⁸ The Samanids also preferred to pay off the military rather than give them parcels of land.¹²⁹ At the beginning the Qarakhanids stayed out of the cities allowing ulama to fill in the political vacuum left by the destruction of the Samanid monarchy.¹³⁰ They were also patrons of Islam and made many endowments for the construction of mosques and other religious buildings such as tomb complexes. They did not favor concentration and control of land from a center and abolished the Samanid administration of religious endowments (*awqāf*). Under the Qara-

¹²⁵ Barthold, 1968; Davidovich, “O dvukh karakhanidskikh kaganatakh,” *Narodi Azii i Afriki*, 1968 No. 1 pp. 73-75 and other works by her. See also O. Pritsak’s articles under the references.

¹²⁶ Barthold, 1968:307-308. On Qarakhanid *iqṭāʿ* see Frye, 1964:125-26 and 156-57.

¹²⁷ There are many references in the *Kutadgu Bilig* (Robert Dankoff. *Yūsuf Khaṣṣ Ḥājib. Wisdom of Glory (Kutadgu Bilig). A Turko-Islamic Mirror of Princes*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983:111) to the virtues of the nobly born; they are praised:

The nobly born knows propriety;
He serves the people with loyalty.
The base-born only lies and cheats
Although he serves dainties and sweets.

Besides the ruler, the vizier (p.111) and the chamberlain (p.120) are also expected to be nobly-born.

¹²⁸ Barthold, 1968:226-227.

¹²⁹ On the slave army of the Samanids see Frye, 1964:120, 122 and 134.

¹³⁰ In his recent book Robert L. Canfield also speaks of the social prominence of the ulama during the Qarakhanid period. *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991 (p.9). However, Yuri Bregel in his article in the same book seems to doubt the relationship between the prominence of the ulama and the Qarakhanids. See Yuri Bregel, “Turco-Mongol influences in Central Asia,” in Canfield, 1991: (pp.53-77 especially p. 72).

khanids the administration of *awqāf* was included in the duties of the *qāḍī*.¹³¹ This policy of giving autonomy and the means to sustain it was one of the many redistributive and power-sharing policies they introduced into the old Samanid lands. It is also not to be denied that as new converts to Islam, they showed fervent respect to religion and its ministers.¹³² As a result of these policies the landowning class, the *dihqāns* suffered a great deal, so that by the Mongolian conquests they had lost their importance.¹³³ The translator of Narshakhī says that in 1128 depreciation of landed property was so great that people did not want it even gratis.¹³⁴ Qarakhanid policies directed against the earlier establishment were the basis of support they found in the region from the popular classes, yet it was also the root of dissatisfaction from the politically relevant strata. Thus in a letter (1130) by the Seljuqid Sultan Sanjar addressed to the “Imāms, Qāḍīs, and Notables” we hear about the misdemeanors of Qarakhanid Arslan Khan. He had ruled badly, offended the descendants of the prophet, destroyed ancient families, executed people on bare suspicion and confiscated their goods.¹³⁵ As we can see, he had acted against the interests of the earlier establishment.

Sharing Power with a Military Aristocracy and the Urban Ulama

The Qarakhanids had broken down the Samanid structure and liberated important elements of the society from the yoke of the central state structure. The ulama were then the main beneficiaries of this new policy. However, as the main Qarakhanid policy was to preserve the autonomy of the societal components, they tried to keep the ulama, the notables (the educated and the rich) and the military aristocracy separate.¹³⁶ The court then played a divide-and-rule policy. With the passage of time the ulama especially found that their sphere of influence was being infringed by anti *sharīʿa* practices of the Qarakhanid rulers, for example the commercial taxation they employed. Moreover, the Qarakhanid rulers, being new converts and fervent believers, were not tolerant to what they considered “heretic” sects. However, many of the ulama were of the Shīʿa or were related to different intellectual currents within Islam. The Qarakhanid rulers did not approve of this diversity and as such offended the ulama. For instance Serakhsī (d.1090) was put into prison because of views that were considered heretical. We are told that in those

¹³¹ Barthold, 1968: 232.

¹³² Barthold, 1968:310-311.

¹³³ Barthold, 1968:307.

¹³⁴ Richard N. Frye (ed.), *The History of Bukhara*. Translated from a Persian Abridgment of the Arabic Original by Narshakhī. Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of America, 1954 (Chapter XII, p.31). Also Barthold, 1968:308.

¹³⁵ Barthold, 1968:321.

¹³⁶ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p.57.

days large wells served as prisons and Serakhsī used to lecture from the bottom of the well to his students who would gather around it.¹³⁷

The Seljuqs, who dominated Transoxianan politics during the eleventh century, intervened on the side of the ulama. Thus it was at the invitation of the ulama that the Seljuqid Sultan Melikshāh marched into the Qarakhanid realm. After the conquest of Samarkand and Bukhara in 1089 he went as far as Uzgend as mentioned earlier.¹³⁸ The Qarakhanid Aḥmed Khan was put on trial under *sharīʿa* law and found guilty. Later he was given over to a Qarakhanid prince to be executed.¹³⁹ From then on, especially under the following Seljuqid ruler Börkyaruq (1093-1104), the ulama gained ascendancy in Transoxianan politics.¹⁴⁰ It is also following these events that the ulama established their own independent rule in Bukhara under Ṣadr Burhān (Āl-i Burhān) who was considered a descendant of Caliph ʿOmar. Thus “people of the turban” became the supports (Ṣadr) of the world.¹⁴¹ In fact they were supported also by the rich merchants, the wealthy and the old families. Zeki Velidi Togan says that the Qarakhanid rulers of this time were much more closely associated with the Sufi dervishes. He mentions that the Sufis were criticizing the Ṣadr because they were living in great wealth. They had not only estates in the countryside but also herds. Meḥammed Qızıarslan (1102-1130) especially felt close to a dervish called *Nemetpūsh* “Wearer of shepherd’s cloak.” He was not only very modest and lived simply, but he was also strict in terms of morals and ethics and was instrumental in influencing the Khan to ban drunkards and other “unacceptable” people from Samarkand.¹⁴² Here it seems we are encountering the beginnings of the rift between the so-called mainstream Islam and popular Islam. Usually these terms are

¹³⁷ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, pp. 70-71 from a manuscript of *Siyer* in the Fatih Library No.1662, Istanbul.

¹³⁸ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, pp. 66-67.

¹³⁹ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p. 72 from a MS written at the siege of Samarkand. MS in Ankara University Library Ismail Saib Efendi Yazmaları No.1265.

¹⁴⁰ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, pp.73-79. Bregel casts some doubts on the relationship between the Qarakhanid rulers and the ulama. He says: “It is not quite clear what connection, if any, existed between the rise of the influence of the Islamic establishment in Central Asia and the political hegemony of the Turks.” Frye (1975a:222) supposed that the Qarakhanids in Transoxiana mistrusted the cities and ruled the country from their nomadic encampments, while the vacuum of power in the cities was filled by religious leaders. This remains to be proved. An argument against it may be that apparently the latest evidence of the nomadic way of life of the Qarakhanid khans of Transoxiana refers to the third quarter of the eleventh century (Barthold, 1963a:378), while the rise of the power of the ulama (the authorities of Islamic learning) of Transoxiana took place only in the twelfth century.

On this issue see my earlier remarks. The issue is not so much where the khans lived but what kind of organization they favored. The ulama gained prominence by merely being in charge of justice, but they became involved in politics in the twelfth century, especially in Bukhara.

¹⁴¹ Barthold, 1968: 326-327 and 353-355 and Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p.77.

¹⁴² Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar* p.78 from a MS by Mullāzāde Aḥmed Muʿīn al-Fuqarā written in Samarkand.

understood as dealing with educated and uneducated masses. However, as we can see from the formalization of this trend under Aḥmed Yesevī (d.1167) and his followers, what is generally called popular Islam was a reaction by people educated in Islamic thought but supported by popular masses. Aḥmed Yesevī who later became the symbol of this moralistic trend that asserted itself against the policies of accumulation of wealth by scholars,¹⁴³ lived at about this time. We know that he studied until 1160 in Bukhara under Shaykh Yūsuf Hamadānī.¹⁴⁴

These conflicts among Muslim intellectuals and opposition by the Ṣadr to the Qarakhanid ruler were followed by yet another component which Barthold calls “the traditional conflict between the throne and the military class.” In this conflict the Qarluqs, as noted earlier, applied for help from the Qarakhitai Gür Khan. The Qarakhanid ruler, in his turn, asked the Seljuqid ruler Sultan Sanjar’s help. The subsequent battle of Qaṭwān (1141), which ended with the defeat of the Seljuqid ruler, firmly established the Qarakhitai in Central Asia.¹⁴⁵ At about this time the son of an earlier Seljuq governor of Khorezm showed separatist tendencies and saw the Qarakhitai also as a means for establishing himself independently as Khorezmshāh.¹⁴⁶ Thus by the middle of the twelfth century the Qarakhanid rule as a way of life had come to an end although Qarakhanids continued to rule as princes over cities under Qarakhitai suzerainty. The change in the way of life from the Qarakhanid times was especially apparent in the new Khorezmshāh army that depended on mercenaries.¹⁴⁷ But it was not a complete change, the Khorezmshāh rule and army was a temporary marriage between tribal politics and armies, mercenary armies and court politics, all of which was going to give way to the universalist rule of the Mongols and their armies of conquest.

The general picture that emerges from the Qarakhanid rule that preceded and in many ways—especially in the institutionalization of redistribution—precipitated the thirteenth century Mongolian rule is one in which the rulers were keen to keep a) the court and the palace, and b) the tribal leaders and the commanders who had control over the military (tribal forces) away from any control over or cooperation with c) the ulama who ruled over the judiciary. The rulers were seen as referees between these contending groups. Thus they were not trying to achieve cooperation but a balance between these

¹⁴³ Goitein, 1968:229 speaking of two sufi brothers, one shying away from extravagance, the other behaving just in the opposite way, says that these two ways did not necessarily constitute two hostile camps. However in twelfth century Central Asia the situation was becoming hostile.

¹⁴⁴ Köprülü, 1984:72.

¹⁴⁵ Barthold, 1968:326.

¹⁴⁶ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, pp. 85, 88.

¹⁴⁷ Barthold, 1968:377.

contending groups. At this juncture it is important to note that for instance Tamghach Khan Ibrahim to whom the *Kutadgu Bilig* was presented in 1069 decided to resign his throne when a descendant of 'Ali said to him: "Thou are not worthy to be a king."¹⁴⁸ Only upon the insistence of the inhabitants was he persuaded to remain in his post.¹⁴⁹ This balance was not only to be seen in terms of methods of government, but also in terms of languages and the culture which has come to be known as the "Turko-Persian Islamic culture":¹⁵⁰

A composite urban society thus took form as the Samanid dynasty gave way to the Qarakhanids in the eleventh century. The ruling institution was dominated by Turks of various sorts, some highly urbanized and Persianized, some rural and still very Turkish. It was managed by bureaucrats and ulama who used both Persian and Arabic.

This was also the environment that produced lexicographers like Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, philosophers like Yūsuf Khaṣṣ Ḥājib, the author of *Kutadgu Bilig* ("Wisdom of Royal Glory") and other literary works in what we call "Middle Turkish."¹⁵¹

Qarakhanid Ideology of Rule and Facts of Life

While the rulers were trying to play their role as intermediaries they let jurists play an important role. It is also from this time period that very important jurists like Serakhsī, emerged. We know that some of the jurists came from families with commercial interests; sometimes they themselves were merchants as we will see in the case of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāḍi further below.¹⁵² This process had been going on for some time not only in Central Asia but also in the Near East. As Goitein states it is in the tenth and eleventh centuries that we witness the rise of the merchant class and "it was predominantly merchants who were engaged in the development of the religious sciences of Islam."¹⁵³ In either case then, the jurists and the merchants were independent of political or military coercion. What is significant is that "the proud conviction of being economically independent of the governing cliques" and a sense of affluence was expressed with the same word that we use in the twentieth century for political independence, namely *istiqlāl*.¹⁵⁴ It is in their independence from political coercion that the Muslim jurists, who often had commercial interests, differed from merchants in China. In China bureau-

¹⁴⁸ Barthold, 1968:311.

¹⁴⁹ Barthold, 1968:311 and Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p. 53.

¹⁵⁰ Canfield, 1991:12.

¹⁵¹ On the literature of Middle Turkish see Nicholas Poppe, *Introduction to Altaic Linguistics*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965.

¹⁵² Süleyman Uludağ, *Fahreddin Razi*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1991.

¹⁵³ Goitein, 1968:219.

¹⁵⁴ Goitein, 1968:219, n.1.

crats might come from mercantile families, but were not independent of coercive power. They were civil instruments of coercive power who also formulated the laws. On the other hand, merchants in China, did not have the freedom to formulate commercial laws like the Muslim merchants who could also be jurists. At this time under Islam theorizing about formulations of justice was “private.” In terms of the administration of justice, however, two different traditions started to emerge. In one, the Seljuqid model, the sultan was the supreme but “just” ruler. In the other, the Qarakhanid model, independent jurists could execute the ruler.

On the other hand, the people, the citizens were armed as “warriors of the Faith.”¹⁵⁵ We can see that the role of the military was not to support absolute rule but rather to act as a lever for the political ascendancy of rulers. Cities were on the receiving end, so to speak; sometimes when some forces left through the back door, others entered through the front door.¹⁵⁶ This picture does not present any stability; nor does it display oppression. However, the element of oppression was there; if it was not autocratic oppression, it was in the form of extortion of the “subjects” by the army consisting of tribesmen on whose support the khanship was based.¹⁵⁷ The situation is illustrated in a beautiful passage in *Kutadgu Bilig* in which the ruler says:¹⁵⁸

A ruler cannot govern without troops. And to acquire troops he needs wealth, for if he lacks wealth men will not flock to his standard. An army commander who spent his life in his monarch’s service quoted the following in this connection:

Through troops and treasury
The prince with glory is crowned
He holds the world in fee
When he these two has found

So to gather troops one must spend a great deal of money. But to get money one cannot help but resort to violence. I have only one back and one throat. Why should I have to shoulder so many people’s burdens.

This was not a circle of equity; if it was anything it was an open ended circle, a half-moon, a crescent. It was not a system that reproduced itself

¹⁵⁵ Barthold, 1968: 229.

¹⁵⁶ On these instances see, Frye, 1964: p.151.

¹⁵⁷ Zeki Velidi Togan states (*Karahanlılar*, p.55) that certain rulers did not permit the soldiers to enter cities. However this is neither a guarantee for the whole period nor does it exclude problems on the rural scene. Barthold also mentions that soldiers were not permitted to enter cities at night (1968:315).

¹⁵⁸ Robert Dankoff, 1983: 217 verse 5459-5465. This work is from 1069-1070. See also Reşit Rahmeti Arat, *Kutadgu Bilig*. İstanbul, 1947, Vol. I: 391. For a discussion of these issues of concepts of rule see Halil İnalcık, “Turkish and Iranian Political Theories and Traditions in *Kutadgu Bilig*,” in Halil İnalcık, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. Essays on Economy and Society*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993 (pp. 1-18).

without resorting to undesirable means. As it seems from the words of the Ruler, it was as yet unfinished business. The passage demonstrates fully the pains of transformation into a new cultural milieu, into a new civilization. The element of doubt is strongly there, which gives the impression of a doubt related to the oppression of Muslims as subjects.

In the body of the book we see different cultural traditions striving for synthesis. Here I will briefly deal with some aspects. The emphasis on restraint shown in relation to the use of force, as if the Qarakhanids were not coming from steppe traditions, is to be attributed to the influence of Iranian traditions. However, in the idea that wealth should not be hoarded but given away we can see the Inner Asian redistributive principles.¹⁵⁹ If we summarize the nature of rule in *Kutadgu Bilig* we can also say that the ruler did not rule alone but with his advisers in a system of joint rule as it were. Here also we see Inner Asian traditions of power-sharing.¹⁶⁰ This was also different from the nearly contemporaneous principles put forward by Nizām al-Mulk to the Seljuqid ruler Melikshāh.¹⁶¹

However, with respect to the structure of the army in *Kutadgu Bilig*, the model was that of a paid army. Here again we encounter Iranian models with a strong center at work. The ruler, however, rejected this Iranian model with a paid army. Yet throughout this source we see this model being introduced as an idea: the army was there to bring order, to quell civil strife, to fight against the enemies. The army was not constituted from adherents in the tribal order or from subjects, but survived on silver.¹⁶² Apparently these passages display pressure to introduce mercenary armies into the Qarakhanid structure which had lost much of its earlier vigour and where rulers were functioning more and more as rulers of city states acknowledging Seljuq or Qarakhitai suzerainty as will be discussed shortly. But the most important aspect of this phrase is the part expressing the ruler's doubts about the means of acquiring silver: violence. There is doubt and pain at the propensity for violence in the words of the ruler of this society in transition from Buddhism, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism and pagan beliefs to Islam, from the steppe to the city, in search for a relationship with a subject population which had a claim on equality based on Islam.¹⁶³ In the ruler's words we witness the pain of all the social transformations, of societies caught between different trends of civilization. The issue in Inner Asia would not be resolved

¹⁵⁹ See Chapter One on redistribution in general and Chapter Four in particular.

¹⁶⁰ On this issue see note 70 and also Zeki Velidi Togan, 1939: 261-262 and 290.

¹⁶¹ Hubert Darke, 1960.

¹⁶² The insistence on "silver" in *Kutadgu Bilig* is the more interesting in the face of the silver crisis that lasted until Mongolian times (Blake, 1936).

¹⁶³ This is a picture different from what Peter Golden presents as despotic in character in "Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Chinggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* II(1982).37-76.

soon. It was only in the days of Temür in the fifteenth century that the “circle” closed on both ends (by that time the society had come to rely on the stronger state structure, and the merchants also had found for themselves a niche in the Sufi orders).¹⁶⁴

The world is a garden for the state to master
 The state is power supported by the law.
 The law is policy administered by the king.
 The king is a shepherd supported by the army.
 The army are assistants provided for by taxation.
 Taxation is sustenance gathered by subjects.
 Subjects are slaves provided for by justice.
 Justice is that by which the rectitude of the world
 subsists.

Before the Timurids, even before the Mongols, this formula had been put forward by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāḍī, but without success. Fakhr al-Dīn Rāḍī's formulation ran as follows:

The world is a garden, whose *ābyār* (waterer) is the dynasty (*dawlat*); the dynasty is an authority (*sulṭān*), whose guardian (*hājib*) is the *sharīʿa*; the *sharīʿa* is a policy (*siyāsāt*), which preserves the kingdom (*mulk*); the kingdom is a city which the army brings into existence; the army is guaranteed by wealth (*lashkar-rā māl kafālat kunad*); wealth is acquired from the subjects; the subjects are made servants (*banda*) by justice; justice is the axis of the wellbeing of the world.

The above quotation comes from a diagram in the form of a circle divided into eight segments at the end of the section on politics in his work which Fakhr al-Dīn Rāḍī presented to the Khorezmshāh Tekesh.¹⁶⁵

In the Qarakhanid case, however, there was no such circle yet. The wishful introduction of a paid army tells us about the tensions in the society. A paid army would be in the service of the prince, the commander, but would not meddle in politics as a tribal army would. Furthermore, such an army could be used to keep peace and would not be instrumental in any kind of violence that would arise because of its insistence on its own views. We know that earlier the Qarakhitai ruler asked that the Qarluqs¹⁶⁶—the tribal people who had invited the Qarakhitai to Transoxiana—be sent to Kashgar, disarmed and put to agriculture; the Qarluqs revolted (1158). The loyalty of tribal armies was difficult to maintain. An atmosphere of “overlapping loyalties” could not deal with tribal forces who had their own cause; what was

¹⁶⁴ From *Nasayih-i Iskandar*, Herat (?), dated A.H. 829 (A.D. 1425) f. 12 as quoted in Thomas W. Lentz and Glenn D. Lowry (eds.), *Timur and the Princely Vision. Persian Art and Culture in the Fifteenth Century*. Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Museum, 1989 (p. 12).

¹⁶⁵ Lambton, 1981:132, 136-37.

¹⁶⁶ On the Qarluq see note 63 above.

required was keeping the balance, and the paid army was better for that purpose.

Principles of how to govern were also represented in the *Kutadgu Bilig* in an outlook in which wishful thinking and reality are merged together. The ruler is told how to govern:¹⁶⁷

Your subjects have three claims upon you—oppress them not, and pay their due. The first is that you keep the coinage pure and protect the standard. O man of great wisdom. The second is that you give the people just laws and not allow them to do violence one another. The third is that you maintain the roads in security, thoroughly cleansing them of highwaymen and brigands.

We can say that the Qarakhanids succeeded in the first two “claims”. The abundance of coinage under the different rulers shows the concern about coinage and also how it was used as a symbol of legitimacy. Yet at the same time the multiple coinage was also a means to localize the economy and to increase the value of the local currency.¹⁶⁸ It is due to these measures that local wealth was kept and used for edification. As Frye notes, in the Qarakhanid period:¹⁶⁹

The silver crisis continued down to the Mongol conquest, and if foreign trade is a good index of prosperity in this period, there certainly was a drop in exchanges with eastern Europe... The proliferation of robber bands, ‘*ayyār*’, plus the Turkish nomadic tribes throughout the Near East are characteristic of this age, which many scholars have characterized as one of decline. Curiously, as we have seen with artistic flowering under the Qarakhanids, so elsewhere in Iran the time between the fall of the Samanids and the Mongol invasion was a period of great literary, especially poetic, activity.

Furthermore, the adoption of the *sharī‘a* and the respect shown to it¹⁷⁰ effected also the attitudes towards violence among ordinary people. Transaction contracts from Qarakhanid times¹⁷¹ show that values related to

¹⁶⁷ Dankoff, 1983:221.

¹⁶⁸ Robert P. Blake, “The Circulation of Silver in the Moslem East Down to the Mongol Epoch,” *HJAS* 2(1936):291-321. See also Zeki Velidi Togan, 1939:111-113, §6a and Thomas S. Noonan, “The Onset of the Silver Crisis in Central Asia,” *AMEA* 7(1989):221-248.

Even in our age and day such measures have been used, with an official exchange rate that was lower than the real (black market) exchange rate to encourage native, local production.

¹⁶⁹ Frye, 1964:189. Lately Bregel, 1991:65 also says that the arrival of the nomads during this time period was beneficial to the economy, as long as there was pasture around the oases. Moreover, he ascribes the growth of the cities not only to the “development of commerce and industry,” he also speaks “of the influx of population from the countryside, who fled from the depredations of the nomads, as well as the increasing pressure of taxes.”

¹⁷⁰ Barthold, 1968:239, 292, 311.

¹⁷¹ Şinasi Tekin, “Bilinen En Eski İslami Türkçe Metinler: Uygur Harfleriyle Yazılmış Karahanlılar Devrine ait Tarla Satış Senetleri (473,483=1080, 1090),” *Seçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi* IV (1975):157-184 (p.159).

Also Sha Biti (Ahmed Sabit), “A Karakhanid contract written in Arabic,” a resumé presented at the International Seminar on the Silk Roads, Urumqi, PRC (19-21 August, 1990). This contract is from 503 A.H. that is from 1109/1110.

safeguards for life and property coming down from Buddhistic Uighur traditions continued side by side with the *sharīʿa*. While warfare was not considered violence, extortion was viewed as violence as we know from the passage above.¹⁷² However the Qarakhanids remained weak on the security side. They were not able to bring about such a thorough cleaning of the roads of highwaymen. After describing the duties of the ruler our source continues saying:¹⁷³

Once you have paid your subjects their due, generous monarch, then you are in a position to demand your own due of them.

You have three claims upon your subjects, that you may require of them. Open your ears! The first is that they respect your command and carry it out quickly, whatever it may be. The second is that they not hold back the Treasury-due, but pay their taxes on time, open-handed one. The third is that they bear arms against your enemies and bear love toward your friends.

The duties of the subjects can be summarized as “obedience, taxes and conscription”¹⁷⁴ and they represent a mixture of Iranian and steppe traditions. Obedience rather than consensus, consent and regular taxation rather than irregular impost and prestations hark back to Iranian traditions, whereas subjects bearing arms was a continuation of steppe traditions as well as of the Islamic ideas of “warriors of the faith.”¹⁷⁵ Here they are not called an army. Later the army is described as “servants” not subjects. Here again we can see conflict coming into the picture in relation to military matters. On the one hand they were regarded as subjects who had the right to bear arms as in the steppe tradition;¹⁷⁶ on the other hand they were servants, or paid soldiers. Steppe traditions in military matters had not made themselves at home on sedentary soil.¹⁷⁷ On the other hand, we saw above how power-sharing and redistribution were institutionalized during the Qarakhanid period.

The Commercial Policies of the Qarakhanids and their Merchants

Although *Kutadgu Bilig* is rich in information concerning the traditions, realities and aspirations of Inner Asian society, it is surprising that merchants

¹⁷² Although there is lip service to “do not shed blood.” (Dankoff, 1983:211) at another occasion it is stated “whatever you want to do it on the infidel (Dankoff, 1983:218)

¹⁷³ Dankoff, 1983: 221 verses 5578-5583.

¹⁷⁴ It is noteworthy that this is still a concept used. In 1937 Abdullah Alpdoğan, a Turkish general spoke in Eastern Turkey saying “we only want three things: soldiers, taxes and obedience.” “Yarım Yüzyıl Sonra,” in *Nokta* 5/25 (28 June 1987). 12-23 (p.13).

¹⁷⁵ Barthold, 1968: 229 and Frye, 1964:123, 124, 156, 160.

¹⁷⁶ This right was also accorded to Muslims as “warriors of the faith.” But this Islamic tradition also has its origins in the tribal customs of the Arabs.

¹⁷⁷ This is a feature that we encounter in the Mongolian and Ottoman periods in the form of *iqṭāʿ* benefiting soldiers or the Ottoman *timar*.

are given little mention. However, we should keep in mind that Nizām al-Mulk does not mention them at all.¹⁷⁸ In the *Kutadgu Bilig* they are mentioned separately, placed after the nobles, prince's servants (commoners), descendants of the prophet, scholars and ulama, physicians, diviners, dream interpreters, astrologers, poets and cultivators and just before the stock-breeders, craftsmen and the poor.¹⁷⁹

Then come the merchants. They never rest from trading and seeking a profit. They roam the world for a living, while they keep mind and heart devoted to God. Associate with them as they come and go, do business with them, and give them what they require. For they have acquired all the choice and beautiful and desirable things of the world. They travel round from east to west, bringing you whatever you may wish. They provide all sorts of silken stuffs, and all the world's rare and wondrous things. O discriminating and generous one! If there were no merchants roaming the world, when could you ever wear a black sable lining? If the China caravan ceased to raise dust on the roads, how could these countless kinds of silks arrive? If the merchants did not travel the world around, who could ever see a string of pearls? Were I to enumerate the many items of the sort, my discourse would be too long.

Such are the merchants. So consort with them, leave the door open. Treat them kindly and you may be sure that your good name will travel far. For these are they who spread one's name abroad, be it good or bad. And if they favor you with some rare item, reciprocate in just measure, and they will be happy. For in matters of profit and loss they have a very fine sense, so pay attention to this when you deal with them. Hear a man who has roamed the world and seen and suffered much: if you would spread your name abroad, be sure to treat travelers hospitably. If you desire good repute, then give merchants good recompense. If you want a good name, my son, continually favor the traveler and the merchant caravan. Deal with merchants in this manner and you will enjoy contentment and good repute.

This passage shows us that the Qarakhanid concern for merchants was equal to hospitality shown to travelers. In other words there was no organic relationship between the merchants and the government or dynasty. As mentioned earlier keeping the coinage pure and the roads safe were regarded as duties of the rulers and showing hospitality would be an extension of those concerns which can be summarized as "facilitating commerce." The rulers were not expected to side with the merchants and institute measures or pronounce decrees that could be regarded as pro-merchant policies—a phenomenon that occurs in the Mongolian period. It was also not expected from the merchants that they would take sides politically. In fact in a few instances we find in our sources that merchants and merchant activities in the twelfth century were regarded as neutral. There are two especially striking passages, one from the east and the other from the west. In the former we are

¹⁷⁸ Darke, 1960.

¹⁷⁹ Dankoff, 1983: 184, verses 4419-4438.

told that towards the end of the twelfth century the later Chinggis Khan's close associate Borghol sent his brother Yesüder through the enemy lines disguising him as a merchant.¹⁸⁰ The other reference is from the *Memoirs of Usamah Ibn-Munqidh*.¹⁸¹ When Usamah is attacked by a Frankish woman in Antioch, his Frankish friend says in his defence: "This is a bourgeois [*burjasi*] (i.e. merchant) who neither fights nor attends a fight." The neutrality of the merchant is also emphasized in *Kutadgu Bilig* which portrays them as people who would spread good or bad news according to what they observed.

Merchants in Action

While "neutrality" of merchants was the general norm that had developed in the aftermath of the break up of the Abbasid Empire, by the twelfth century we also become aware of an opposite tendency, especially in Bukhara, the seat of the former Samanid empire. Here in Bukhara, wealth and politics were striving for a common cause. Since the Qarakhanids who replaced the Samanids in 999 in Transoxiana, did not follow a pattern of one ruler and one capital, but preferred instead multiple capital cities, Bukhara lost some of its former luster and importance. On the other hand, it continued to flourish as a city of great learning. The learning institutions in Bukhara attracted the greatest minds and the great Sufi teachers like Hamadānī, Ghijduvānī and Yesevī all studied in Bukhara in the twelfth century. The learning centers run by the famous family of the Şadrs employed many scholars. In a long passage quoted by Barthold we become aware of the Şadr's connections to worldly matters. Summing up the situation Barthold says, "The stories of 'Awfī and Ibn al-Athīr show that the Şadr by no means led the life of a hermit, and possessed vast financial means. This is confirmed by Nasavī's account of the same Şadr, who held the office of khatīb together with that of ra'īs, but for wealth could be compared only with ruling princes; 6,000 faqīhs were maintained at his expense."¹⁸²

Thus Bukhara not only attracted students of learning but also money and wealth. Looking at the rich merchants who were in cooperation with the Şadr who possessed vast financial means we get the impression that rich merchants in the twelfth century wanted political support and stability coming

¹⁸⁰ T'ang Ch'i, *Moğol Sūlalesi Devrinde Türk ve İslam Dünyası ile Temasda Bulunan Şahsiyetler*. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Istanbul, Faculty of Letters. Chair for General Turkish History. Istanbul, 1970 (p.191). Unfortunately I do not know of any reference that describes the merchant outfit. However, one could think of the merchants in the Mehemmed Siyāh Qalem miniatures.

¹⁸¹ Philip K. Hitti, *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades. Memoirs of Usamah Ibn Munqidh*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1929), 1987 (p.170).

¹⁸² Barthold, 1968: 354-355.

from this support. That there was no dearth of rich merchants in Transoxiana at this time as we know from our sources. When the Mongols under Chinggis Khan conquered Bukhara, they confiscated the goods and silver previously plundered from Mongolian caravans. After plunder the silver had been sold by the Khorezmshāh to the rich of Bukhara.¹⁸³ It is significant that the rich who could and would buy the silver were located in Bukhara. In the face of the dearth of silver, the “silver crisis”, it is even more noteworthy that the Khorezmshāh did not keep the silver for his treasury but sold it to the Bukharan merchants. One wonders against what was this silver sold and what was the exchange rate. The use of silver for dealings with the outside world comes out quite clearly from this episode.

After their conquest of Bukhara the Mongols made a list of 280 rich merchants of whom 190 were native Bukharans and 90 were foreigners and taxed them heavily.¹⁸⁴ One wonders whether it was these rich Bukhara merchants who were referred to as forming “merchant trusts” in the *Kutadgu Bilig*.¹⁸⁵ The related passage reads:¹⁸⁶

In this way prince and subjects are paid their mutual claims and both follow their proper course. Thus the people gain the benefit of their prince, while the prince gains tranquility and promotes his reputation. Clearly this is your royal glory. O king, assuring you a portion in both the worlds. Then the Ulema may stand and share their wisdom with the people. The public censor, again, will have a strong hand and, making the rounds of the community, will restrain evildoers. *The merchants will preserve their trusts*, [my italics I.T] the artisans continue to impart their skills, the farmers work hard cultivating their field, the stockbreeders multiply their livestock.

There came into being a “democratic” movement in Bukhara at the beginning of the thirteenth century directed against both the rich merchants and the Šadr̄s. It was led by Sanjar, the son of the seller of shields.¹⁸⁷ From this we can deduce that there was also a conflict between the rich merchants and the small merchants and artisans. An overview of the eleventh and twelfth centuries shows that under Qarakhanid policy merchants were left alone but were not helped. There was, however, confiscation of property from richer merchants who tried to ally with the aristocratic families or who came from these families. In the face of the uncertainties and insecurities of the time we see then merchants and merchant capital looking for political outlets under the Šadr̄. The Šadr̄ themselves were, as already mentioned, owners of rural

¹⁸³ Barthold, 1968:410.

¹⁸⁴ John Andrew Boyle, 1958, I: 104 and İbrahim Kafesoğlu, 1984:263 n.140. Sayyid Ejel, the *sayyid* at the Mongolian court and in their service as the governor of Yünnan, was related to this Bukharan elite.

¹⁸⁵ Dankoff, 1983: 221.

¹⁸⁶ Barthold, 1968: 221.

¹⁸⁷ Barthold, 1968: 355.

estates, big herds and many shops in the city.¹⁸⁸ It was a movement which eventually met with resistance. The Şadr̄s were rescued from the “democratic” rule by the Khorezmshāh in 1207. However, when Meḥemmed Khorezmshāh b. Tekesh took Bukhara from the hands of Sanjar the Shield maker (1209), he did not restore the authority of the Şadr̄, but appointed an outsider to be the chief of the Hanefite judges in Bukhara.¹⁸⁹ The Khorezmshāh was attempting to revive the center. Towards this end he also built a mercenary army which, however, was not strong enough. He did not initiate any meaningful policies safeguarding merchant interests; neither was he able to bring stability to the region. He showed signs of an interest in conquering China, yet, in Barthold’s words, “There was no...harmony between the Khwārezm-shāh’s ambition to conquer Eastern Asia, and the commercial interests of his subjects.”¹⁹⁰ However, the Khorezmshāh had neither a docile army¹⁹¹ to provide security for the realm, nor was he interested in commerce. He had already closed the Turkestan trade routes.¹⁹²

The appointment of an outsider by the Khorezmshāh to be chief of the Hanefite judges in Bukhara is of significance as a step towards the centralization of justice and its enforcement by the coercive power of the state.¹⁹³ Although the Khorezmshāh example was not successful, it shows us the emergence of a need for such a ruler. Normally we would associate the centralization of justice with the Mongols. However, here we see that that rulers, who represented justice themselves, in fact wanted a justice system that was subordinate to them.

When we look more closely at this development under the Khorezmshāh, we see that it was not only the rulers who wanted to control the judiciary system, but also jurists who wanted to establish close ties with the ruling establishment, in fact with coercive power. Fakhr al-Dīn Rāḍi (1149-1209) was probably the foremost of them. He came from a merchant family and also earned his living by commerce.¹⁹⁴ He seems to have been one of the earliest persons to break away consciously from the tradition of independence. When we consider that scholars and merchants were usually from the same families, or the same person as in the case of Rāḍi and later Molla Fenari (1350-1431),¹⁹⁵ we can see that the merchant’s neutrality and the

¹⁸⁸ Frye, 1964: 188 mentions shops in the city.

¹⁸⁹ Frye, 1964: 183.

¹⁹⁰ Barthold, 1968: xxxi.

¹⁹¹ Barthold, 1968: 377, 405.

¹⁹² Barthold, 1968: 400. But elsewhere (1962:31) he says there was lack of response from Muslim subjects. The evidence shows that Muslim merchants were interested, but that the Khorezmshāh had other plans.

¹⁹³ King John in England started to collect the dues himself in place of the lords and thus justice was centralized.

¹⁹⁴ Süleyman Uludağ, 1991: 1 and 17.

¹⁹⁵ Hakkı Aydın, *İslam Hukuku ve Molla Fenari*. İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1991.

scholar's independence had common roots and were closely related. In Fakhr al-Dīn Rāḍī's case we see that he was consciously striving for contact with rulers and to expand the area of his influence.¹⁹⁶ It seems that he was eager to influence politics and towards that aim he was willing to forsake the by now traditional independence of the scholar. Fakhr al-Dīn Rāḍī was criticized for his "love of position" and for his "love for the company of rulers."¹⁹⁷

On the other hand, when we examine Nizām al-Mulk and his *Siyāset-nāme*, we see that the *qāḍī* is always the person who can not be trusted because he is greedy, reminding one of the *qāḍīs* in the tales of the later Central Asian Khoja Naṣr al-Dīn. *Siyāsetnāme* was going to serve as a guideline for the Seljuqs. The examples were mostly drawn from the Ghaznavid times. The Ghaznavids with their centralized establishment built around *ghulām* armies provided an example to be followed by the Seljuqs. During Seljuqid times it is apparent that there were problems with "independent" *qāḍīs*. But the Seljuqids had established themselves as sultans, and the relationship between the sultan whose *raison d'être* was justice and the judicial establishment had yet to be defined. The independent *qāḍī* was a phenomenon of the age of the international political order of the ninth to eleventh centuries. In that order the *qāḍīs* were one of the independent but autonomous groups. In summary, the Seljuqs had reservations concerning the independent *qāḍī* and the Khorezmshāh tried to do away with them. However, they were glorified under the Qarakhanids. Times were changing and the tide of affairs was towards establishing close relationships with the rulers, a process that eventually resulted in the merchants' forsaking their independence. However, as we have seen, both the independent scholar and the ruler were ready for joint action even before the coming of the Mongols. But it was the Mongols who were ready to take action and had the means to enforce these actions.

In conclusion, just before the Mongol invasions the general picture was one of a large number of displaced and mobile people roaming around from Tun-huang to Transoxiana and from Transoxiana to the Near East where in the conflict between Crusaders and Muslims many people were making a living by taking sides in shifting alliances. Merchants in this atmosphere were no one's concern. They were also considered "neutral," but they were not able to take advantage of their "neutral" position when the countryside as well as the cities were changing hands continually. Their neutrality became also somewhat of a liability; both the ruler of Otrar and the Khorezmshāh had no qualms about killing merchants who had come as envoys using their "neutral" status. They were killed as "spies."

¹⁹⁶ Uludağ, 1991:19.

¹⁹⁷ Uludağ, 1991:11-12, 22, n.2.

The dissatisfaction of the Muslim merchants is only one example of overall dissatisfaction. Within all this turmoil, a lot of agricultural land had also come under destruction. The former religious tolerance¹⁹⁸ and pattern of coexistence was also no longer present¹⁹⁹ and people apparently had lost their patience. This dissatisfaction with Qarakhitai rule among their sedentary subjects was so great that they did not hesitate to invite the non-Muslim Mongols as saviors.

It is no wonder then that the merchants in Inner Asia should be the ones to look for greener pastures. They found the solution with the Mongols and their forces, and in partnership with them they forced the gates to China. They had been trying to gain access to the China market for a long time.²⁰⁰ One of the most illustrative accounts is by Sharaf al-Zamān Ṭāhir Marvazī who in his work of 1120 devotes a whole chapter to the China trade. In this chapter he especially states that “their territories are divided into three categories, namely, Ṣīn, Qitāy, called by common people Khitāy, and Uyghur, of which the greatest is the region and kingdom of Ṣīn (China).” He continues further saying:²⁰¹

The Chinese do not mix with the Turks from whom they differ in most things because the latter wear *jubbās* and turbans and not *qabas* and hats. (On the contrary) the Qitay and Uyghur mix with the Turks and have relations with them. They have relations and correspondence with the kings of Transoxiana, whereas the Chinese are different and *do not allow strangers to enter their country and stay among them.* [my italics I.T.]

The last statement is a reflection of the changes in the policies toward foreigners in Sung China in the aftermath of An Lu-shan's rebellion.²⁰²

In China both fiscal policy and justice were determined by the state and ideology and represented by impartial bureaucrats. Sung merchants thriving

¹⁹⁸ Frye, 1964: 116.

¹⁹⁹ Küchlüg Naiman, who managed to sit himself on the Qarakhitai throne, was especially extreme in his anti-Muslim policies. Juvaini (Boyle), 1958, I:61-70.

²⁰⁰ The following excerpt from Albert Hourani is quite illustrative of these developments:

The great cities were centers of manufacture... there is some evidence, however, that production for markets outside the Muslim world became less important from the 11th century onwards, and transit trade of goods produced elsewhere, in China, India or western Europe, more important. This change was connected with the revival of urban life in Europe, and in particular the growth of the industries in Italy.

Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*. The Belnap Press of Howard University Press, 1991 (p.112). Muslim merchants from Central Asia had joined Temüjin (Chinggis Khan) from the earliest times (Chapter One, note 32). Some, such as Maḥmūd Yalavach, ‘Alī Khoja of Bukhara and Yūsuf Kankā of Otrar even took place in the embassy sent to the Khorezmshāh (Barthold, 1968:396).

²⁰¹ Minorsky, 1942:14-15.

²⁰² As this passage from Marvazī shows, the position of Sung China posed a problem for Muslim merchants. It is for this reason that the discussion on China in this chapter emphasizes the Sung, more than on the Liao or Chin which also represent the history of China.

in a setting close to a world system were not in a position to shape power. Unlike Islam, Confucian ideology neither encouraged nor condoned such action. That would have been “legalism,” doomed thousands of years ago. Muslim merchants had no such barriers as far as ideology was concerned.

In the beginning of the thirteenth century with the aid of the Mongols and in cooperation with their former foes, the Uighur merchants, Muslim Merchants were able to influence the terms of favorable trade and fiscal policies. As the Mongolian judiciary system was functioning within the “normal” chain of command of the army of conquest, the army was an important tool for the Muslim merchants. With this development the impartial character of twelfth century merchants, Muslim or non-Muslim came to an end.

CHAPTER THREE

SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND THE KERAIT

In the tribal world of Inner Asia, especially in Mongolia and to the west of the Altai region towards the Tarbaghatai, we witness during the twelfth century fierce tribal strife. This inter and intratribal warfare is usually understood as warfare for the sake of warfare, as stemming from the “nature” of tribes.¹

The Earliest Accounts

According to a thirteenth century account the Kerait² appeared in history³ in the year 1007, on the occasion of the conversion of their ruler⁴ to Chris-

¹ The nomadic tribes of the twelfth century have not left to us documents that would give their own view point. Yet my contention is that tribal histories can be reconstructed for the twelfth century, once we are clear about the vantage point and biases of the sources, because there are so many of them. The focus on the twelfth century is intentional. In view of the fact that the new order (*jasagh*) of the thirteenth century was in essence anti-tribal, the preceding twelfth century is crucial for an understanding of problems related to the formation of nomadic states and empires.

In that spirit this chapter will not compare the Chinggisid Empire to other nomadic empires, but will seek for paths of transformation from the previous tribal order to the state based on an army of conquest. Because the development of the Chinggisid state was in many ways closely related to developments among the Kerait, the study will concentrate on the Kerait. During the course of the chapter we will see that there was a fundamental difference in organization between the Kerait of the twelfth century and the Chinggisid order of the thirteenth century. This fundamental difference is that between a tribal order and a nomadic state. The latter will be discussed in Chapter Four.

² The name of these people entered the literature in western languages as *Kerait*, a reading based on the Persian KRAYT. The different forms of the name Kerait have been rendered by Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan. Chen-wou ts'incheng lou*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1951 (207-209). Paul Pelliot transcribed the name as *Keräit* but adopted the form Kerait because that is the familiar form in the western languages. Here also the form Kerait has been used for the sake of convenience.

The name has also been discussed by Doerfer, 1963, I: No.329. Julius Nemeth has discussed the evolution and the spread of the name in “Kereit, Kerey, Giray,” *UAJB* 36(1965).360-365.

³ Earlier there was only one study on the Kerait done by D. M. Dunlop “The Karaits of Eastern Asia,” *BSOS* 11(1944).276-289. However, there are now four recent studies on the Kerait. Paul Ratchnevsky has devoted a considerable portion of his work to Chinggis Khan's relations with the Kerait Ong Khan. See Paul Ratchnevsky, *Činggis Khan. Sein Leben und Wirken*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983, abbreviated here as *RCK* (pp. 28-76). A more recent study is an article on the ethnic origins and clan composition of the Kerait by Ch'en Te-chih, “Kereit Kingdom up to the Thirteenth Century.” This article appeared in Vol. 3 of *Yüan-shih*

tianity. The metropolit of Merv, who reports this conversion to his Catholicus, incorporates a letter sent to him by the then Kerait ruler. In this letter the Kerait ruler stated that the number of followers in the new faith was 200,000 and that they were in need of a priest for baptism. He himself had obtained his evangelium from the Nestorian merchants living in his camp. As their food consisted of milk and meat only, their major concern was as to how they should fast. Upon the referral of these requests, the Catholicus recommended that the metropolit send two presbyters and deacons with altar vessels to the Kerait. They were given permission to fast on milk.⁵ It is well known that the echoes of this news at the time of the Crusades, combined with other events, engendered the legend of Prester John who would come from the east to the aid of the Crusades.⁶ These stories gave way to other

lun-ts'ung (pp. 1-22) and was brought to my attention by Ruby Lam to whom I would like to acknowledge my gratitude here. The other two works deal more with the Kerait starting with the time of Chinggis Khan in the thirteenth century. Of these *Kereiler Kerveni* ("The Kerait Caravan") by Islam Kabyshtuly was published in 1978 in the Kazakh language in Mongolia. I am indebted to Hasan Oraltay for sending me a photocopy of this work. The more recent work is by the young Kazakh scholar A. Sh. Kadyrbayev, *Ocherki Istorii srednevekovikh Ugurov, Djalairov, Naimanov i Kireitov*. Almaty, 1993. I thank Timur Beisembiev and the author for making a copy of this work available to me. There is also a short account on the Kerait in the *Ha-sa-k'e tsu chien-shih* ("A short History of the Kazakh People") which was published in 1987 in Urumqi, PRC (pp.101-107).

⁴ Rashīd al-Dīn speaks of the Kerait as a *qawm* "people" who had their own rulers (*pādshāh*). In this study different editions of Rashīd al-Dīn's work were used. One of these is a critical edition of the first volume on the tribal histories by A. A. Alizade (Vol. I. Akademia Nauk Azerbaidjanskoj SSR, Moscow 1965, abbreviated as *R/A* in this study). There is also another fuller but not so critical edition by Bahman Karīmī in two volumes, *Jāmi' al-Tawārikh* (Tahran, 1338, abbreviated as *R/T* in this study). There is also a Russian translation edited by A. A. Semenov. Part 1 of Volume I was translated by L. A. Khetagurov. Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSR, 1952, (abbreviated as *R/SL* in this study). The above reference to *qawm* and *pādshāh* is from *R/A*: 253. Tribal leaders or chieftains he calls *muqaddam* (*R/A*: 254).

The story of conversion is based mainly on the information given by Bar Hebraeus as can be seen from the references. Pelliot, 1951:208 had some doubts on this information, a stand that has been adopted by Ratchnevsky (*RCK*: 3, n.10).

⁵ Gustav Oppert, 1864: 88-90. See also E. A. W. Budge, *The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l Faraj... commonly known as Bar Hebraeus*. 2 vols. London-Oxford, 1932. The translation into Turkish speaks of this incidence as "Aynı yıl [389 H/1007] şarktaki iç Türk diyarının kabilelerinden olup *Kruth* adını taşıyan biri, *Mesih'e* inandı ve bu kabilenin hükümdarı ile ilgili olan bir mucize bunların kamilen vaftiz edilmelerine sebeb oldu." (*Abu'l-Farac Tarihi*, 2nd printing. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987 Vol. I: 279).

⁶ For a recent treatment of this issue see Igor de Rachewiltz, *Prester John and Europe's Discovery of East Asia*. Canberra, 1972. See also W. W. Rockhill (1900: 110-111, n.4) who says "Palladius (op. cit. 23) has shown how some of the confusions concerning Ung Khan has arisen, the title of Wang Khan (Ung Khan) being transferred from Prester John, already dead at the time, to the Turkish tribe of Wang-ku (Ongu, Raschideddin's Ongot). The whole subject of Prester John has been so admirably discussed by Yule (Marco Polo, i. 229, et seq.) that nothing remains to be said about it."

stories. But in actual fact there is no additional news about the Kerait in the eleventh century.⁷

Their homeland is given as “to the northeast of the Turks of the Interior” in the letter to the metropolit.⁸ According to another account,⁹ they used to live earlier southeast of the Kyrghyz, between the Irtysh and Altai. However, according to the letter, their conversion was the result of an encounter on top of a mountain¹⁰ and the Altai region may well have been the former habitat, which later was taken over by the Naiman. Later the Kerait moved east and northeast. By the first half of the twelfth century their main base and refuge area was along the Orkhon River¹¹ and they were making raids and incursions into the Kentei Mountain range in the vicinity of the Tatar.¹² Later in the second half of the century the Keraites were nomadizing around the Onon

⁷ The late Turkish historian Zeki Velidi Togan thinks that most of the information on the Kāfir Turks pertains to the Keraites and that names like Khata, Qara, Ivāniye and Tamghājiye all refer to the Keraites. See Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p.46, 48-51, 79 and *İç Asya Kavimleri Etnografyası*, 1963-64 Yılı Ders Notları. İstanbul, 1964 (in mimeograph), p.75. In his view the Keraites were ‘The Seven Tatars’ living in the Qinghai, Gansu regions of the present PRC. When the Tangut Kingdom was established at the end of the tenth century they were pushed out of the region. Following the southern route, Fa Hsien’s route, they arrived via Kashmir in the Khotan region around 1017. They were reported as having a swarthy countenance, i.e. *qara* ‘blackish’.

The reference on Khata is regarded by Z. V. Togan as an error for Khara as is also supported by Oppert, 1864. In the Muslim sources the Keraites are apparently also referred to as Tamghājiye and Ivāniya. The first refers to the *tavghaj* clan among the descendants of the Keraites, that is the Kirei of the Kazakh. Ivāniya on the other hand referred to a branch of the Tamghājiye (Z. V. Togan, *İç Asya*: 75). Z. V. Togan also mentions a certain Unc Khan in the eleventh century Khotan region. As this can neither be identified with Ong Khan To’oril, nor with the title *ong<wang* that was given to him nor with the Qarakhitai rulers, it is to be assumed that the title *ong khan* from the Chinese *wang han* was in use among the Inner Asian people much earlier than Ong Khan To’oril. The above reference is from Münejjim-bashi, *Jami’ud-düvel*. See Z. V. Togan, *Karahanlı*: 51.

⁸ We have no way of determining where these Turks of the Interior lived or who they were. At about the same time there were two waves of migrations according to the Syriac chronicle. One was from the east to the west to Transoxiana, the other a bit later from the northern Tibet region to Khotan. On these migrations see Z. V. Togan, *İç Asya*, pp. 48-49. However, S. G. Kijaštornyj’s study on the Tatar shows that these Turks of the Interior might be one of the “Tatar” groups (“Das Reich der Tataren in der Zeit vor Činggis Khan,” *CAJ* 36(1992).72-83), taking us again to issues discussed in Appendix A.

⁹ See the section on the Naiman in *R/A*: 292-293.

¹⁰ Having lost their way in the snow on top of a mountain they were led by a saint to salvation. They were persuaded by the saint to adopt the faith.

¹¹ They camped and left their “baggage,” women and beasts near the Orkhon River. We have a detailed narrative in epic form on the early history of the Kerait. This account has been interpolated into the section on the Tatars in Rashid al-Din’s work. Here in this study this whole episode has been rendered in translation as Appendix A.

¹² These were the Alchi Tatar (Appendix A).

and Kerülen Rivers, in an area extending to the sources of the Tula River in the west and to the borders of China in the south.¹³

The formation of the Kerait Khanate¹⁴ seems to have been related to the turmoil following the formation of the Tangut Kingdom (990 A.D.) in the region of the present Qinghai, Gansu and Ningxia provinces, PRC. As there is no information on them prior to 1007, it is most probable that they were formed in the interim.¹⁵ The clans¹⁶ making up the khanate are more or less known to us. According to legend there were seven clans in addition to the ruling one, confirming the number of clans in the twelfth century.¹⁷ Fur-

¹³ *R/A*: 253; *R/T*: 87; *R/SL* 1,1: 126. See also Pelliot, 1951: 209. According to Rashīd al-Dīn the Keraites used to live on the Altai and the Irtysh. The Naiman pushed them eastwards. As a result there has been continuous warfare between the two. On these views of Rashīd al-Dīn see also *RCK*: 1.

¹⁴ For the Keraites the term khanate seems to be appropriate on three accounts: first the rulers were all called *khan*. Secondly Rashīd al-Dīn emphasizes their long dynastic tradition on different occasions. Actually, according to him, the Kerait presented the example par excellence of a people who had had their own rulers since a long time. Thirdly, the structure of Kerait society is much in line with the anthropological definition of a “chiefdom.” See note 22 below.

¹⁵ The juxtaposition of these dates would indicate a relationship. As mentioned above (note 7) the late Zeki Velidi Togan sees the Kerait emerging out of the events that created the Tangut State. It would seem that he was right as the most recent studies by Dunnell, 1991 and Haarmann, 1974 show that the earlier history of the Kerait developed in the regions of present Qinghai and Xinjiang, PRC. See also Appendix A below for a discussion of these issues.

Ratchnevsky sees a relationship between the end of the Menggu Khanate in the middle of the twelfth century and the rise of Kerait (1986:2). He seems to be influenced by Pelliot’s interpretation that the information on the conversion of the Keraites from the beginning of the eleventh century is an interpolation (*RCK*: 3, n.10 from Pelliot, 1951: 208). I do not think that we have evidence to cast doubt on the authenticity of the information given by Bar Hebraeus as similar information is also recorded in other Islamic sources. See Z. V. Togan, *Karahanlılar*, pp. 48–49.

Under “Implications of this story for history” in Appendix A, we see that the earlier history of the Kerait goes back to the Kökenor Region, that is the present Qinghai Province, PRC. Gumilev’s (1987:96–100) reconstruction of Kerait history is based on the information given in our sources on the Northern Tsu-pu who seem to represent the northern connections of the Kerait.

¹⁶ Rashīd al-Dīn uses the Mongolian term *yasun* “bone.” Here I have translated the term as clan so as to denote the ethnic and kinship identity.

¹⁷ Below are given the names of the clans with the relevant source of information:

1. Jirgin (*MNT*). The name appears as HRQYN in *R/A*. On this clan see notes 208 and 247 below.
2. Tübe’en (*MNT*). See note 109 below.
3. Qongqayid or the Tongqayid (occurring frequently in *MNT* and Rashīd). See notes 126 and 247 below.
4. Ilyad or Alyad (*R/A*)
5. Ongqojid(?) (*MNT*, §187)
6. Saqayid (*R/T* 285)
7. Moghuls of Sariq Khan (Appendix A) and the ruling family with their Kerait.

Here *MNT* refers to the *Secret History of the Mongols* with the initials of its Mongolian form as *Mongghol-un ni’ucha topcha’an*. I have used the translation by Francis W. Cleaves, *The Secret History of the Mongols*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982. If

thermore, the origin of the different clans denotes association with different regions. One of the clans (Tübe'en) seems to have had close connections with a clan in the Tangut Kingdom, the T'o-pa.¹⁸ This close relation is also demonstrated by later Kerait history when the Tangut kingdom becomes a place of refuge for dissident Kerait leaders.¹⁹ Furthermore we have evidence in more than one source that there was a close relationship between the Mongols (Mogholan, not in the limited sense of the thirteenth century)²⁰ and the Kerait at the beginning of the twelfth century. These Mongols seem to have been at one point one of the participating tribes of the khanate under the leadership of the ruling Kerait ruling family as will be discussed later. On the other hand there was also a large following with a north-western, i.e. Qıpchaq/Qanglı, connection among the Kerait. We do not know exactly whether these people were in clan form or were merely a large group of followers.²¹

In view of these facts it is evident that the Kerait Khanate consisted of diverse groups without any common origins, neither regionally nor linguistically: a phenomenon typical of chiefdoms in Inner Asia.²² These observations concerning the composition of the Kerait Khanate are also supported by historical data in terms of the language prevalent among the Kerait. It seems that like in many other tribal societies located in cultural frontiers, bilingualism without literacy was prevalent among certain sections of the Kerait. In the words of Rashīd al-Dīn:

They share many characteristics with the Mongols. The methods of taxation, their traditions, their dialects and their languages are very close to one another.²³

Additionally, the personal names that we know of are also bilingual.²⁴ However, it seems certain that at the beginning of the thirteenth century Mongo-

not indicated otherwise, *MNT* refers to Cleaves' translation. The numbers preceded by a paragraph sign (§) refer to the sections of the text. Igor de Racheviltz's translation was not available to me.

¹⁸ Pelliot, *HC*, 55-57, 228 and Peter Olbricht and Elizabeth Pinks (ed.), *Meng-ta pei-lu and Hei-ta shih-lüeh*. Asiatische Forschungen: 56. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1980 (p.200). See also note 109 below.

¹⁹ The name of the Tübe'en appears too many times in conjunction with the name of Jaqa Gambu of the Kerait. His Tangut connections were very strong.

²⁰ For the usage of the phrase 'Mongols,' not in the limited sense see Pelliot, 1951:56.

²¹ See *YS* 130: biography of Pu-hu-mu (Vol. 5: 3163).

²² Sharon Baştuğ says that this arrangement is not necessarily typical of chiefdoms in general, but that it is standard among Altaic and Indo-European nomadic peoples of the Asian steppes (personal communication). For chiefdoms and their characteristics see Timothy Earle, "The Evolution of Chiefdoms," in Timothy Earle (ed.), *Chiefdoms: Power on Chiefdoms. Power, Economy and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

²³ *R/A*: 249-50, *R/T*: 264.

lian was the prevalent language, as is also evident from the clan names.²⁵ Later in history, however, they appear mostly as Turkish speaking clans among the Kazakhs, the Özbeks, the Bashkorts and the Crimean Tatars.

*A Narrative Account of Kerait History*²⁶

The developments in Kerait history become more pronounced by the twelfth century, especially as we get more information concerning their relations with neighboring tribes, the Tangut Kingdom and the Chin dynasty.²⁷ They also must have been one of the eighteen tribes who supported Yeh-lü Ta-shih around 1124-1129 in his quest for the riches of the west.²⁸

At this period the preoccupation of the Kerait was to stand against their enemies the Tatar who were making constant raids²⁹ into the Kerait encampments.³⁰ These attacks were carried out when the Keraites were on

²⁴ Below are given some of the personal names encountered in our sources; *t* and *m* in parenthesis indicate Turkish and Mongolian respectively:

to'oril<turkish *toghril*
 erke qara (t+m)
 buqa temür (t+m)
 sorqaghtani (m)
 cha'ur beki (m)
 kökse'ü sabragh (t)
 qori shilemün (m)
 qadagh ba'atur (m)
 doquz khatun (t)

²⁵ They spoke Mongolian and had Mongolian clan names, but carried personal names of mixed order, Turkish and Mongolian. It is also possible that the ruling family and some of the clans were bilingual.

²⁶ One of the main sources for this account is to be found in the *Hsin Yüan-shih* chapter 118. This account of the Kerait has been translated by T'ang Ch'i (1970: 157-178) into Turkish. However, this account is not a primary source. Another more recent account is T'u Chi, *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* chapter 20.

²⁷ For the detailed account from Rashīd al-Dīn see Appendix A; see also Pelliot, 1951: 242-248.

²⁸ For a list of these tribes see Wittfogel, and for the Tsu-pu as the ancestors of the Kerait see Gumilev, 1987:92.

²⁹ The literature on the Naiman has been cited in detail by Ratchnevsky (1983:1, n.16).

³⁰ The Tatar of this time were gaining power through their good relations with the newly established Chin dynasty (*R/A*: 260). Barthold ascribes this situation to the machinations of the Chinese in general. Apparently he is not completely wrong. The White Tatars were opposed to the Chin and supported Yeh-lü Ta-shih at the beginning, even refusing to sell horses to the Chinese. When the Chin government inquired about the matter, the Tatars sent their heir apparent to Yün-chung where he was detained (Wittfogel and Feng, 1949: 633). This was in 1127. In the next year when the Chin government dispatched a commander to attack Yeh-lü Ta-shih, the Tatars promised to guide him if their heir apparent was sent back (*ibid.*). From then on, they adopted a policy of being reluctant supporters of the Chin. In 1130 when an order was sent to various tribes to mobilize soldiers, the tribal chieftains disobeyed them (Wittfogel and Feng, 1949: 630). It seems they were using the horse trade and military support as a bait in their dealings with China.

migration, because this was the time when the nomads were most vulnerable.³¹ The Kerait ruler Sariq Khan, “the Yellow King,” who was camping along the Orkhon suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Tatars.³² According to the account Sariq Khan escaped from the Tatars with only four of his followers. No one else was left from his army of 40,000.³³ Many were killed; others were taken captive by the Tatars, including his grandson, the later Ong Khan, and his mother.³⁴ Sariq Khan had no recourse other than to seek refuge under the protection of the Naiman rulers. This incident is probably one of the earliest accounts we have for the Naiman who are generally known to historians from the beginning of the thirteenth century. In these later accounts there is no information to indicate that at one time they were the “protectors” of the Kerait. Apparently the reasons why throughout later Kerait history dissident members of the ruling family sought Naiman support were connected to this former period.³⁵ In fact, while the Kerait lived under Naiman protection, marriage ties were established between the two ruling families to mark this new relationship.³⁶

One group of the Naiman of that time were ruled by the Betekin clan³⁷ and like the Naiman rulers at the end of the century they carried the title of *buirug*, reminiscent of an Uighur connection in the past.³⁸ Sariq Khan, the

P. Pelliot ascribes these events to the second third of the twelfth century. The events that took place after Yeh-lü Ta-shih's departure fall into the earlier part of the the second third (1951: 245).

³¹ In one such an encounter a member of the chiefly family of the Alchi Tatar group who was captured by the Kerait explained his whereabouts by their need for a certain kind of wood suitable for arrows and clubs, because he was encountered in a region way out of their habitat. *R/A*: 195-196. See also Pelliot (1951: 242-245) who does not include these remarks.

³² The name Sariq Khan is interesting as the Kerait are known as having a swarthy complexion. They have been described as such by Rashīd al-Dīn. We are also told that Chinggis Khan referred to the swarthinness of Khubilai and said that he took after his maternal kin, i.e. the Kerait. J. A. Boyle, *The Successors of Chinggis Khan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971 (p. 241). The name Kerait is also derived in folks etymology from *kherei* (the crow), which is a bird of black color. Nemeth Gyula, 1965: 36. On Sariq Khan see Appendix A.

³³ *R/A*: 198.

³⁴ His grandson, Toghoril, who later became known as Ong Khan, and his mother (Ilma) were among the captives. See Appendix A and Pelliot, 1951: 245. On the reconstruction of the mother's name as *ilma* “mulberry” see Pelliot, 1951: 243.

³⁵ In the narrative of Chapter Three we see that Erke Qara, a young Kerait (note 90-92), was able to acquire Naiman support. Later we also see similar support extended to Jaqa Gambu (note 235).

³⁶ Appendix A.

³⁷ See Pelliot, 1951: 246.

³⁸ The Uighur connection is strongly stressed by Z. V. Togan. Pelliot does not say anything specific in this connection. He thinks that *buirug* < *boila* is an Avar term (1951:298). However the latest opinion on this issue is that these terms are separate and that *buirug* is a Turkish term. See Marsel Erdal, *Old Turkic Word Formation*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1991. 2

Kerait ruler, better known to historians under his Christian name Marghuz, i.e. Marcus, was also known as Buiruq Khan according to the Persian historian Rashīd al-Dīn.³⁹ The son of Marghuz was called Qurjaqus, i.e. Cyriacus. With his title *buiruq* he was later to be called Qurjaqus Buiruq Khan. The marriage connection was between Qurjaqus and the daughter of the Naiman ruler.⁴⁰ This marriage connection seems to have had two effects. The Naiman, as “wife givers” in this case, seem to have acquired a kin relation with a line superior to theirs in the tribal hierarchy.⁴¹ In return⁴² they⁴³ were instrumental in restoring the Kerait⁴⁴ people to the rule of Sariq (Marghuz) Khan. Subsequently former associates, tribes allied with him but which were dispersed after the defeat by the Tatars, began to join the ranks of Sariq (Marghuz) Khan again.⁴⁵

The restoration of the Kerait rule seems to have occurred around 1140,⁴⁶ corresponding to the time period of the early Mongol rulers, Qabul and Qutula Khans.⁴⁷ Soon there were disagreements between the Naiman and the

vols. (Vol. I: 231). Talat Tekin, to whom I owe the above reference, confirms this view of the Turkish origin of *buiruq*.

³⁹ *R/A*: 259. However it is interesting to note that except for the title of *buiruq*, there is no historical connections between the Naiman and the Kerait and the Uighur are not known to us. However, we know that the Naiman go back to the “Sākiz Oγuz” mentioned in the early Türk inscriptions (*RCK*: 1, n.1). *Naiman* also means “eight” in Mongolian.

⁴⁰ Her name was Töreqaımış. For the name see Pelliot, 1951: 247.

⁴¹ It is interesting to note that the Naiman ruler asks Sariq Khan that he might be granted the leadership of the Mongols. Pelliot (1951:243) also drew attention to the term *bakhsh kerdēn*, “to grant,” a term denoting hierarchy. In this case then the Kerait ruler Sariq Khan stands higher in hierarchy than the Naiman ruler. These earlier Mongols, seem to have been the dependents of Sariq Khan. It is of course noteworthy that this passage is interpolated into the section on the Tatar, who later become annihilated.

⁴² The Naiman ruler, on the other hand, got angry because he was not “granted” the Mongols and said: “I have revived your dead spirit with many people. For your flocks and herds that had gone astray I stood as a shepherd at the places of encampment. But man is as forgetful a being as the earth changes its features. From now on do not become friends with the Mongols and do not become their companions,” saying this to his men, he returned.” For the whole passage see Appendix A.

As we can see towards the end the Naiman ruler does not make a distinction between the Kerait and the Mongols. The relationship between the two seems to have been very close.

⁴³ The then Naiman ruler was Betekitei Oba Kötürchi Buiruq Khan (Pelliot, 1951: 246). His son Qajir Khan is some times called Qadir Khan in our sources (*qajir* in Mongolian is *qatır* in Turkish, that is a “mule”).

⁴⁴ The text has *ulus-e Kerajin*, i.e. “people of the Little Kerait” (*R/A*: 200 and Pelliot, 1951: 246).

⁴⁵ In this connection Rashīd al-Dīn says: “Thereafter the Mongols (Moghūlān) joined Sariq Khan” (Appendix A). The nature of our information on these developments leads one to conclude that the source of information was a literary fragment as Paul Pelliot also suspected (1951: 243-244).

⁴⁶ Pelliot (1951: 246) gives this date on the basis of his understanding of the events as recorded by Rashīd al-Dīn.

⁴⁷ *RCK*: 5-10 and 26.

Kerait, and Sariq (Marghuz) Khan broke away from the Naiman and headed eastwards.⁴⁸ The strife between the Naiman and the Kerait over the territories between the Irtysh and “Mogholistan” seem to stem from this period.⁴⁹ Shortly afterwards, the Tatars, the eastern foes of the Kerait, were successful in their endeavor against the Kerait. This time the Tatars of the Buir-nor region⁵⁰ were instrumental in handing over Marghuz (Sariq) Khan to the Chin authorities who then killed him.⁵¹ There is no indication as to why the Chin authorities had an interest in him. The illustration of this event, however, shows that he was crucified. Our sources state only that he was nailed to a wooden ass.⁵² Kerait folklore pertaining to this time is not interested in the Chin, but is preoccupied with the Tatars.⁵³ The story of Marghuz (Sariq) Khan continues with his wife:⁵⁴

After Sariq (Marghuz) Khan’s death, his khatun, called Qutuqtai Herigji (*herigji* means radiant and wavy and she was called this because her face was radiant and wavy) whose encampments were near the Tatar tribes, sent a messenger to them saying: “I wish to honor the ruler of the Tatar Na’ur Buiruq with a hundred sheep, ten mares and a hundred *öndür* of kumiss.” *Öndür* is [the name given to] very big containers, sewn together from skins that are put on carts, so that each can hold five hundred *men* of kumiss. She wanted to avenge their betrayal of her husband and hid a hundred valiant men, complete with arms in the *öndürs* and put them on the carts. When they arrived, the horses and sheep were handed over to the *ba’urchis*, so that they could attend the cooking. They said: “when the feast begins, we shall bring the kumiss on the carts.” When they were seated at the feast they led the hundred carts with the *öndürs* in front of their houses and unloaded them. The stalwarts came out and together with the khatun’s other retainers they drew their swords and seized and killed the Tatar ruler and also the majority of the Tatar people who were there. This story as to how Marghuz’s khatun avenged her husband is famous.”

Qurjaqus Buiruq Khan succeeded his father Marghuz (Sariq) with the consent of his brother Gür Khan. He had been married when he was quite young. His first wife Ilma bore him a son whom they named To’oril, i.e. “gerfalcon.”⁵⁵ This son of theirs would later be known as Ong Khan and

⁴⁸ Pelliot, 1951: 244.

⁴⁹ *R/A*: 292-93 the section on the Naiman. See also *R/T*: 96.

⁵⁰ Their leader was also called Buiruq Khan. To be more specific he was the Buiruq Khan of the Lake (*nawur*). On him see Pelliot, 1951: 238.

⁵¹ *R/A*: 260, *R/T*: 89

⁵² *R/A*: 260, *R/T*: 89. See Plate 3. The significance of the ass seems to be related to Jesus’ triumphant entry into Jerusalem riding upon an ass. Matthew (21.5) states:

“Behold, thy the king cometh unto thee, meek, and sitting upon an ass...”

⁵³ See Appendix A on Sariq Khan.

⁵⁴ *R/T*: 89-90 and *R/A*: 260-263.

⁵⁵ This is the Mongolian form of the originally Turkish word.

would revive the legends of Prester John.⁵⁶ When he was seven (around 1135), the Merkids captured him in a raid and, in the words of the *Secret History of the Mongols*, “they made [him] wear a black, speckled kid coat and he beat a mortar of the Merkid in the Bu’ura Steppe of the Selengge [River].”⁵⁷ Then his father Qurjaqus Buiruq Khan came, defeated the Merkid people and saved his son. Later he was captured together with his mother Ilma by the Tatar. Apparently his mother was very much favored by the Tatar chieftain⁵⁸ who was the leader of the Alchi Tatar group. Mother and son were rescued by the grandfather, Sariq (Marghuz) Khan, with Naiman support (see above).⁵⁹ By that time the young Qurjaqus was already married to the Naiman princess⁶⁰ with whose people they had taken refuge. Although as Nestorians one would expect them to be monogamous, these instances show that this was not the case for the ruling family. Earlier Sariq Khan also spoke of the “hundred women” that he had. Thus we know that Qurjaqus had at least two wives: To’oril’s mother Ilma, and the Naiman princess Töreqaımış. Most probably the two elder sons of the Naiman princess were already born when To’oril and his mother were rescued.⁶¹ Later Kerait history was very much affected by the succession struggles between the half brothers.⁶²

Of their father Qurjaqus Buiruq Khan we know very little. He used to reside in Orta Balghasun.⁶³ His younger brother Gür Khan⁶⁴ and his eldest son To’oril were sent away to the frontiers and were given troops to govern those regions.⁶⁵ His two sons from the Naiman princess were stationed closer

⁵⁶ See Gumilev, 1987. On To’oril who was known as Ong Khan see also Klaus Lech, *Das Mongolische Weltreich*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1968 (p. 181, note 21). On the title see note 7 above.

⁵⁷ MNT, §152.

⁵⁸ The name of the Tatar chieftain is according to the *Secret History* Ajai Khan (MNT, §152). Rashīd al-Dīn has Alchitai. See Pelliot, 1951: 243, 245.

⁵⁹ MNT, §152 has a different account which does not seem very plausible. According to this account he was forced to herd the camels of the Tatar chieftain and then it says: “Having taken a shepherd of Ajai Khan, he fled...”

⁶⁰ Her name was Töreqaımış. See above note 40.

⁶¹ They were Taitemūr Taishi, Yula and Maghus. See Pelliot, 1951:247.

⁶² Gumilev 1987: 136 thinks that the fact that To’oril was captured twice shows that “all was not well in the Kerait headquarters. His enemies could twice capture the khan’s son, only with the connivance of the khan’s relatives and grandees.”

⁶³ The name of the capital is given by Rashīd: AWRTA BALṬASWN (R/A: 263). Apparently this is derived from the Turkish *orta* “middle, center” and Mongolian *balghasun* “town, city.”

⁶⁴ Gür Khan was not a name; it was a title in general. As Gumilev states (1987,134 n.10) “the title Gurkhan indicates that he was the leader of an association of tribes; the only one at that time was the Mongol-Kerait alliance.”

⁶⁵ Rashīd al-Dīn (R/A: 268) uses the words *serḥad* and *tusamishi*. On the latter see Pelliot, 1951: 238-39.

to the capital.⁶⁶ When Qurjaqus Buiruq Khan died,⁶⁷ the two sons of the Naiman princess arrived immediately in the capital and took over the rule. Soon afterwards To'oril (Ong Khan) made his appearance in the capital,⁶⁸ whereupon the two brothers tried to find refuge with the Merkid chieftain Toghto'a.⁶⁹ Toghto'a did not want to implicate himself in this matter and returned the two brothers to To'oril (Ong Khan) who in turn killed them.⁷⁰ His uncle Gür Khan did not let the matter rest here. Accusing To'oril of murder and of acting against the will of Qurjaqus Buiruq Khan, he set out against To'oril and pillaged his people and wealth.⁷¹ To'oril who ended up with only hundred men had no recourse but to escape into the Qara'un Qabchal on the frontiers of Chin China.⁷² The homicide he committed against his two brothers was later never forgotten. In crucial moments he was always judged in view of the crime he had committed.⁷³

For seven years To'oril was compelled to roam. He found support in the person of Yesügei Ba'atur, the father of Chinggis Khan. His support was remarkable because it happened in spite of the opposition of Qutula Qa'an, the ruler of the Mongols.⁷⁴ Yesügei Ba'atur with his following was instrumental in bringing To'oril back to power and in reassembling To'oril's former following. Together they fought against the uncle, and forced him to escape to the Tangut Kingdom. Later nothing more was heard of him, however this case illustrates the role of the Tangut Kingdom at this time. Whoever faced trouble in the Mongolian steppe, found refuge and support there until the kingdom was completely destroyed by Chinggis Khan in 1227. After their victory, Yesügei Ba'atur and To'oril became *anda* "blood brothers," and Ong Khan To'oril showed his gratitude with the following words:

[As to] the benefit of this thy service, let the protection of Heaven above and Earth [below] know how I shall return the benefit unto the seed of thy seed.⁷⁵

Although the accounts of these incidents are preserved to us in most beautiful prose⁷⁶ we do not know exactly when they took place. However, Qutula

⁶⁶ For their encampment see Pelliot, 1951: 267-270.

⁶⁷ "His Khatun Töreqaimish practiced sorcery and whenever he mounted to go hunting, she at once brought him down. As he was tormented by her, he ordered two of his concubines to kill her, which they did. Then he thought of his sons, and wishing to conceal the matter, he found a pretext to kill both of his concubines." (*R/A*: 264)

⁶⁸ *R/A*: 268.

⁶⁹ We do not know why they did not seek the help of the Naiman.

⁷⁰ *R/A*: 264-265.

⁷¹ *R/A*: 265. On Qurjaqus see *R/A*: 264.

⁷² For a very lively account of this episode see *MNT*, §177.

⁷³ *R/A*: 265.

⁷⁴ *R/A*: 265.

⁷⁵ *MNT*, §177.

Qa'an's reproach of To'oril gives us a tentative date. As Qutula and his brothers were slain by a combined army of Chin and Tatars in 1161, the Gür Khan episode must have occurred before this date.⁷⁷ This whole episode, with its seven years of exile preceding Yesügei's support, seems to span the 1150's.

The Aftermath

The friendship between Ong Khan To'oril and Yesügei Ba'atur of the Kiyad Borjigid was to have long lasting consequences. Both To'oril and Yesügei seem to have made their careers by defending the unusual and not the tradition. Reminding To'oril of the situation after his father's death Temüjin says later:⁷⁸

saying, '[I am] the eldest brother of forty sons,' thou didst become *qan*. After becoming *qan*, thou didst kill both Tai Temür Taisi and Buqa Temür, thy younger brethren. When thy younger brother Erke Qara was [at the point] to be killed, saving his life, going out, he escaped and submitted himself unto Inanča Bilge Qan of the Naiman. When, saying, 'He is become the murderer of his younger brethren,' thine uncle, Gür Qan, setting forth, is come against thee, thou -a hundred men saving their lives- didst escape and fleeing down along the Selenge, thou didst slip [into] Qara'un Qabčal

In all the passages concerning the deaths of his brothers and his uncle's reaction, Ong Khan To'oril is described as a selfish person who 'forsakes his people to save his own life.'⁷⁹ On the other hand, his uncle Gür Khan always either voices concern for the welfare of the people⁸⁰ or condemns his nephew as a murderer. Gür Khan's revolt is always portrayed as for a just cause.⁸¹ Qutula Khan, the Khan of the Mongols at that time, did not at all approve of

⁷⁶ Especially *MNT*, §177, which is now available in the English translation of F. W. Cleaves, brings us back to the sentiments of those times. However, as we know from other episodes, the order of events is not to be taken as chronological. As *MNT*, §177 is an oral letter of reproach directed against Ong Khan, the order of events is in line with the argument and not with chronology. For a different version of this oral letter see Appendix B.

⁷⁷ Desmond Martin, *The Rise of Chingis Khan and His Conquest of North China*. New York: Octagon Books, 1981 (p. 59).

⁷⁸ *MNT*, §177. The date of this event is uncertain. However, we can assign it an approximate date, because of Qutula Khan's presence. If we accept D. Martin's information that Qutula died in 1161, then this event occurred in the late 1150s. The date given by the later Hsi-hsia account as 1171 is definitely wrong as Ratchnevsky also points out (*RCK*: 29 n.118). Qutula Khan was not alive in 1171.

⁷⁹ See *MNT*, §177.

⁸⁰ He expressed concern saying, "What will be the fate of the people?" (*R/A*: 265). For these struggles between Ong Khan and his uncle Gür Khan see also William Rubruck's account in Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*. 1980: 122-23.

⁸¹ *R/A*: 265.

this union. Speaking of values and prevalent traditions, he expressed his disapproval in a tone of ridicule when he said:⁸²

It is not advisable to become friends with him; we know him. It is better to become *anda* with Gür Khan who is a gentle and good person. This man [i.e. Ong Khan] has killed his own brothers and with their blood he has stained the pear of the banner. Today [he is like] an injured mountain ox and a *gurkhar* (zebra) which has its youngsters and baggage (*aghruq*)⁸³ around its neck. Because of that he is coming to seek our protection.

But Yesügei did not listen. By the unequivocal support he gave to Ong Khan To'oril, Yesügei was able to accumulate power and establish himself and raise the ranking of his line. It is to be noted that Ong Khan To'oril did not enjoy unanimous support. It seems that this was especially the case in terms of the clan leadership. The chieftains did not extend their support to him but to his uncle Gür Khan who seemed to have had 'the welfare of the people' on his mind, when he voiced his concern with the words: "What will become of our *ulus*?" But apparently the term *ulus* was used here in a narrower sense, referring to the followers and soldiers of the ruling family. It is interesting to note that no loyalties were expected from the people. It was the leader's duty to keep them attracted to the center.⁸⁴ If they were dissatisfied with the leadership they could easily change sides. In our sources they are even described as passive victims of the developments surrounding them. Temüjin who later as Chinggis Khan speaks of these events, says:⁸⁵

...and coming out from Qara'un Qapčal, as thou didst come unto my father Yesügei Qan, then, when [thou] didst speak, being told, 'Save my people for me from [mine] uncle, Gür Qan,' my father Yesügei Qan...saying, 'I shall save thy people for thee,' ordering [his] army, departing, pursuing, toward Qašin, Gür Qan -twenty [or] thirty men- who were at Furban Telesüd, he saved thy people for thee.

It was the leader's ability and skill which made it possible to attract and keep followers who provided him with power. Power was manpower. The success of Ong Khan and of Yesügei was, however, not to be ascribed to power alone. Our sources give ample evidence of times when Ong Khan To'oril was in difficulty. He seems to have been an alternative, as Temüjin who replaced him was going to be later. It would seem that the 'unusual methods' of Ong Khan and Yesügei were indications of a need for change in this tribal

⁸² *R/A*: 265.

⁸³ For *aghruq* see Gerhard Doerfer, 1964, II: No. 496 (pp. 76-77).

⁸⁴ This was just the opposite in the days of Chinggis Khan as we will see in Chapter Four.

⁸⁵ *MNT*, §177.

world where for centuries tribalism had prevailed as the “ways and methods of the ancestors.”⁸⁶

In addition to Yesügei's support against Gür Khan, Yesügei seems to have helped Ong Khan on yet another occasion.⁸⁷ To'oril's half brother Erke Qara⁸⁸ forced him to leave his country and Ong Khan To'oril was later reinstalled in his position a second time, again through Yesügei's support.⁸⁹ This

⁸⁶ This argument is supported by other incidents, such as the ritual where a junior Jirgin women complains that since Yesügei died traditions have not been honored. Also see complaint made to Kümüş Sijang in the Appendix A.

⁸⁷ The placement of this episode in the lifetime of Yesügei Ba'atur is not conventional. It is usually seen as happening in the 1190s. However, this latter chronology is a result of the order in our sources. There is nowhere any indication as to its date. Especially the *Secret History* leaves one with the impression that this episode occurred during Chinggis Khan's time. Yet we should bear in mind that, except for Rashīd al-Dīn (see translation of the passage), in all of our sources this episode is recounted retrospectively. In all the accounts it is tied to the appearance of Ong Khan To'oril in 1197.

It seems that our sources intentionally give the impression that the Erke Qara episode had happened in Chinggis Khan's adulthood because their aim seems to conceal something related to the young Temüjin and to Jaqa Gambu, as will be discussed later. Paul Ratchnevsky who is of the opinion that there is a “Lücke im Leben Činggis Qan's” does not deal with the Erke Qara episode in detail (*RCK*: 45-47).

Moreover, when Temüjin reaches adulthood, the Naiman rulers he deals with are Tayang Khan (Tai Buqa), his grown up son Küchlüg and the former's brother Buiruq Khan. Except for the Erke Qara episode, Inanch Khan does not enter the picture. I assume that Inanch Khan had been dead for some time when we are dealing with the 1195s. This assumption is based on a careful reading of the related passages. The Erke Qara episode is related in such a manner that the mention of Inanch Khan's name gives it a time perspective which denotes an earlier period.

Additionally the passage translated from Rashīd al-Dīn claims clearly that Yesügei had helped Ong Khan To'oril. Pelliot, noting this information, had expressed his astonishment (1951: 230-57). The related passage in the *YS* (I: 5-6) puts this event after the death of Yesügei Khan, but the narrative is still retrospective. It says clearly that at that time, i.e. when Chinggis Khan was an adult, Erke Qara revolted again. The *YS* version would let us assume that Erke Qara revolted twice, once in 1173-74 and the second time in the 1190s. The information in *SWCCL* (Pelliot, 1951: 230-257) shows that the remarks were formulated retrospectively.

In conclusion I also would like to point out first that Erke Qara fled because he was on the verge of being killed by Ong Khan To'oril. We know that Ong Khan To'oril killed his brothers at the beginning of his career. According to the chronology adopted in this study, Erke Qara would have fled to the Naiman at the latest after the Gür Khan episode, that is in the 1160s. If we were to insist on the conventional version, we would have to assume that he waited for 20-30 years among the Naiman to be able to oust his elder brother. However, if we acknowledge that the insistence of the Hsi-hsia account to place all events related to Ong Khan To'oril's flight in the 1170s cannot be categorically dismissed and that it is a clue to see the events in a different light, then Erke Qara's appearance does not take such a long time (See note 93 below).

⁸⁸ For *erke* meaning “power” and *qara* meaning see “black” see Pelliot, 1951:401. Pelliot thinks that Erke Qara was an uncle (1951: 250).

⁸⁹ The information given in our sources on the Erke Qara incident is not uniform. Moreover *The Secret History* gives the impression that the incident occurred much later. The discrepancies in the sources will be explained in the notes. The following account is a new reconstruction of events concerning the succession struggles in the Kerait Khanate.

time it was in the early 1170s that Ong Khan To'oril had to leave his people and his country:⁹⁰

when Erke Qara, the younger brother of Ong Qan, was [to be] killed by his elder brother, Ong Khan, he fled away and submitted himself to Inanča Qan of the Naiman. Inanča Qan sent troops, but Ong Qan, passing by three cities, betaking himself [thither] was gone unto Gür Qan of the Qara Kidad.⁹¹

Years later Chinggis Khan will speak of this event with the following words:

...when Erge Qara requesting soldiers from Inanča Bilge Qan of the Naiman, setting forth, came against thee, thou, forsaking thy people to save thy life - a few persons fleeing- went out and thou departed unto the Gür Qan of the Qara Kidad, at the Čui River, in the country of the Sarta'ul.⁹²

According to the later Hsi-hsia account, Ong Khan To'oril had "departed for the [black] Ch'itan country in the second month of 1173; he passed through the Hsi Hsia on his way back in the tenth month of 1174."⁹³ This incident is seen later as his submission to the Qarakhitai.⁹⁴ Apparently Ong Khan To'oril did not achieve anything in his sojourn in the Qarakhitai country and had to return empty-handed from his trip to Central Asia. But it was again Yesügei who

for the second time helped Ong Khan. Taking the land and people from Erke Qara, he gave them all to Ong Khan.⁹⁵

After his return in 1174 Ong Khan To'oril was not challenged in his position at least for a decade.⁹⁶ Within this period he consolidated his power. His brother Erke Qara had been eliminated thanks to the efforts of Yesügei Ba'atur. Erke Qara who because of an earlier marriage connection obviously

⁹⁰ Wittfogel and Feng, 1949.

⁹¹ *MNT*, §151.

⁹² *MNT*, §177.

⁹³ This incident is seen later as his submission to the Qarakhitai. For the quotation above see *Hsi-hsia shu-shih* 38 (*ts'e* 8). 2r-3v, mentioned also in Wittfogel and Feng, 1949: 648, n.21. For Erke Qara see note 87 above.

⁹⁴ *MNT*, §152. There is something peculiar about the description of his journey to the Qarakhitai country. *The Secret History* passage speaks of the "three cities" that he passed. The corresponding passage in the *YS*, on the other hand, does not speak of cities but of three countries: The Tangut Kingdom as Ho-hsi, the Uighur Country as Hui-ho and apparently the Khorezmshāhs as the Hui Hui country, the country of the Muslims. Passing through these regions he flees into the Qarakhitai region (*YS*, I: 6).

⁹⁵ *RS/T*: 275.

⁹⁶ We see him in the Merkid campaign in 1184. Then there is a lacunae in our sources that are mostly filled with the Erke Qara episode. At the end of which he appears as the plight stricken Ong Khan To'oril who asks Chinggis Khan's help. This latter event is traditionally ascribed to 1196, the winter of the Tatar campaign. Paul Ratchnevsky, on the other hand, is inclined to see Ong Khan appearing after the Tatar campaign, that means in 1197 in the year that Rashīd al-Dīn gives for this event. Thus it is certain that it is a decade, from 1174 to 1184.

felt at home at the court of the Naiman ruler Inanch Bilge Khan, seems to have joined the Naiman again.

After these incidents Ong Khan To'oril was more or less firmly established, to the extent that he had young men as representatives of the leading families of his subject clans residing with him at his 'mobile court.' The practice of employing and educating the young boys of a subject tribe, clan or even of a vassal state was widely practiced in China. They were called "hostages."⁹⁷ The practice was also known in neighboring cultures. For instance, when Yeh-lü Ta-shih was leaving the Uighur court in 1124, the Uighur "ruler offered him 600 horses, 100 camels and 3000 sheep; he also delivered some of his descendants as hostages, thus expressing his subordination..."⁹⁸ However, educating and rearing the youngsters of vassals was a prevalent practice in different parts of the world.⁹⁹ Apparently at the Kerait court there were quite a number of these hostages, called *turghaq*,¹⁰⁰ and their position was considered a high office. Among these young men two are especially known to us. These were Jamugha and Temüjin, both "hostages" from the Mongols. Jamugha was from the Jadaran; Temüjin was the son of Yesügei Ba'atur of the Kiyad Borjigid. Apparently these two youngsters were very close and had sworn an oath to be supportive of each other and thus had become *anda* during this time:

at the moment when Temüjin was eleven years old, Jamuḡa, giving unto Temüjin a roebuck knucklebone-Temüjin's brass knucklebone [being given unto Jamuḡa] together becoming *anda*, at the moment when they were playing at knucklebone on the ice of the Onan [River] where they declared themselves *anda*¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ See Lien-sheng Yang, "Hostages in Chinese History," in *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961 (pp. 43-57).

⁹⁸ See Wittfogel and Feng, 1951: 606. From *LS* 30. 5 r-v.

⁹⁹ To give just a few examples: in feudal Europe it was practiced among junior lines. Sons of junior lines were sent to courts of superior standing to be educated there and eventually to be married. See for instance George Duby, *The Knight, the Lady and the Priest*. London: Allen Lane, 1983.

Moreover, a similar practice is to be encountered among the Funj in the sixteenth century in the Central Sudan and it is also a well known practice among Afghan tribes. The technical term in the Afghan instance is *yerghamel*. Personal communication by Ashraf Ghani.

¹⁰⁰ The word *turghaq* is a derivative of *tur-* "to stay" with the suffix *-ghaq* (A. von Gabain, *Altürkische Grammatik*, 1950: §114). It is also a term used for day guards (Doerfer, 1965, II: No.882). The meaning as a day guard must have evolved from the practice of having hostages who would stay with the rulers.

For the occurrence of this term see the biography of Jochi Turghaq in *YS*: 122. See also T'ang Ch'i, 1970: 182 n.1 where a reference is given to explain *turghaq* as "hostage" Unfortunately he does not list this reference *Yüan-tai Meng-han sse-mu tai-yü-k'ao*, in his bibliography.

¹⁰¹ *MNT*, §116. There are different studies on this pre-state practice among the Mongols. However, here I would like to note that Doerfer (1963, I: No.33) in his study of the *anda* sees "living together" as a prerequisite for this specific relationship. His understanding of the

Taking Temüjin's age as a lead we can then place these incidents around 1178. Together with friendship there developed rivalry between these youths, as each one aspired to be like "their father, the khan." Temüjin, as the later Chinggis Khan reminds, both Jamugha and another fellow hostage of these days:

not being able to see [me], i.e. not being able to tolerate me, thou hast made [me] to separate myself from my father the Qan. The one of us which rose up first was wont to drink [from] the blue goblet of the father the Qan. When by me, upon rising up first, it was drunk, thou was jealous. Now, empty [ye] the blue goblet of the father Qan. How much more will ye consume?¹⁰²

Apparently these lines refer to a Turco-Mongolian custom still prevalent among the Altai Kazakhs, who partly claim Kerait ancestry, and also among the Bashkorts. According to the custom leftovers from prominent 'elders' are coveted by young people who aspire to be like the elder.¹⁰³ Here in the case of Ong Khan To'oril we are referred to the antecedents of such a custom.¹⁰⁴

Jaqa Gambu, the Hidden Hero

In the interim Ong Khan To'oril faced some problems because of the popularity of Jaqa Gambu, another younger brother of his or perhaps a younger uncle. Jaqa Gambu had grown up among the Tangut probably because he had been taken captive by them.¹⁰⁵ His given name was Kereidei, i.e. "of the Kerait."¹⁰⁶ As a member of a neighboring royal clan, who probably was also

practice confirms my interpretation. I would think therefore, that interpreting this passage in the *Secret History* as pertaining to Yesügei's encampment and seeing Jamugha as one of the neighbors would be misleading (*RCK*: 18). Moreover, the location corresponds more to the area the Keraites occupied. Yesügei, on the other hand, is mentioned in relation to locations such as Qara'un Qabchal which are located more to the south, in the former Chaqar region.

¹⁰² *MNT*, §179. According to Rashīd al-Dīn these words were spoken to To'oril, a descendant of Charaqa Linqum and Tumbinai Sechen.

T'ang Ch'i (1970: 176) mentions that T'u Chi thinks that these words were spoken to Senggūm, Ong khan's son. See Tu' Chi, 20.16v.

¹⁰³ I have seen this custom among the Kerei Kazakhs living in Salihli, Turkey. These Kerei Kazakhs migrated to Turkey from the Manas region in Eastern Turkestan/Xinjiang, PRC in 1954.

¹⁰⁴ This connection is made by the Turkish historian Z. V. Togan, *Cengiz Han*, 1962-63 Yaz Söğmestri Notları (p. 20).

¹⁰⁵ *R/A*: 265. His given name was either Kerebeten or he was called as Kereidei, i.e. "of the Kerait." There is a rather long passage on him stating how he came to live in the Tangut country and later returned and that he was first in union with Ong Khan To'oril but then later revolted against him once or twice.

¹⁰⁶ See Pelliot, 1951: 226-227. His name appears in different manuscripts either as Kereidei or Kerebedei. See *R/A*: 267, the text has KRAYDAY, MS HA: KRANDAY, MS KH: KRABDAY. Zeki Velidi Togan accepts the Kerebeten form and sees a relation between this form and the city "Kere Beten" KRBTN, a city with "Turk horsemen" in the lands of Tibbat, as

functioning in the capacity of a hostage, he had been given the governorship of a province and thereafter he was called Jaqa Gambu by the Tanguts.¹⁰⁷ He was on good terms with the Tangut ruling family. Apparently he married there, stayed for quite some time, and one of his daughters was eventually given to the son(?) of the Tangut ruler in marriage.¹⁰⁸ She was known for her beauty.¹⁰⁹

Jaqa Gambu must have returned to Mongolia sometime before 1184¹¹⁰ as we see him beside Ong Qan To'oril around that time. The pursuits of Jaqa Gambu are not quite clear. There are many lacunae and much disconnected or contradictory information.¹¹¹ Furthermore, the state of information on Jaqa Gambu is very peculiar. In the *Secret History* Jaqa Gambu's story emerges with no context, as if it had been censored.¹¹²

quoted by Juzjānī. Z. V. Togan: *Cengiz Han*, I:22-24 and Raverty (Juzjānī), 1881 (pp. I: 564-574).

¹⁰⁷ On the name Jaqa Gambu see note 248 below and Pelliot, 1951:226.

¹⁰⁸ Rashīd al-Dīn has also an alternative account that he had given a daughter in marriage to the Önggüd ruler. But I think here Önggüd is a mistake for Tangut. In any case this woman, whom apparently Chinggis Khan had sought out and could not find, was a sister of Sorqaghtani Beki. The story of Jaqa Gambu raises also questions about who exactly was Sorqaghtani Beki's mother. Was she born of a Tangut princess?

¹⁰⁹ The Tangut royal clan "regarded itself as quite distinct from the people it ruled, in constitution if not in origin" (Ruth Dunnell, 1983: 391). They seem to have cultivated relationships within their own clan and kin network. The Tangut rulers called themselves T'o-pa and advanced a view of their origins alluding to their ancestors as the later Wei, i.e. the Northern Wei who ruled 386-532. In this way they themselves perpetuated an idea that they, the T'o-pa Tangut were "a Tibetanized Hsien-pei elite ruling a largely a Ch'iang population" (Dunnell, 1983: 38, 62). As Ruth Dunnell says "whether the T'o-pa Tanguts were a Tibetanized Hsien-pei or a Turkicized T'ang-hsiang may never be known" (1983: 40). In both cases we are dealing with people who perpetuated the clan name T'o-pa and probably saw their kinsmen in the Tuba'ud /Tübe'üd/Tübe'en Kerait (On the different forms of the name see Pelliot, 1951: 55-57 n.12). In terms of the relationship between the Tübüd /Tübe'en Kerait and the T'o-pa that has been suggested by various Chinese scholars, Pelliot has reservations and says "it is probable but not proven" (1951: 57). Jaqa Gambu and the Tübüd Kerait as they were also called were closely linked with each other and also later with Temüjin.

¹¹⁰ See page 76 below.

¹¹¹ Ratchnevsky (*RCK*: 52, n.63) says that "Jaqa-gambu hat eine zweispaltige Rolle gespielt."

¹¹² Jaqa Gambu was the father-in-law of Tolui and Jochi. Jochi was given Bek-tutmish Fujin (Boyle, 1971: 99). We do not know of her children. All notable sons of Jochi seem to have been born of Qonggirad wives. However, in relation to the grandfather of Möngke Qaghan, Khubilai Khan and Hülügü Khan, such a censorship is possible. It is believed that the original of the *Secret History* was revised under the reign of Khubilai or even later to suit the interests of the house of Tolui. Apparently the information on Jaqa Gambu did not suit the self esteem of the house of Tolui. Paul Ratchnevsky thinks that the problem is not Jaqa Gambu but Chinggis. He is in favor of taking the *Meng-ta pei-lu* account that Chinggis was a captive of the Chin as the cause for the censorship. I think that the situation is more complicated than that. It was both ways, that is the personalities of Chinggis and Jaqa Gambu were both at stake. When convictions are that strong it has to do with loyalties. They both turned against their own khan, i.e. the Kerait Ong Khan just because of their own ambitions. This incident was something that could never be admitted, neither for Chinggis Khan nor for Jaqa Gambu. And

Glimpses from Rashīd al-Dīn's work where we find contradictory information on Jaqa Gambu give the impression that his was not a 'heroic' career, neither as we understand it today nor as it was understood at the time of the author. He was a captive three times. But more importantly the problem seems to have been related to his frequent shift of loyalties and changing alliances.¹¹³ Additionally we get the impression that whatever it was that was unsuitable in the case of Jaqa Gambu, involved also Temüjin, the later Chinggis Khan. Within this understanding the censorship becomes much more understandable. Paul Ratchnevsky, who has indicated these irregularities for the first time, describes this period as a *Lücke* (hole) in Chinggis Khan's life.¹¹⁴ These peculiarities will be studied later in the course of this chapter, where the emphasis is not on Temüjin, the later Chinggis Khan, but on Jaqa Gambu, as one of the leaders of the Kerait.

Jaqa Gambu's life was full of new alliances and thus a perfect illustration of tribal politics. As we lack sufficient background information it is generally not possible to figure out the causes of the changes. Yet, even a bare attempt to do so is fascinating as they illustrate the intricacies of tribal politics in twelfth century Inner Asia. One clear outcome of this reconstruction of Jaqa Gambu's life story is that the Keraites were not at all an isolated tribe roaming aimlessly in the Mongolian steppes.¹¹⁵ On the contrary they had connections with most of the neighboring people in Inner and East Asia, as illustrated in Chapter Five below.

In 1184,¹¹⁶ when we encounter Jaqa Gambu for the first time, we see him taking part in a joint campaign with Ong Khan To'oril, the young Temüjin, and Temüjin's *anda* and later rival, Jamugha. The campaign was directed against the Merkid who had abducted Temüjin's wife Börte. Yesügei Ba'atur, father of Temüjin and the *anda* of Ong Khan To'oril, had died earlier.¹¹⁷ Temüjin was deserted by his father's following and went through a difficult time with his family. Ong Khan To'oril was not very much interested in the fate of his *anda*'s son in spite of his pledge "to return the benefit unto Yesügei's seed" (see above). The aloofness seems to be due to Ong Khan To'oril's character but was probably also due to the limits of the relationship between *anda*. It seems that this specific relationship was essentially horizontal and served to establish a bond between two persons from the

this is why all information regarding these incidents is garbled. We know, however, that Chinggis was not the single cause for this censored information from other passages where the information on Jaqa Gambu appears disconnected or shortened or censored.

¹¹³ This is also what Ratchnevsky (*RCK*: 52, n.63) alludes to, that is that you could not trust him.

¹¹⁴ *RCK*: 46.

¹¹⁵ See Chapter Five.

¹¹⁶ See note 119 below.

¹¹⁷ According to Rashīd al-Dīn Temüjin was 13 years old when his father died.

same or separate clans or tribes but did not entail any duties that would involve other generations.¹¹⁸ Thus Temüjin in his later lament (as Chinggis Khan) did not blame Ong Khan To'oril because of his neglect (*See* Appendix B). Apparently a greater interest was not expected. However, the relationship of *anda* could be cultivated in the succeeding generation by invoking the former bond. Ong Khan To'oril had known also Temüjin from the time when he was a *turghaq* at his mobile court.

Thus prior to 1184 the young Temujin paid a visit to Ong Khan To'oril to renew their ties and to seek a relationship of protection. Temüjin went to Ong Khan and presented him the sable coat that his bride had brought as a present to her in-laws. The presentation and acceptance of this present (*emüskel*) signified a confirmation of the earlier ties of obligation.¹¹⁹ Ong Khan To'oril, who until that time had been remote and aloof regarding developments among his *anda*'s new people, took an active interest and decided to intervene on behalf of Temüjin when the request was made to be recognized as a son. Later Ong Khan To'oril was approached by his son "who was born in his raiments," to help as his wife had been kidnapped by the Merkid people. He said:¹²⁰

In return for the coat of sables,
[Even] until I destroy
Wholly the Merkid,
I shall save and give [unto thee] thy Börte Üjin.
In return for the coat of black sables,
Breaking
All the Merkid,
Making thy *Qatun* Börte to return, we shall bring [her].

¹¹⁸ We see this clearly when an *anda* of Chinggis called Quyildar Sechen asks Chinggis specifically to take care of his own children after his death. *MNT*, §171. On *anda* see note 101 above.

¹¹⁹ The following reconstruction follows in general the chronological outline set by Paul Ratchnevsky (*RCK*: 41). I have here accepted the date that Ratchnevsky uses as the starting point of his chronology, 1186, as the most probable birth year for Ögedei. For this date he refers to P. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*. Paris 1973, Vol. I: 287 (*RCK*: 17, n.76 and p.33). Following these he estimates Temüjin's year of birth as 1165.

Starting with this date then Ratchnevsky places the expedition against the Merkid in the year 1184 (*RCK*: 33). However, another interpretation would be to accept the age given by Rashid al-Din as 23 during the Merkid expedition, adding it to the date of birth of Temüjin as established by Pelliot as 1167. In that case the date of the Merkid expedition would be 1190. In this latter case we have a long span of time between the ages 16 and 23, in fact seven years when we don't know what really happened. Z. V. Togan, on the other hand, has accepted Rashid al-Din's dates including Temüjin's year of birth as 1155. In that case year of the Merkid expedition would be 1178.

In conclusion then the date of the Merkid campaign is reconstructed as 1184 by Paul Ratchnevsky. I also think that this is a plausible argument.

¹²⁰ *MNT*, §104.

Ong Khan To'oril had one *tümen* of men under his control and his brother Jaqa Gambu also commanded another *tümen*. Jamugha, the former hostage at Ong Khan's court, commanded two *tümen* and Ong Khan To'oril asked him to supply Temüjin with troops from his own people. From this we can see that Jamugha seems to have been in a commanding position. Ong Khan To'oril also made apologies to Jamugha for their delay.¹²¹ This proved to be a very successful operation. Through Jamugha's efforts and expertise Temüjin gained access to his own people. Within these specific circumstances there were three different kinds of relationships. Ong Khan To'oril, who regarded Jamugha as his younger brother, accepted Temüjin as a son, and Jamugha and Temüjin who were *anda*. Although Jaqa Gambu took part in this campaign, we do not have details about him. He was overshadowed by the intricate relationships between the other three. Among these Jamugha commanded a higher status than Temüjin and also exerted control over a large body of forces.¹²² It is not surprising, then, that after being friends for one and a half years, there was a falling out between the two young men, both protégés of Ong Khan To'oril.¹²³ The conflict was the result of the rivalry with which our sources seem to be preoccupied for the next decade. This conflict signified also a political decision by young Temüjin. As a result our sources have been concerned with Temüjin's career from then on, sometimes censoring information that was unsuitable for the later World Conqueror or his descendants. However, events were taking a different turn; these we have to reconstruct from among the scattered passages. It is as if the passages had dispersed themselves.

Ong Khan To'oril Disappears from View

At a first glance we can ascribe the scarcity of information on Ong Khan To'oril to this preoccupation with the falling out between Jamugha and Temüjin. However the scarcity seems due more to Ong Khan To'oril's absence. According to the Persian historian there had been disagreements between Ong Khan and Jaqa Gambu. Jaqa Gambu turned against his own brother. Placing these events a decade later, the Persian historian is keen to

¹²¹ MNT, §108.

¹²² It is also interesting that in the Chinese version of these developments his forces are referred to "Jamugha's *pu* (in chapter 3: 11v and 12r of the Chinese text)." *Pu* can mean "tribe" but also "allotment" or "section." For *pu*, see Chapter Five, note 6. What I would like to point out here, however, is that the people under Jamugha's command are not referred to as Jadaran, the clan he was a member of. The repetition of the phrase gives the impression that the people who made up the *tümen* were of diverse ethnic backgrounds.

¹²³ See Chapter Four below related to note 15.

point out that Temüjin was loyal to his “father, the khan” and went forth and defeated Jaqa Gambu. He says:¹²⁴

...after taking care of matters in relation to the Jirgin people, Chinggis Khan set forth against Jagambu,¹²⁵ the younger brother of Ong Khan who had revolted against his elder brother and [Chinggis Khan] defeated him. The Tongqayit¹²⁶ people who constitute a section of the Kerait and who were also among the companions and subjects of the Kerait rulers... had been dispersed for a period, joined Chinggis Khan after that incident and became his subjects...

Paul Ratchnevsky dismisses this specific incident as untrue,¹²⁷ because no such revolt can be substantiated for the indicated time period (1197). In fact, our sources agree that at that time just the reverse happened and Jaqa Gambu “came to be a companion to Chinggis Khan.”¹²⁸ But it is still possible to treat this paragraph as containing half of the truth.¹²⁹ A possible scenario would be to place these events in the late 1180’s and early 1190’s: Jaqa Gambu had revolted as Rashīd al-Dīn states, but Temüjin did not go out and defeat him.¹³⁰ In fact, he could not have done so as he was not that powerful.¹³¹

¹²⁴ Rashīd al-Dīn (*R/T*:251) places this incident after the revolt of the Jirgin, that is in the year 1196/97. However, at that time there was no revolt by Jaqa Gambu. The Jirgin incident happened after the Tatar campaign but before Ong Khan To’oril’s return.

¹²⁵ Rashīd al-Dīn always uses the form Jagambu (JAKMBV), in which *ja<jaqa* is in contracted form.

¹²⁶ Tongqayid and Dongqayid are dialectical variants of the same name.

¹²⁷ In this respect Ratchnevsky says the following (*RCK*: 46, n.36):

“Temüjin hat die Jürkin nach dem Feldzug gegen die Tatar unterworfen (S. 50ff.) *YS* I, 6a spricht nicht vom Kampf mit Jaganpu, vermerkt aber—nach Temüjin’s Sieg über die Jürkin—Jaganpu sei gekommen, um sich zu unterwerfen. Nach Hong Juns Ansicht entspricht der Bericht über Temüjin’s Kampf mit Jagampu nicht den Tatsachen (*YSYWZL*, I, 1 A, 25).”

In the English translation—*Genghis Khan His Life and Legacy*. Translated and edited by Thomas Nivison Haining. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996, (p. 235, n. 38)—this passage reads as follows:

...The *YS* (1,6a) does not mention the battle with Jagambu but does report after that, after Temuchin’s victory over the Jurkin, Jagambu came and submitted to Temuchin. It is Hong Jun’s opinion (*YSYWZL*, I, 1a, 25) that report of Temuchin’s battle with Jagambu does not represent historical fact.

¹²⁸ This specific information is from the *Secret History* (*MNT*, §150) and also from the *SWCCL* (Pelliot, 1951: 224).

¹²⁹ We know that in the *Dalan Baljus* also, Rashīd al-Dīn supplies us with half of the truth. See further below.

¹³⁰ Only by looking at our sources from this perspective can we understand Temüjin’s loyalty to Jaqa Gambu, the censored information in our sources and the isolated condition of the paragraphs related to Jaqa Gambu. Almost all of them have been placed into the text out of context both in Rashīd al-Dīn’s history as well as in the *Secret History*.

¹³¹ Only by placing the episode a decade later can we make Temüjin stronger.

What seems to be true is that Jaqa Gambu was not turned over to Ong Khan. On the contrary, Ong Khan To'oril had to flee. In fact, although he doesn't go so far as to speak of a collaboration between the two men, Zeki Velidi Togan's reading of these events throws some light on the events which happened at about the same time.¹³²

Because you disagreed with Cagambu [for Jaqa Gambu] and had to leave your country, you took refuge in Western Turkestan, in the lands of the Karahitai, among the Muslim Sartaktai in the regions of China. Then as you could not achieve anything from there you came to the Tangut country.

During the time when Ong Khan To'oril was away Temüjin was on his own, no more a protégé. He seems to have made use of this power vacuum for his own benefit as we will see later. It is probable that Temüjin and Jaqa Gambu became *anda* at this time.¹³³

The split among the Kerait royal contenders played an important role in Temüjin's career as is evident from his later loyalty to Jaqa Gambu. More importantly, it was at this time that the Tübe'en joined forces with Temüjin. The Tübe'en remained loyal as is evident from the Kerait biographies in the *Yüan shih*.¹³⁴ But at this moment the repercussions of this split were to be seen in the composition of Temüjin's first formal army units. This was an army consisting of 13 units (*Wagenburg*),¹³⁵ one of them being the Tübe'en. However, it was headed by a relative of Temüjin, not by Jaqa Gambu.¹³⁶ From this fact we can conclude that by the time of the battle of Dalan Baljus in which the Tübe'en participated on Temüjin's side (see below), Jaqa Gambu was already in the lands of Jauqut¹³⁷ and, therefore, absent and that the Tübe'en, who were closely associated with him, remained with Temüjin.

Rereading these passages we can see that by supporting Jaqa Gambu, Temüjin had broken away from Kerait Ong Khan and he alluded to these developments as we will see later. In the absence of Ong Khan the young

¹³² Z. V. Togan *Iç Asya*, II: 19 says explicitly:

"Sen Cagambu ile bozuşarak memleketini terkedip garbi Türkistan'da Kara Hitaylara sığınıp Çin havzasında müslüman Sartaktaylara sığındın, burada bir iş yapamıyarak Tangutlara geldin, perişan bir haldeydin. Üstünde elbise yoktu, açtın." (This quotation is apparently from the Arabic version of Rashid al-Din's work).

¹³³ In his reproach addressed to Ong Khan To'oril Temüjin refers to Jaqa Gambu as *anda*. See Appendix B.

¹³⁴ The Kerait were later annihilated for the most part. The prominent personalities of the Kerait seem mostly to be of Tübe'en origin.

¹³⁵ On these famous "thirteen *küre'en*" see Chapter Four.

¹³⁶ See *RT* 243. Paul Pelliot, who was very much puzzled by this information, could not point to a possible closer relationship between the "Mongghol" and the Kerait. Pelliot, 1951:55-57. But it is a simple appointment over a tribal force.

¹³⁷ As mentioned by T'u Chi (20, 6v). He places this event in 1186. As the battle of Dalan Baljus happened around 1187 (*RCK*: 45), the two dates support each other.

Temüjin was elected as *khan*. This event took place after Jaqa Gambu's departure in 1186 and also was prior to the formation of the 13 *küre'en*. In fact, when by the falling out with his friend Jamugha, Temüjin demonstrated independent decision making abilities, he was approached by his more senior relatives, the Mongol "elders" Altan, Quchar and others, to become their *khan*. These Mongol "elders" wanted to eliminate Jamugha and according to Vladimirtsov, they thought that in young Temüjin they saw somebody who could be elected as a leader for war time and thus be manipulated by them.¹³⁸ It is highly probable that they wanted also to take advantage of the split among the ranks of Ong Khan To'oril.¹³⁹

As a consequence Temüjin was able to make use of Ong Khan's "absence" to assert his autonomy and manipulate these developments to secure his election as khan by the Mongol "elders," who in their turn wanted also to eliminate Jamugha.¹⁴⁰ But we know that the people who had gathered around Temüjin were not the majority. Even much later "the greater part of the Mongghol" were with Jamugha.¹⁴¹

In the meantime the rivalry between Temüjin and Jamugha culminated in the battle of Dalan Baljus (1187-88)¹⁴² where Temüjin suffered a great defeat in spite of his famous "thirteen units," including the Tübe'en.¹⁴³ That Rashīd al-Dīn, taking Temüjin's side, should have him win this battle, shows what a crushing defeat it was. Having suffered a defeat and lost at least some of his forces, it would be quite possible that during the frequent raids into

¹³⁸ Vladimirtsov, *Chinggis Khan*, 1930: 33 and *RCK*: 39-40. It is generally accepted that the title Chinggis was given to Temüjin in 1206. See *RCK*: 40.

¹³⁹ Although the *Secret History* makes a point of saying that Ong Khan To'oril was informed by two messengers of Temüjin whose names were Daghai and Sükegei about Temüjin's khanship, it would seem that this is not true. Later Temüjin in his address of reproach to Ong Khan To'oril speaks of sending the same messengers to meet Ong Khan To'oril in 1197. Here following Ratchnevsky the date of this incident is placed in the years 1185-86 (*RCK*: 45); Gumilev (p. 137) places it in 1182. Morgan (1986: 60) does not mention any date; Barfield (1989: 190) gives hesitatingly 1190 with a question mark. As mentioned above the dates by Ratchnevsky are calculated according to the birth year of Ögedei (*RCK*: 33 n.131 and 17n.76). According to this passage pertaining to the earlier period, Ong Khan To'oril expressed his pleasure that the "Mongghols" had found leadership under his protégé and said:

To make my son Temüjin to become qan is very right. How would the Monγol fare without a qa? Break ye not this decision. Undo [ye] not your decision that which hath been tied [of you]. Rend [ye] not your collar (*MNT*, §126).

As I stated above, I think that this passage seems to be interpolated, in view of the turn events were to take. After his supposed praising of the Mongols for their election of a new *khan* - incidentally a passage that is not confirmed by our other sources- there is no direct information on Ong Khan To'oril for a long while.

¹⁴⁰ *RCK*: 39.

¹⁴¹ See *RCK*: 37 and *MNT*, §193.

¹⁴² See *RCK*: 45.

¹⁴³ On this episode see Chapter Four below.

the Chin territory he was taken captive as mentioned in the *Meng-ta pei-lu*. Paul Ratchnevsky, who accepts the *Meng-ta pei-lu* information, thinks that the captivity was something to be ashamed of in Chinggis Khan's later career and quotes¹⁴⁴ from Rashīd al-Dīn Temüjin's own description of how he brought Jaqa Gambu back from the lands of the Jauqut to show that the difficulties of these years have been deliberately left out.

The passage in question, translated below, in fact provides strong evidence on the lacunae of Temüjin's life. However, the same source is quite liberal in accounting stories related to different captivities of Temüjin. Therefore, I am inclined to see the lacunae as related to a breach of loyalty. The often repeated phrase of "forsaking one's own *qan*" could have been the issue. Since this was an issue about which the later Chinggis Khan was very sensitive, not only as a principle but also because of his personality, the omission seems plausible. Even if Temüjin was a captive, we know that by 1195 he was back.¹⁴⁵ But it seems it was not Temüjin but Jaqa Gambu who became a captive or took asylum in the lands of the Jauqut.¹⁴⁶ Later we hear in Temüjin's lament addressed to Ong Khan To'oril:¹⁴⁷

in the lands of Javqut I called at Jagambu Anda with a loud voice and made signals at him by lifting my hat and did *dilaymishi* that is I gesticulated with my arms and hands. That way I brought [back] Jagambu Anda.

Jaqa Gambu's return from asylum in the lands of Jauqut was then due to the efforts of Temüjin who called Jaqa Gambu his *anda*. Earlier we saw that the Tübe'en had joined Temüjin's ranks around 1186. We can see that a common front between Jaqa Gambu and Temüjin had developed initially to the advantage of latter. Jaqa Gambu, on the other hand, did not use these developments for his own aims. He also never attained a position such that he could attract and hold different groups together. It seems that this was also not his aim. We always see him making himself felt in opposition to movements rather than trying to be the leading person. So when things turned bad and he sought asylum, his followers the, Tübe'en, apparently remained with Temüjin.

During the period of Ong Khan To'oril's absence there were also other people who joined Temüjin from the ranks of the frontier populations. One such person was Yeh-lü A-hai who first came to Temüjin on a mission and later joined him as a "hostage" and also conducted raids into the Chin territories. He was later joined by his brother. The incident of these famous brothers, who earned themselves a biography in the *Yüan shih*, gives the

¹⁴⁴ RCK: 46 from *R/SL*, I/2: 128 corresponding to the passage the translation of which is presented in Appendix B.

¹⁴⁵ RCK: 46 from *R/SL*, I/2: 249.

¹⁴⁶ T'u Chi 20, 6v places this event in 1186. See RCK: 46, n.33.

¹⁴⁷ See "the Lament of Chinggis Khan" in Appendix B.

impression that there were others not so famous.¹⁴⁸ This view is supported by Paul Buell who in his study of the frontier region demonstrates the fluidity of the population and also gives an idea of the communication networks of that time. It seems that using intricate communication networks, Temüjin arranged for the return of Jaqa Gambu from his asylum in the lands of Jauqut, somewhere in the Chin borderlands.¹⁴⁹ Recalling this period, Chinggis Khan later expresses the dangers he risked by undertaking such a venture:¹⁵⁰

When I was bringing him, the enemy was sitting in ambush in retaliation

Temüjin, who speaks openly of his attachment to Jaqa Gambu, apparently at some point went out into Merkid country and rescued Jaqa Gambu:

At another time, the Merkid people made Jagambu [one night?] run away. Out of generosity and humanity [lit. manhood] I saved him.

Jaqa Gambu apparently had an important place in Temüjin's mind and heart. Without contesting the fact that Jaqa Gambu needed to be punished for what he had done, Temüjin expressed his mixed feelings and loyalties when he said:

A person who brought Jagambu Anda out of the lands of the Jauqut that is out of North China (Khitai) and who saved him out of the hands of the Merkid, how could he kill him.

All these passages testify to the fact that there was a close bond between these two men. Yet all of our sources are silent about the details. However, in later history, it will be the descendants of both these men who will rule all over the Mongolian World Empire. The question is why were Möngke, Khubilai and Hülegü silent about their maternal grandfather. In history it is their mother Sorqaghtani Beki who gets all the credit.¹⁵¹

Around 1196¹⁵² events took a definitive turn. In the absence of Ong Khan To'oril, who had been a tributary of the Chin,¹⁵³ Temüjin was given a chance to participate in a Chin campaign against the Tatar.¹⁵⁴ By participating he accepted a position in the Chin world order. This was apparent from the title

¹⁴⁸ *YS* 149. Paul Buell, 1977: 48-49, 255-56 n.45.

¹⁴⁹ Desmond Martin (1981: 67) gives the date as 1196.

¹⁵⁰ See Appendix B.

¹⁵¹ See M. Rossabi, "Khubilai Khan and the Women in his Family," in Wolfgang Bauer (ed.), *Studia Sino-Mongolica. Festschrift für Herbert Franke*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1979 (pp. 153-180).

¹⁵² For the date see Pelliot, 1951: 196-98 and *RCK*: 48.

¹⁵³ This is Ratchnevsky's interpretation of the information given by Rashīd al-Dīn (*RCK*: 29).

¹⁵⁴ On the campaign see *MNT*, §132, 133, 134, 135. For the date see Pelliot, 1951: 196-198 and *RCK*: 48.

he received from the Chin which can be interpreted as “a chief in the service of the Chin who exerts control over different tribes.”¹⁵⁵ These developments were leading him and his adherents away from parochial tribalism, and he also had the personal ambition to do so. However, the implications of this venture were very wide. It was not well-taken in the community of his kinsmen. In principle this was a movement away from tribal politics. Allying with a sedentary state power had also implications of centralization. The usual trend was not monopolistic, neither in manpower nor in political power. Since the fall of the Uighur Empire in the ninth century, in the absence of centralized political power, the norm had been to acknowledge plurality, to acknowledge that others had equal rights to a comparable existence.¹⁵⁶ Fighting each other did not mean annihilation; it was a mechanism for the purpose of changing the balance of power between different groups. Monopoly of power, on the other hand, meant annihilation and the destruction of others’ contending points. This was one of the main lines of opposition to Ong Khan To’oril. Now Temüjin’s Tatar expedition was not at all well taken. The opposition came from the ranks of the Jürkin, the kinsmen of Temüjin. In their opposition, sometimes also called “the revolt of the Jürkin or the Yürki,”¹⁵⁷ they demonstrated that they perceived this whole venture as a challenge and even a danger to their own existence and position. They did not participate in the expedition and later looted the *a’urugh* (“baggage”) of Temüjin that had remained behind. In their view they could only sustain their status and position under the status quo: tribal politics where everyone had a voice, not only the grand and the mighty. For this reason they showed their opposition openly and, therefore, were eventually annihilated in the winter of 1196/97.¹⁵⁸ Later Temüjin would lament this fact and say to Ong Khan:¹⁵⁹

And I have killed my elder brothers for your sake. If people would ask who they were, these were Seche Beki who was an elder brother of mine and Taiju Quri who was a younger brother of mine.

¹⁵⁵ Pelliot, 1951: 203-207 and *RCK*: 49, n.49.

¹⁵⁶ As mentioned earlier this coexistence was valid not only for the nomadic tribesmen, but for all, sedentary and nomad. Ruth Dunnell in her excellent study on the Tanguts expresses these views quite clearly: “The Tangut state of the Ta Hsia considered itself a full-fledged, if junior partner in the multi-centered imperial order of East Asia in this era.” (Dunnell, 1983: 254).

¹⁵⁷ Z. V. Togan, *Cengiz Han*, p.7 and 11.

¹⁵⁸ *RCK*: 51-52.

¹⁵⁹ From *R/T*: 285 see also Appendix B. This passage is not extant in the *Secret History*. Therefore the passage related to the Jürkin (*MNT*, §136) gives the impression of a falling out among the various “Mongghol” groups. The *Secret History* version does not furnish us with an understanding as to why the Jürkin, who had supported Chinggis Khan earlier and also contributed to his election as khan had turned against him. The related Jürkin passages are to be found in *RS/T*: 250-51 and 267.

However, Ong Khan To'oril had not yet returned.¹⁶⁰ Chinggis Khan's ascription of this incident to Ong Khan seems to be either rhetorical from Chinggis Khan's side or an innovation of Rashīd al-Dīn as Paul Ratchnevsky points out.¹⁶¹

During this time of upheaval Ong Khan To'oril had taken refuge abroad, in the Tangut and Uighur countries, as is evident from the words of his commanders and companions such as Altun Ashugh, El Qutur and others who had accompanied him into exile and had given their word of allegiance to him.¹⁶² To judge by the lack of direct information on Ong Khan To'oril, the exile years seem to have lasted a long period of time.¹⁶³ Our sources do not tell us openly what happened in his absence. Zeki Velidi Togan's interpretation of the situation is as follows:¹⁶⁴

Çinggis distributed the booty that he had taken to the people and he was much liked by the people. Whereas Tuğrul [i.e. Ong Khan To'oril] did not. He did not give away anything to anybody and this situation harmed his position. [As a result] Tuğrul was deposed twice: first by his younger brother Erke Kara and later by his other brother Karabetei. The name Karabetei was written thus in the Topkapı Manuscript [of Rashīd al-Dīn] and in other early manuscripts. He had another name which was Caganbu [read as Jaganbu]. This name is a name in the Tibetan or Tangut language. In his youth he had been taken prisoner by the Tanguts, and they gave him the name Caganbu.

Finally [at about this time] Caganbu returned. People were very happy about his return. In 1194 Tughrul found first refuge in the Tangut territory and later among the Karakhitai. The Karakhitai did not pay too much attention to him as they were afraid that such a policy would anger the Naiman. Tughrul roamed around until 1196 and returned to his homeland. When he returned to his homeland, his brother Cagambu sought shelter with Çinggis Han...As the brothers were in disagreement earlier, Çinggis Han brought about a truce between the two.

Ong Khan To'oril's Return

The historical information we have pertains to the return of Ong Khan To'oril from his exile. When he was informed that Temüjin had been elected khan by the elders of the Mongols,¹⁶⁵ he returned and asked for his support. He knew that Temüjin was obliged to his father's *anda* because of the rescue of Börte. Moreover, their relationship had gone beyond that as Temüjin had also been a *turghaq* in Ong Khan To'oril's court. But probably there were

¹⁶⁰ For a discussion of this matter see *RCK*: 49.

¹⁶¹ *RCK*: 51.

¹⁶² *MNT*, §152.

¹⁶³ Although *MNT* speaks of the Erke Qara episode as happening at this time, it seems to have occurred in the years 1174-76, as I stated above.

¹⁶⁴ Z. V. Togan, *Iç Asya*, II: 8.

¹⁶⁵ *MNT*, §123.

also other reasons for the warm welcome, as will be discussed below. Receiving him in due course, Temüjin gave Ong Khan To'oril shelter in one of his *küre'en* as the famous passage on this reception reads:

Knowing that thou, the father the Qan, being in a strait, wast coming and being mindful [of thee] because of the fact that beforetime thou didst declare thyself *anda* with my father, Yesügei Qan, having sent as messengers to meet thee both Tayai and Sükegei, again, I myself departing from the Bürgi Escarpment of the Kelüren [River] to encounter [thee], we did meet each other at Lake Güse'ür. Saying that thou wast come, being in a strait, I, having levied levies and having given [them] unto thee, by reason of the fact that beforetime thou hadst together declared thyself *anda* unto my father, was that not the reason for which we two declared ourselves father and son in the Black Forest of the Tu'ula [River]? That winter, suffering thee to enter within [my] *güre'en*, I did nourish [thee]. Wintering the winter, summering, in the autumn, setting forth against Toγto'a Beki of the Merkid people, fighting with [him at] Mürüče Se'ül of Qadiyliγ Niru'un, driving Toγto'a Beki toward Baryujin Hollow, spoiling the Merkid people, taking their many herds and *ordo* tents and their grains—all—, I gave [them] unto [my] father the Qan. [I] suffered not thy being become hungry to endure unto the middle of the day. I suffered not thy having wasted to endure unto the half of the moon.¹⁶⁶

The emphasis on the return of Ong Khan To'oril and on the welcome given to him by Temüjin provide us also with certain clues. It seems that the raid on the Merkid in the autumn of 1197¹⁶⁷ was carried out in order to provide Ong Khan To'oril and his people with the necessary materials for living. The details of the welcome give the impression that Temüjin wanted to make up for something. In fact in his message of lament some of his words can be taken as an explanation for what happened in this period. He says to Ong Khan To'oril,

“What was your right to become hidden behind clouds, lost as if [it was invisible] after sunset, that is in the dark,”

On the basis of this passage we can speculate that what was hidden was something which had not been destroyed or could not be destroyed. What was lost in the dark could be seen under light; in other words it was still there. It remained as his right. Such an interpretation of the passage leads one to conclude that what was Ong Khan To'oril's right was his khanship and that when Jaqa Gambu revolted against his brother, Temüjin, by not fighting against him and probably by standing by him, contributed to the exile of Ong Khan To'oril.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, when Ong Khan To'oril went to

¹⁶⁶ *MNT*, §177.

¹⁶⁷ *RCK*: 53.

¹⁶⁸ Our sources in general speak of Erke Qara at this juncture but then do not connect his story to any other event that was happening in this decade. On this problem see note 87 above. Ratchnevsky's understanding is that when Erke Qara came, Ong Khan To'oril was expelled

the west, the khanship was lost to him as he was a “nobody” in the lands of the Qarakhitai. That the khanship was the issue can also be seen in the following words that illuminate Ong Khan’s return in this long lament.

And also Oh! Khan! My Father! When like the sun which comes out from underneath the clouds, you came to me; and when you came to me you come like fire spreading slowly.

Again this passage is describing the events rather than giving facts. Both the description of Ong Khan’s exile and his return like “fire spreading slowly” tell us about his position and about his long journey of returning home, without telling us too much. There is, however, no doubt that Ong Khan was “the Sun” although he had been hidden behind clouds and in darkness. Temüjin did not claim to be the Sun. This is an open admittance by Temüjin that Ong Khan was still the *khan* per se. After Ong Khan To’oril’s return:¹⁶⁹

<After that>, Jaqa Gambu of the Kerait came for to be a companion unto Činggis Qahan, at the moment when [Činggis Qahan] was at Tersüd. At [the time when] he came, as the Merkid came for to fight, Činggis Qahan, Jaqa Gambu and others fought and made [them] to withdraw. Then the ten thousand Tüben and the many Dongqayid and the Kereyid people which had dispersed themselves, came submitting themselves unto Činggis Qahan.

Apparently Chinggis Qan wanted also to bring truce to his relation with his “father, the khan”¹⁷⁰ and arranged¹⁷¹ for the reconciliation of his *anda* with his father’s *anda*. Ong Khan To’oril was, however, not in a position to argue. So he agreed to the arrangements and was supported during the hardships of that winter of 1196/97 by the levies levied by Temüjin. Ong Khan To’oril, was also provided with provision by the booty obtained by Temüjin on his expedition of the autumn 1197 into the Merkid country as they were growing grain there.

from his land and had to go into exile and Jaqa Gambu had to seek asylum in the Chin lands. However, he does not explain why they went in different directions and also why Jaqa Gambu had to flee (*RCK*: 46). Later he says that accepting the “captivity” as a fact in Temüjin’s life fills the gap of 10 years in his life and also explains the expulsion of To’oril from Mongolia in connection with the flight of Jaqa Gambu (*RCK*: 47). However, he does not say why one was expulsion (*Vertreibung*) and the other flight (*Flucht*).

¹⁶⁹ *MNT*, §150. For the dating of this passage see *RCK*: 53, n.65. See also *RCK*: 52, n.63 for Ratchnevsky’s views on Jaqa Gambu. For the significance of the sun for rulers see Eva Baer “Representation of ‘Planet Children’ in a Turkish Manuscript,” *BSOAS* 31(1968):526-33.

¹⁷⁰ Ratchnevsky argues that after Jamugha’s victory, Chinggis Khan had to leave as much as Ong Khan To’oril did and that the *MTPL* (3a) account speaking of a 10 year captivity of Chinggis Khan in his youth gains credence (*RCK*: 46, 68, n.136). However as I mentioned above I do not see any evidence for being ashamed of captivity in the culture of that time. Zeki Velidi Togan (*Cengiz Han*, p.9) says that Ong Khan To’oril was deposed twice by his brothers, once earlier by Erke Qara and now at this juncture by Jaqa Gambu who returned from the Tangut lands and who took refuge with Chinggis Khan upon the return of Ong Khan To’oril in 1196.

¹⁷¹ The same passage is also to be found in *SWCCL* (Pelliot, 1951:224).

In spite of the warm welcome that he received from his former protégé Temüjin, Ong Khan To'oril was only restored to power when the Tümen Tübe'en and the many Dongqayid who came to Temüjin accompanying Jaqa Gambu were sent over by him to his brother Ong Khan, as "there was friendship between Chinggis Khan and Ong Khan To'oril."¹⁷²

Because Chinggis Khan was on friendly terms with Ong Khan, Jaqa Gambu sent those Tongqayit people back to Ong Khan. After that he remained in agreement with Ong Khan until the time when he revolted again and took refuge with the Naiman ruler Tayang Khan.

Having been restored to power, both politically and in manpower, by the help of his brother, Ong Khan To'oril could not hold anything against him. Ong Khan To'oril was reconciled with his brother and restored to power by his protégé, who in turn needed him because of the opposition he encountered in the Jürkin ranks. It is also possible that he wanted also to make up for his former breach of loyalty.

Beginnings of Dual Kingship, the Second Shaft

Our sources do not let Ong Khan To'oril speak for himself and we do not know what he was thinking at this juncture. But we see him shortly afterwards in 1198¹⁷³ making a raid on the Merkid. In this raid he took a large amount of booty and prisoners—among whom were the sons of Qutu—but he did not share it with Temüjin, who regarded this incident as a sign of selfishness and injustice. However, as Ong Khan was still the khan at this time, it was not his duty 'to present' his inferiors with a tribute of booty. In the traditional steppe practice he should have made the booty available to his own people who participated in the raid. However, as Temüjin had not participated in that specific raid, his reproach did not have a righteous basis. Under the then prevailing tribal order of the steppe, a pooling of booty and a subsequent redistribution was not the norm. How the concept of the new redistributive order was introduced later, we learn from the *Secret History*:¹⁷⁴

Before joining battle, Činggis Qahan... made an ordinance ..saying 'If we overcome the enemy, let us not tarry for spoil. When we shall have made an end of overcoming, that spoil shall be ours. We shall part [it] with one another. If we be made to withdraw ourselves by an enemy, let us return unto our place from whence we first rushed [forward]. We shall make [one to behead the man which shall not have returned unto [the place of] the first rushing [forward].'

¹⁷² In the *Secret History* the expedition of 1197 is recanted as if its only purpose was to secure grain (*MNT*, §177). The quotation about the friendship between the two is from *R/T*: 251

¹⁷³ *RCK*: 53.

¹⁷⁴ *MNT*, §153.

This ordinance was for the first time issued in 1202 to his own people, on the occasion of the Tatar campaign. Ong Khan, however, was not under Temüjin's orders and therefore, when he did not share the booty, he was acting according to steppe traditions. Moreover, as we will see, Temüjin's new policies of redistribution were met with strong opposition even by his own clansmen who in disgust joined Jamugha.¹⁷⁵

Ong Khan To'oril was a selfish person who could not see beyond his own needs and motives. His ambition was to achieve control over others. As mentioned earlier, he was a person who could not satisfy himself by driving away his adversaries, but had to annihilate them, as in the case of his brothers. Therefore, Temüjin's methods of annihilation directed against the Jürkin would be familiar to him. The difference between the two of them, Ong Khan To'oril and Temüjin, was that Ong Khan To'oril tried to concentrate power in his hands on the basis of the tribal structure and did not succeed because of the opposition of these corporate structures. However, Temüjin succeeded by reducing the corporate structures to individuals loyal to himself and especially appealing to their sense of fairness, a sentiment that is not mentioned in any of our sources in relation to Ong Khan To'oril.¹⁷⁶ At this point in his career Ong Khan To'oril was trying to regain his power and was incapable of independent policy. He had to rely on help from Temüjin and Jaqa Gambu. However, others in the steppe were evaluating the situation from the vantage point of tribal politics and corporate bodies. As a result, there arose gradually a tendency to unite against the common enemy, Ong Khan To'oril and Temüjin, as enemies of tribal politics. The tribes were evolving toward a new oath as will be discussed further below.

Being mindful of the situation, Ong Khan and Temüjin were at about the same time (1198/9)¹⁷⁷ busy dividing the opposition into factions. Within such developments they availed themselves of the discord among the Naiman rulers after their father Inanch Khan's death.¹⁷⁸ Tai-Buqa Tayang Khan was ruling in the west along the Irtysh towards Tarbaghatai on the plains; his brother Buiruq Khan ruled over the mountainous region in the Altai.¹⁷⁹ The expedition of 1198/99¹⁸⁰ did not prove itself to be successful for Ong Khan To'oril. A short victory over Naiman Buiruq Khan was followed by a split with his former protégé Temüjin, who apparently approached

¹⁷⁵ *MNT*, §166.

¹⁷⁶ See Chapter Four.

¹⁷⁷ *RCK*: 53.

¹⁷⁸ *RCK*: 53-55.

¹⁷⁹ René Grousset, *Conqueror of the World*. New York: Viking Press, 1972 (p.95) and *RCK*: 53.

¹⁸⁰ *RCK*: 53, n.69.

Kerait Ong Khan To'oril with a proposal for succession.¹⁸¹ Ong Khan To'oril, not wanting to implicate himself further, withdrew at night, leaving Temüjin to discover by himself that there was no agreement.

In this endeavor Ong Khan was accompanied by Jamugha, though we do not know whether he had been there from the beginning. Seeing the rift and perhaps also having contributed to it,¹⁸² Jamugha felt it his duty to remind Ong Khan To'oril that Temüjin was not to be trusted:¹⁸³

Mine *anda* Temüjin, from afore hath had messengers unto the Naiman. Now he is not yet come. Qan, Qan, the *qayirughana* [small bird with white feathers] which remaineth is I. The *bildu'ur* [small bird which tells Heaven, i.e. the lark] which returneth [to Heaven?-İ.T.] is mine *anda*. He is gone unto the Naiman. He hath remained behind, being at the point to submit himself [unto them].

These words of Jamugha that otherwise make no sense, are to be seen as alluding to the incidents leading to Ong Khan's exile. However, Jamugha could not sufficiently convince his former protector, because the troops and the baggage of Ong Khan To'oril's son Senggüm, and of Jaqa Gambu who had taken part on the side of his brother, suffered an attack by the Naiman

¹⁸¹ RCK: 54. Paul Ratchnevsky refers here to the Russian original of L. Gumilev's work as "*Poiski*, 264." In the English version that I have used, this reference corresponds to Gumilev 1987: 246-248.

¹⁸² According to Rashīd al-Dīn he had contributed to the rift, so that he was admonished by one of the commanders saying "it is not suitable to say such destructive words between friends." (RS/T: 270).

¹⁸³ MNT, §160. In the corresponding passage in Rashīd al-Dīn (R/T: 269-70) Jamugha is shown as having arrived with Temüjin, "when he recognized the standard of Ong Khan, he rushed towards him and said: 'Khan! Khan! did you see? My elder and younger brothers are like sparrows who from summer pastures are heading towards winter pastures. In other words he meant that Chinggis Khan is my relative, he is planning to change sides [lit. to escape] and I am saying that I am your sparrow.'"

Gumilev who discusses this passage at length (1987: 249-51) says, "Jamuqa continually finds himself among Chinggis' enemies, but plays a double game there. Here he plays Chinggis' hand, frightening Ong-qan from reconciliation with the Naiman." Gumilev is convinced that Jamugha was Chinggis Khan's agent who in spite of all the treachery of his sworn brother remained true to him (see also note 231 below).

Although the stand taken in this study has been like Gumilev to analyze the puzzling passages and to understand them in their own terms, our starting points being different, interpretations also vary. Gumilev was preoccupied with the destruction of the Nestorian Khanates in such a brief period (1987: 258) and he tried to show that the success of the victor (Chinggis Khan) was due to his use of a 'double agent' (I have explained my stand in the Introduction; see also note 242 below).

The Mongolian version of this passage in its Cleavesan translation shows the enigmas of the original. This passage harbors some folk poetry and analogies in it and is still not explicitly clear because of the use of the verb *ajira-* together with *bildu'ur*. It could either mean that that a *bildu'ur* would be going back or changing sides or if it is a bird that tells Heaven as it is noted in the glossary (Cleaves, 1982: 86, n.38-39) then we could understand *ajira-* with its other meaning as "returning to Heaven." Probably Jamugha was alluding to the fact that Temüjin was communicating with Heaven and as such showing ambitions of rule.

commander, Ong Khan saw no recourse but to turn to Temüjin for help who in turn sent his four heroes to the rescue. As Lev Gumilev and Paul Ratchnevsky have discussed, this situation, which by itself seems inconceivable, gains credibility when Ong Khan's request is seen as an affirmative answer to Temüjin's proposal for succession. In fact their agreement is expressed by Ong Khan in the following words:¹⁸⁴

Mine *anda*, Yesügei Ba'atur, once saved for me my people which was wholly departed. [His] son, Temüjin, again hath saved my people which were departed. [And] he had given [them unto me]. When these, both father and son, assemble and give unto me the people which were entirely departed, on whose behalf do they suffer, assembling and giving [them]? I also now

Am waxed old.
When, waxing old,
I go out to the heights,
I am become old.
When, becoming old,
I go out to the cliffs,
Who will govern my people?

My younger brethren are without virtue. Mine only son is as if I had none, Senggüm is alone. Making my son Temüjin to be the elder brother Senggüm, I would have two sons and would be at ease.

With Činggis Qahan, Ong Qan assembling himself in the Black Forest of the Tu'ula [River], they declared themselves father and son...

In this way they formalized¹⁸⁵ a joint rule between Ong Khan To'oril and Temüjin. Later Temüjin will refer to this joint rule¹⁸⁶ with a "cart analogy," saying:¹⁸⁷

If a cart having two shafts break its second shaft, its ox is not able to pull [it]. Am I not thy second shaft like that? If a cart having two wheels break its second wheel, it is not able to journey. Am I not thy second wheel like that?

Taking the version contained in Rashīd al-Dīn's work into consideration for this cart analogy, we can see the evolution of political culture. In the so

¹⁸⁴ *MNT*, §164.

¹⁸⁵ These events are recorded by Rashīd al-Dīn in the form of a formal agreement in the Sa'ari Keher (*R/T*: 272).

¹⁸⁶ On joint rule, "dual kingship" see Chapter Two note 76. Lately the same issue has been taken up by E. Streusand, *The Formation of the Mughal Empire*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989 (pp. 30-35).

¹⁸⁷ *MNT*, §177. The reason I am referring to these lines as a "cart analogy" is because of its use over time. We see the *beg* of the Shirin tribe in Crimea use this analogy in the 16th century (İ. Togan, forthcoming "Altınordu Çözülürken"). In 1993 the former Azerbaidjani president Ebulfeyz Elçibey used it saying "if we think of the dissolved Soviet Union as a cart, then Azerbaidjan was only one of its wheels. What can a wheel do by itself?" in an interview that appeared in the Turkish daily *Milliyet*, 7 July 1993.

much quoted “Lament” the later Chinggis Khan is speaking of being a wheel and a shaft of Ong Khan To’oril’s cart. In a statement still acknowledging Ong Khan To’oril’s superior position he said:

If one of the two wheels of a cart (*gerdun*) breaks, migration (*kuch*) is not possible. And if the ox of the chariot gets tired and the cart-driver having remained alone, loads the cart and leaves it, thieves will get it. If he does not load it and travels, the [ox] becomes ill and dies. And from the two wheels of the cart, if one breaks and the ox wants to pull, it will not be able to pull. As it pushes uphill with all of its force, its neck will be injured. And because of that it will jump up restlessly and become helpless. Like the two wheels of one cart, one of the wheels of your cart was I.

As we know also from other historical sources the political formation that we call dual kingship, or Doppelkönigtum, based on the Khazarian practice was not a practice of sharing among equals. However, equality was possible when the two persons were from the same royal family. In the Khazarian example it was a joint rule between a ruler and his viceroy (*nāʾib*) as Ibn Faḍlān describes the situation.¹⁸⁸ The alliance between Ong Khan and Temüjin brought displeasure to Ong Khan’s son Senggüm who by this agreement acquired an “elder brother.” Senggüm thus started to see himself on the losing side and expressed his misgivings at every occasion, a situation that also weakened Ong Khan’s ranks.

Following these events in the spring of the year of the Monkey (596 A.H. 23 Oct. 1199-12 Oct. 1200) Ong Khan and Temüjin first convened a joint *quriltai* in Sāri Keher and then jointly attacked the Taiji’ud. Upon the Taiji’ud defeat and the death of many of the Taiji’ud,¹⁸⁹ the many tribes¹⁹⁰ who strongly opposed the joint rule of Ong Khan and Temüjin came together and made a covenant:¹⁹¹

.....[they] all gathered together and took an oath with each other. There was not a greater oath than this oath among the Mongols. And this oath is like this: they hit a stallion, an ox, a ram and a male dog with the sword and say’ Oh! God! Oh! Heaven! Oh! Earth!. Listen to us. We are taking an oath and these are the (*usul and fahl*) male animals. If we do not keep our word and break our oath, we should become like these animals. Accordingly they took their oath in order to fight Chinggis Khan and Ong Khan. [my italics İ.T.]

¹⁸⁸ On these issues see Z. V. Togan, 1939: §100 (p.101). Also see Czegledy, 1966 and Golden, 1983: 144-154.

¹⁸⁹ Rashīd al-Dīn explicitly states the reason for this covenant as follows: “most of the Taiji’ud people were killed in the fashion described above” (*R/T*: 272-73 and 274).

¹⁹⁰ The “many tribes” at this juncture were mainly the Qataqin, the Salji’ud, the Dörben, the Tatar, and the Qonggirad (*R/T*: 274).

¹⁹¹ *R/T*: 274, *RCK*: 57 also see Pelliot, 1951: 411, n.7.

In that winter both groups had a severe fight and the many tribes were defeated by Ong Khan and Temüjin. In the way these events are portrayed in the *Yüan shih* we can sense a sentiment of apprehensiveness about the future of the tribes:¹⁹²

The.....Tatar and the Unggira[d] tribes heard that the Naiman and the Taichi'u[d] had been defeated by Chinggis, all of them stood in awe and felt insecure, and assembled at the Alui<Alghui Spring, sacrificed a white horse and made an oath to attack the emperor and Wang [i.e. Ong] Khan. Deyi of the chiefs of Unggira[d] apprehensive of failure dispatched secretly a messenger to inform the emperor of the affair. The emperor and Wang Khan came to fight from the marsh of Qutu and at the valley of Büyire he again defeated them. Wang Khan consequently detaching his troops marched from Kelüren River and went away.

In this same winter¹⁹³ Ong Khan To'oril suffered a setback through the criticism of his brother Jaqa Gambu about his personality and his policies:¹⁹⁴

Jagambu said to his commanders Altun Ashugh, Il Qutur, Il Qongqur and Qulbari: This brother of mine has an evil nature; he does not rest in one place and because of his bad disposition he destroyed all his elder and younger brothers and because he did so, they [he and his people] had to go to the Qarakhitai. With these ways and this disposition he does not let the nation (*ulus*) to live in peace. What shall we do with him?

The same account appears in the *Secret History* as follows:¹⁹⁵

Then, when the younger brethren of Ong Qan, the chiefs and others, spake unto one another, they said unto one another "This *qan*, our elder brother, had a poor nature and goeth, having a stinking liver in his bosom. He hath made an end of [his] brethren. He had also submitted himself unto the Qara Kitad. And he maketh the people to suffer. Now how shall we deal with him?...

[they recount the past-I.T.]...being in strait, seizing and milking five goats and pricking and eating the blood of a camel, having an only, blind yellow horse with black mane and tail, as, being in a strait, he came unto [his] son Temüjin, [Temüjin] levied levies and [so] nourished [him]. Now, forgetting the fact that he was so gone unto [his] son Temüjin, he goeth, having a stinking liver in his bosom. How shall we deal with [him]?" Altun Aşuy reported unto Ong Qan the words which they had thus spoken unto one another. When Altun Aşuy spake, saying, "and I also am entered into this counsel. However, I was not able to forsake thee, my Qan," then Ong Qan made one to seize his younger brethren and his chiefs such as El Qutur, Qulbari, and Arin Taisi, which had thus spoken unto one another. Jaqa Gambu, fleeing from the younger brethren, submitted himself unto the Naiman...

¹⁹² *YS*, 1: 7v-8r in the old edition.

¹⁹³ Following the chronology in *R/T*: 274-275.

¹⁹⁴ *R/T*: 274-75. I am indebted to Fatemeh Keshavarz for helping me with problems of the Persian.

¹⁹⁵ *MNT*, §152.

The last part of the episode differs again in Rashīd al-Dīn's account where we read:¹⁹⁶

After that, because of this, the four great commanders of Ong Khan, Il Qutur, Il Qongqur, Narin Toghril, Alin Taishi showed an inclination to join the side of the Naiman ruler and they left by themselves. Jagambu sent messengers on the way to the Naiman and informed him saying: "Altun Ashugh has insulted me in front of my brother Ong Khan and turned me into a rotten liver. Because of this, I have taken away my heart from him and am coming to your services," and at that, they all went to join Tayang Khan, the ruler of the Naiman and Ong Khan happened to be far away from them and passed the winter at the settlement of the Qiyan. And Chinggiz Khan passed the winter at a place called Chegcher on the frontiers of Chin China (Khitai).

Again, for Jaqa Gambu it was not the end but the process that was important. He could not bear the humiliation and loss of autonomy that would come from his brother, so he changed his allegiance again. He was the master of shifting alliances. Jaqa Gambu remained with the Naiman until much later. However, his opposition to his brother Ong Khan To'oril at this point, after the covenant of Alqui, is significant in terms of its timing. This opposition, encapsulated in the phrase "having a stinking liver," is an expression of disgust by the Kerait leaders in view of the fact that Ong Khan To'oril was now pitted against everyone. Otherwise how can we explain this dissatisfaction with him when he and Temüjin had defeated the Taiji'ud who had been the enemies for so long?

At about this time the ranks of the "many tribes" swelled: the new members included the Qonggirad, who initially wanted to join Ong Khan but became angry and joined the others when Temüjin's brother Qasar plundered them.¹⁹⁷ In the year of the cock (597 A.H./1202) the many tribes united:¹⁹⁸

[earlier-I.T.]...these tribes, assembling themselves at Alqui Spring, saying, "Let us raise up Jamuḡa the Jajirad as *qa*," together they cut in twain a stallion and a mare and made a covenant with one another. [Now-I.T.] Journeying from there down along the Ergüne River at the corner of the island where the Ken river poureth into the Ergüne, they then raised up Jamuḡa as *gür qa*. Having raised [him] up as *gür qa*, they said unto one another, "Let us set forth against both Činggis Qahan and Ong Qan."

The many tribes were actually all tribes, the Nirun and the *Törölki(n) all together.¹⁹⁹ As we can see they first put up Jamughā as khan and later as *Gür*

¹⁹⁶ R/T: 275.

¹⁹⁷ R/T: 276.

¹⁹⁸ MNT, §141.

¹⁹⁹ See Chapter Four, note 6.

Khan. Rashīd al-Dīn says “The meaning of Gür Khan is the king of kings and princes.”²⁰⁰ The ritual is described further as follows:²⁰¹

they swore an oath saying “among our covenants if there is anyone who leaks this plan may he be like the crumbling of the bank [of the river] may he be felled as the felling of the trees.” When the oath was finished they raised their feet and waved their swords and chopped the forest and driving their soldiers they came to attack.

In connection with this second covenant Paul Ratchnevsky’s remarks are pertinent:

There was a social background to the impending struggle. The old steppe order hung in the balance and the tribal princes, concerned to preserve their independence, were solid in their opposition to Temuchin...[tribal leaders-İ.T] and others adhered Jamuka’s coalition.

The coalition at this point was joined by the Naiman, the Merkid. As Paul Ratchnevsky²⁰² notes, the coalition was further strengthened by the weakening of the Kerait lines after Jaqa Gambu and the commanders decided to shift their alliances and joined the Naiman.

The intentions of the coalition parties were made known to Temüjin and Ong Khan To’oril, who had a skirmish with some of Jamugha’s men and defeated them.²⁰³ Thereafter they were joined by a section of the Qonggirad who had been wintering at locations near two rivers close to the Chin border.²⁰⁴ Ong Khan To’oril and Temüjin had been wintering in a location in the central parts of the present Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (PRC).²⁰⁵ When they heard that the Naiman forces were approaching, they headed towards the south and came into the vicinity of a long wall:²⁰⁶

²⁰⁰ “*Pādshāh-i selatīn ve mulūk*” in *R/T*: 277.

²⁰¹ *YS*, I:8 or I: 8r10-8v10 in the old edition.

²⁰² The quotation of above is from the English translation (1996, p.62). The German original of this passage (*RCK*: 57 and n. 86) reads as follows:

Der bevorstehende Kampf hat einen sozialen Hintergrund. Der Einsatz ist die Erhaltung der alten Ordnung in der Steppe. Die Stammesfürsten nehmen solidarisch Stellung gegen Temüjin. [in the footnote he says: Die Stammesfürsten sind um die Erhaltung ihrer Unabhängigkeit besorgt, sie sammeln sich um Jamuqa]

²⁰³ *R/T*: 277 speaks of a victory of Temüjin at Yedi Quriqan over Jamugha before the battle at Kūyiten. The Yedi Quriqan incident according to which Jamugha would have entered the Battle of Kūyiten is also recorded by *SWCCL* / *WKW*: 80. The name of the location is given as Hai-lar T’ieh-ni Hu-li-han where *t’ieh-ni* > *teni* seems to be a mistake for Yedi. This name can be reconstructed as *Qailar Yedi Quriqan.

²⁰⁴ Qara’un Jidun, not far from Lake Simultu which in turn was not far from Shang-tu.

²⁰⁵ According to a Ch’ing dynasty source these two rivers of Ulqui and Sileljin were located in the old Üjümijin Banner in Inner Mongolia. See *Ch’ing i-t’ung t’u*, Vol. 2. Wang Kuo-wei, on the other hand identifies these two rivers with the Orkhon region further north (*SWCCL/WKW*: 81). Here I have adopted the more southern location as discussed in note 208.

²⁰⁶ *R/T*: 278-79.

[called] Utku which was like the Wall of Alexander and had been built at the borders of the Khitai country and Sengün, the son of Ong Khan was at the edge of that of it. He arrived at a hill and [made his camps there]. When you came down the hill you would arrive at Utku. Before Sengün arrived there, Buiruq Khan said: they are the Mongols. Let us attack and destroy all of them at once...Sengün, too went from that place and entered Utku and they, the allied forces had done *jadalmishi* that there should be snow and fog, and the meaning of *jadalmishi* is that they speak out magical words and put different kinds of stones into the water and then there is a heavy rainfall; that snow and fog turned on them and they wanted to return and to come out of those hills but were retained at the place, which is called Küiten. It is well known that the hands and feet of Buiruq Khan of the Naiman and other people from the Mongols who have been mentioned, were stiff because it was so icy cold and the fog was so deep that many of the people and animals those having four legs fell down from the mountains and perished.

And Chinggiz Qan and Ong Qan had been residing at the edge of the *aral* that is the island and at that time Jamuqa also turned once again to Chinggiz Qan's side as the people who had set him up as Gür Qan and who had allied themselves with Buiruq Qan were in such position and Jamuqa plundered the families of the people who had set him up as ruler and came under the services of Chinggiz Qan. Chinggiz Qan and Ong Qan passed through Utku and passed the winter at the winter encampment which is called Abjiya Köteger. Formerly this place had been the winter encampment of the Qongrat and at the time when there was a battle between Qubilai Qaan and Ariq Buqa they had a fight at this place. This place is a desert, there is no water. The inhabitants of this place have to satisfy themselves with snow.

This battle which is known as Küyiten, ended in favor of Ong Khan and Temüjin. The battle came to be known as Küyiten because of the frost, as *küyiten* means "cold" in Mongolian.²⁰⁷ This location was in the vicinity of the "Wild Fox Range"²⁰⁸ and, therefore, quite familiar to both Chinese and Persian sources. This location indicates that the fighting between the mem-

²⁰⁷ As we have seen this frost in the spring days was ascribed to the magical skills of the Naiman. It is possible that the expression of the "unexpected" coldness and frost was also due to the location of the battle. According to Rashīd al-Dīn the battle took place at a location not very far from the later Shang-tu in the present Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in PRC. This is a far more southern location than is generally assumed. It would seem that such a frost was not expected there.

²⁰⁸ "Wild Fox Range" is called *Hünegen Daban* <*hünegen daba'an* in Mongolian and *Yeh-hu ling* in Chinese. It was located near the former Shang-tu (see note 207 above). Rashīd al-Dīn says explicitly:

...and Chinggiz Khan came down to a city called Fu-jiu and besieged it....[the Chin commanders] were with a great army on the top of the hill called *Hünegen Daban* which was close to Qara'un Jidun " (RT: 322).

The *fu-jiu* of Rashīd al-Dīn is the Chinese Fu-chou and again brings us back to the Chin borderlands in the present Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in PRC. The Black Mountain Range also seems to have been the homeland of some of the Jirgin Kerait. See the quotation related to note 257 below.

bers of the coalition and Ong Khan To'oril and Temüjin took place in the vicinity of the Liao-Chin border areas. When they learned that the enemy was approaching they took shelter in this "walled" area. Both Ong Khan To'oril and Temüjin used these regions, which were the winter quarters of the Qonggirad, as their base at about this time. They would return to this area later but for the moment they both pursued different ways. Ong Khan To'oril pursued Jamugha, while Temüjin followed others with a great many encounters while routing the Taiji'ud.²⁰⁹

Shifting Alliances Royal Style: Ong Khan To'oril Turns away from his Protégé and Partner

During the course of 1202 (the year of the dog)²¹⁰ Ong Khan To'oril's camp became informed of the resentment that was visible among the clan elders. In his recent expedition against the Tatar, Temüjin,²¹¹ declaring that "they should not tarry for spoils"²¹² took away from them what they perceived as their "share" according to old custom. This kind of "confiscation" was unprecedented. This intrusion into the redistributive rights of clan elders was going to be one of the dividing lines between the old and the new order as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. This incident marked, then, the beginning of a rift among the two power-sharing "dual kings." Rashīd al-Dīn says explicitly that the clan elders brought about a falling out between Ong Khan To'oril and Temüjin, leading to a show of force in which Ong Khan To'oril was on the side of the clan elders.²¹³ Until this time Ong Khan To'oril himself had tried to put pressure on the other tribal leaders and to assert his authority. However, here at this moment he was able to see that in spite of his own lineage, seniority and high standing, the "new" system was going to work against him. The emerging popular front was a threat.

It was also during the same winter of 1202-1203, when the two passed the winter along these "walled" areas,²¹⁴ that Temüjin, being unaware of uneasiness of Ong Khan To'oril, requested Cha'ur Beki, the daughter of Senggüm, for marriage to his son Jochi.²¹⁵

²⁰⁹ He was wounded in these battles. *RCK*: 59-61 and *MNT*, §144-147.

²¹⁰ *R/T* gives 598H=1201-1201 A.D. as the equivalent of the dog year. However the date is given correctly in *SWCCL* and *YS*. See *RCK*: 61, n.101.

²¹¹ *MNT*, §153.

²¹² *MNT*, §153; *R/T*: 276.

²¹³ *R/T*: 278.

²¹⁴ These walled areas of the Chin have been of importance for the rise of Chinggis Khan as Paul Buell pointed out in his article (1979) which carries a title indicating the importance of more southerly locations for the early history of Chinggis Khan's carrier. For the references on these walls see also Doerfer I, 1963: No.35 under *öngü* ? "Mauer."

²¹⁵ The incident is quite well known. *MNT*, §165 and *RCK*: 62-64.

This request was not met favorably. The request gave Senggüm a pretext to reply as the “father of the bride,” and we see Senggüm taking the lead in dealing with external affairs. This change of rank among the Kerait lines on the one hand showed the disenchantment of Ong Khan To’oril with Temüjin’s policies. On the other hand, this change of rank also signified a change of orientation among the Kerait. Senggüm’s strategy developed, not toward concentration of power, but towards working together with the steppe aristocracy. However, he himself signified a “unilineal” line of succession within the tribal world. In that sense he personally presented an anti-structural element.²¹⁶ His strategies also did not have a long life as the “new” forces were gaining more currency. During all this time when Ong Khan To’oril and Temüjin split formally over the issue of a marriage connection between the two families, Jaqa Gambu was not there.²¹⁷ He was still with the Naiman.

In the spring of the year of the pig [1203] Jamugha and elders of various clans came to Senggüm and Jamugha spoke:²¹⁸

Mine *anda*, Temüjin, hath messages and messengers unto Tayang Qan of the Naiman. His mouth is [yet] saying, ‘father, son,’ [but] his behavior is other. Are ye [yet] relying upon [him]? If ye do not prevent him, how will it be for you? If [ye] set forth against *Anda* Temüjin, [then] I shall enter with [you] from athwart.

Another one of the leaders²¹⁹ said:²²⁰

It were best that we go and take the people of Temüjin. If he be taken [in respect of] his people and if he be without people, what will those do?

Thereupon Senggüm spoke to his father:

Even in a time in which thou art [yet] so much alive, he is not regarding us as even aught. And verily when thou, his father the *Qan*

Will choke
On the ‘white’
Will gag
On the ‘black’

²¹⁶ Probably Temüjin meant this limitation when he supposedly likened him to a Sartaghchin (Muslim!) sheep. Francis W. Cleaves thinks that Senggüm wished to do something which he could not do because it was beyond his capacity (1982: 110, n. 510).

²¹⁷ He submitted in 1204 from the ranks of the Naiman when they were defeated by Chinggis Khan. See further below note 235.

²¹⁸ *MNT*, §166.

²¹⁹ He was To’oril, a descendant of the *ötegü bo’ol* who were slaves from the olden times. On this term see Doerfer, 1963, I: No.40.

²²⁰ *MNT*, §166.

will he suffer thy people which thy father Qurčaqus Buyıruy Qan, with labour, assembled in so great a quantity to be governed by us? By whom and how will he suffer [them] to be governed?

First Ong Khan To'oril replied saying:

How shall I forsake my lad, my son? If, until now, [our] prop being by him, [we] think evil, would it be fit? We shall not be loved by Heaven.

Senggüm was displeased with these words and expressed his anger by casting aside the felt door of the tent and going out. Ong Khan who long since had lost the initiative gave in and said:

[if we did that], who knoweth whether we would [yet] be loved by Heaven? How say ye that ye will forsake [my] son? Do ye but as [ye] are able. Know [ye how ye shall do].²²¹

From then on Senggüm took the initiative and devised a plan according to which Temüjin would be trapped and killed. They were going to act as if they had reconsidered the marriage proposal. When Senggüm realized that his motives had come under suspicion, he decided that they should fall upon Temüjin immediately the next day. However, two people who had been in the service of the Kerait²²² informed Temüjin so that Nilqa Senggüm's plans of a surprise attack came to naught. The two sides met and fought for three days. We have a dramatic description of this battle in the *Secret History*.²²³ When Senggüm was shot by an arrow on his cheek and fell, there was disarray among the Kerait ranks and Temüjin and his people made use of this to withdraw their remaining men. But still

The more part of the Mongyol is here with Jamuqa and with Altan and Qučar at [the side of] us. The Mongyol which have revolted and are gone out with Temüjin, whither will those go?

said one of Ong Khan To'oril's commanders.²²⁴ Having withdrawn with his fewer men Temüjin sent his messengers and his oral letter of "lament" that has been referred to quite a few times above.²²⁵ This lament which has come down to us in the *Secret History* and in Rashīd al-Dīn's work makes many

²²¹ All these three quotations are from *MNT*, §167.

²²² These were Badai and Kishilig. They were later granted the title of *tarkhan* and they and their descendants became exempt from taxes and were not to be accused until they had committed nine crimes.

²²³ *MNT*, §170-174.

²²⁴ *MNT*, §174.

²²⁵ See Appendix B.

allusions to the past where we feel we do not know all the details.²²⁶ Ong Khan To'oril felt exasperated at the wording of the lament and said:²²⁷

Ai! Soyilugh! Shall I separate myself from my son? [That is what I have done, but in doing] I have separated myself from the principle [törö-ĭ.T.]. Shall I stand aloof [from him]? [That is what I have done, but in so doing] I have stood aloof from [mine] obligations.

Now that Ong Khan To'oril had fallen out with his protégé, the various clan leaders,²²⁸ among whom was also Jamugha, came together, held council and said:²²⁹

Let us go and attack Ong Khan at night time and *let us be ourselves rulers* and let us not attach ourselves neither to Ong Khan and nor to Chinggiz Khan and let us not show favors to them.

It is significant here that the elders from Temüjin's clan and the other leaders, including Jamugha, were not speaking in terms of one ruler who would rule over all. Their strategy was "let us ourselves be rulers." Jamugha was portrayed by Rashīd al-Dīn as a man jealous of others and especially of Temüjin²³⁰ and has been regarded as a man with personal ambitions by some modern historians.²³¹ Here in this passage from Rashīd al-Dīn we have an occasion to witness the political preferences of the steppe leaders. It was definitely power-sharing. Earlier they had objected to the pooling of booty and redistribution from the center. In both cases the major resistance came

²²⁶ The text of the *Secret History* is in MNT, §177. As we have the English translation I have mostly used the Persian text to compliment in places where it differs.

²²⁷ MNT, §178.

²²⁸ According to Rashīd al-Dīn (R/T: 289) these people were Daritai Otchigin, the paternal uncle of Chinggiz Khan, Altan Juyin, the son of Qutula Qa'an who in turn was the paternal uncle of Chinggiz Khan's father, Quchar Biki, the son of Nekün Taishi who was a paternal uncle of Chinggiz Khan and Jamuqa of the Jajirad and the people of the Barin [clan] and Sülegei [error for Sübegei, see MNT, §180] and Toghril from the clan of *ötegü bol* (where NVKTH BVL is an error for AWTGW), that is who were slaves from olden times, Taghai Qulaqai of the Manghut, whom they called Taghai Kehrīn and Qutu Temür who was a leader of the Tatar.

²²⁹ The passage in question reads: *shebkhūn ber ser-i Ong Khan berevīm ve mā bekhīshēn pādshāh shevīm ve bā Ong Khan ve Chinggiz Khan nepeyvendīm ve iltifāl nenumāyīm*. R/Revan: 169, see also R/T: 289. For these events see RCK: 71.

²³⁰ R/T: 280.

²³¹ RCK: 42, 58 especially 80-81 and 65. Ratchnevsky gives his verdict clearly as a person who sees only ambition in Jamugha's behavior. "Wenn beide Rivalen Temüjin und Ong Khan entzweit und durch den Kampf geschwächt sind, öffnet sich ihm der Weg, seine *ehrgeizigen Pläne zu verwirklichen und die Herrschaft an sich zu reißen*" (RCK: 65). Gumilev, on the other hand, sees him in a different light as the sworn brother of Temüjin who remains true to Temüjin up to the end (1987:256-59). Gumilev thinks that Chinggiz Khan had proposed to Jamugha that he "become the second shaft of the cart of state for the services he had performed." As part of the services, Gumilev understands that Jamugha had worked as an agent of Chinggiz Khan while playing the adversary. In his opinion, this was why the Mongols could "become lords of the Great Steppe in the course of two years." (1987: 258).

from the ranks of the elders of Temüjin's clan and from Jamugha. Ong Khan To'oril, was also one of the sources of resentment. He, too, had won the wrath of the clan leaders. However, he seems to have had a more farsighted vision than the clan leaders, as eventually the developments were going to take a turn in the direction set forth by Ong Khan To'oril, in other words towards concentration of authority, but not by him. The clan leaders were all going to be on the losing side. However, as yet, they felt they were still in command of events.

When Ong Khan To'oril was informed of these new developments, i.e. the meeting of the leaders and their plan to get rid of him, he set out and pillaged them. However at this moment his ranks were further weakened when some of his own supporters left him and joined Temüjin. Among these was a whole clan of the Kerait.²³² Thus when some of the Kerait joined Temüjin they again influenced the course of events. Temüjin seized to make use of the opportune moment when the occasion arose. When messengers said, "Ong Qan is unaware. Having pitched *his golden tent*, he feasteth," Temüjin and his forces fell upon Ong Khan To'oril and Senggüm. The two sides fought for a long time, at the end of which both father and son escaped and fled. Later Ong Khan To'oril was killed by a Naiman who did not recognize him even when he identified himself. Stating that that he was "a great *qan* of the old" the Naiman rulers performed a ritual of sacrifice to his head.²³³ It is only towards the end of the narrative that we hear from our sources that he was a great man and had a golden tent as a ruler, or that his son had "raiments having gold" when he was a baby. We see this recognition of his greatness when the subject becomes the inheritance of his title and position by Temüjin. Rashīd al-Dīn refers to "the ascendance of Chinggis Khan on the throne of khanship after Ong Khan who was the most recognized ruler."²³⁴ So ended the life of an ambitious man, but his legacy of concentration of power continued under the protégé who had become his rival.

²³² The name of this clan is given as Saqayit by Rashīd al-Dīn. See *R/T*: 289 and *R/Revan*: 169 and *R/SL*, I/2: 132. Ratchnevsky also comments on these names (*RCK*: 71, 148).

What is noteworthy is that in all manuscripts there is a lacunae in relation to the deserters of Ong Khan's camp. This lacunae involves the subsections of the Kerait, mostly. The name—in this specific case the Saqayid—appears actually in *SWCCL* (Pelliot, 1951: 36, 71) and Rashīd al-Dīn (*R/T*: 244) as people who had been attached to Daritai Otchigin, Temüjin's uncle. In the section on tribes Rashīd al-Dīn says about the Saqayit that there were no important people among them and that there was not sufficient information on them. However, they appear at the two crucial moments of history; they were part of the 13 *küren* among the people who supported Temüjin and now among the people who deserted Ong Khan To'oril in this crucial time period. One wonders why we do not have information on these people whose political preferences had such a great input on the developments.

²³³ *MNT*, §189.

²³⁴ *R/T*: 292.

Ong Khan To'oril's kin, on the other hand, took different routes. His brother Jaqa Gambu had remained with the Naiman. He came from the ranks of the defeated forces of the Naiman in the year of the rat (1204) and joined Temüjin. In this connection we read in the *Yüan shih*:²³⁵

[When] the Naiman and the Merkits came jointly to attack [us]... we defeated them. Jürchitei took Jaqa Gambu, [one of] their leaders captive and his two daughters and [they i.e., Jürchitei and Temüjin] married [them]. When all the tribes were pacified, he [Jürchitei] made a covenant with Jaqa Gambu and those who had submitted. Not long after, the Naiman rebelled again, Jürchitei then planned to succeed Jaqa Gambu, killed him and subsequently pacified his country.

Earlier we had seen how Jaqa Gambu had joined the Naiman in resentment of his brother Ong Khan To'oril's ways of government. The Naiman treated him as a leader who came to join them with his following. In the ensuing battle then Jaqa Gambu took part as one of the "Naiman" leaders. The *Secret History* has the following to tell us in relation to Jaqa Gambu's end:²³⁶

[As to] Jaqa Gambu, the younger brother of Ong Qan, there were two daughters. When Činggis Qahan himself took Ibaqa Beki, the elder of them, he gave Sorqaytani Beki, the younger, unto Tolui. By that reason, saying that Jaqa Gambu and the private slaves and people subject unto him wholly should be a second shaft [for himself], favoring [him], he did not suffer [one] to spoil [him].

Jaqa Gambu again was getting special treatment. Our sources explain this special treatment as developing as the result of his being the father of the women who married into the Chinggisid family. However, as the elder daughter later was given away to the commander (Jürchedei) who took her father captive and later killed him and thus did not remain in the Chinggisid family, we can see that the connection is made to Sorqaghtani Beki, the mother of the later Emperors, Möngke and Khubilai, and the Ilkhan Hülegü. We can not accept the information given in our text then that he was spared because one of his daughters was going to be an empress dowager with great power and prestige. Many other women who were taken as wives²³⁷ were not able to have their fathers spared because they were married to the later Chinggis Khan. Here in Jaqa Gambu's case he was not only spared but he was also made "the second shaft." This was also why Jürchedei wanted to succeed him. We will remember that Temüjin had referred to himself as the second shaft in relation to his "father, the Khan" Ong Khan To'oril's cart. After their ways split they fought at the Qalaljin Sands and Ong Khan and

²³⁵ The entry is in the biography of Jürchedei *YS* 120 (Vol. 5: p. 2962). See also Cleaves, 1995: 397.

²³⁶ *MNT*, §186.

²³⁷ For instance the most famous among these are the Tatar princesses Yesüi and Yesülün.

his son Senggüm were defeated. None of them was offered the option of coming and joining from the ranks of the defeated army and then being offered the position of the “second shaft.” Here again we are left without any explanation as to how and why it was only Jaqa Gambu who was pardoned and offered a position as the “second shaft” (see Appendix B). As the story follows, however, we learn that this new position did not last long. Again we do not receive details as to why:²³⁸

In the strife in which the Merkid and the Naiman dispersed themselves, Jaqa Gambu of the Kereyid, by reason of his two daughters, had been with his own subject peoples as [an] entire [tribe]. Jürchedei enticing [him] who had separated himself [from us], becoming an enemy a second time, by a device laying hand upon [him], seized and made an end of Jaqa Gambu which had wholly separated himself [from us]. Destroying a second time the people of that Jaqa Gambu, we spoil it....

.... Činggis Qahan, favoring [him], gave Ibaqa Beki unto Jürchedei.

Ibaqa Beki was given over to Jürchedei “being mindful of the principle of [recompense] of his services.” It is to be noted that Jürchedei had wanted to succeed Jaqa Gambu and it was Jürchedei who brought an end to Jaqa Gambu. Putting the two accounts together, we can say that he took Jaqa Gambu’s daughter as part of his “succession.”²³⁹ Ibaqa Beki²⁴⁰ as the daughter of Jaqa Gambu and a member of the Kerait ruling clan had so much “value” that her “place” at the court of Temüjin was not to be abolished but would continue “unto the seed of the seed.”²⁴¹ We also hear that when she joined Temüjin as wife, her father Jaqa Gambu had given her 200 personal slaves as part of her dowry (*ingjes*) and also two cooks. From this we can also see that the marriage of the daughters of Jaqa Gambu had been conducted by observing proprieties, that is with the parties more or less on equal terms and not in the form of taking the daughters of a captive as wives. Her marriage with a dowry of personal slaves and two skilled persons as cooks, a position which we see later occupying a high position reminiscent of a finance minister, also confirms that Jaqa Gambu had become “the second shaft,” though it be for a short time. The relationship between the two, Jaqa Gambu and Temüjin, remains as enigmatic as before. Here by questioning the suggestiveness and the evasiveness of the passages we become much more aware of the complexity of their relationship.²⁴²

²³⁸ *MNT*, §208. See also p. 114 for the passage in which Ibaqa Beki is given to Jürchedei

²³⁹ Elsewhere I had commented on this episode as the charismatic or dynastic power of a woman that is not only transmitted to her children but also to her mates. İ. Togan, 1992: 145, n.16.

²⁴⁰ On her see Pelliot, 1951: 236-37.

²⁴¹ *MNT*, §208.

²⁴² Except for pieces of poetical passages that bring forth the man, Jaqa Gambu, historians, medieval or modern saw in him a man whom you could not trust. The poetical passages on

In an overview of this intricate and complex relationship where there are still many lacunae of information we can see retrospectively that alliance with Jaqa Gambu was crucial in Temüjin's career. This alliance made it possible for Temüjin to secure manpower. This manpower came from the ranks of the Tübegén and the Dongqayid clans. Some of the Tübegén had joined Temüjin's ranks at the time of his formation of the 13 *küren*. They had followed Jaqa Gambu in his rebellion against his brother Ong Khan To'oril. At that time Temüjin did not "go and defeat" Jaqa Gambu. On the contrary, Temüjin benefited from the new situation to the extent that the Tübegén remained with him when Jaqa Gambu ended up in the lands of the Jauqut. Later Temüjin arranged for Jaqa Gambu's return,²⁴³ but this time he fell into the hands of the Merkid, and the Tübegén and the Dongqayid dispersed. Temüjin went into the Merkid country and rescued him but we do not know exactly what happened after that. When Ong Khan To'oril returned, Jaqa Gambu came to be a companion to Temüjin. Then his clansmen, the Dongqayid and the Tübegén, and the Kerait who had dispersed came to join Temüjin.²⁴⁴ At that time, because of the friendship between Temüjin and Ong Khan, Jaqa Gambu sent his Dongqayid to join Ong Khan To'oril. Jaqa Gambu, in fact, would remain loyal to his elder brother until the time when he joined the Naimans. What we see here is that alliance with Jaqa Gambu was crucial both for Ong Khan To'oril and Temüjin. But it was Temüjin who used these alliances for his own benefit in spite of the fact that their policies were different. In this sense then, in a similar vein with Temüjin's many services to Ong Khan To'oril (see Appendix B), Jaqa Gambu's last service was to give his daughters in marriage to Temüjin and his descendants. With that he had fulfilled his historical mission in Temüjin's eyes and when the need arose could be discarded. Thus Jürchedei devising a plot as mentioned in the *Yüan shih* account did away with him. With this action Temüjin seems also to have buried all of his emotions

Jaqa Gambu have a subjective value, whereas the historians' interpretations objectify the situation. In terms of subjective values how you feel about the situation is more important. Whereas it seems we historians of the twentieth century expect from historical figures that they objectify the situation or at least that they confirm to our notions of "objective" history. Our notions of "objective" history carry qualities of aim, purpose, end. "End" is understood as victory or defeat. One could say that models of dominance play an important role in the interpretation of history. We expect from political figures that they subordinate themselves to aims, ideals, purposes. But in terms of ideals, aims we have definite views as to how they should be. Thus both Jaqa Gambu and later Jamugha do not conform to our views as to how things should be and operate. They do not seem to work towards an end that we understand or care about. They seem to be more involved in keep the *status quo* in a world of tribalism that we do not appreciate.

²⁴³ Desmond Martin, 1981: 67, n.43 says that Temüjin arranged for Jaqa Gambu's return who had sought asylum in China.

²⁴⁴ *MNT*, §150.

toward him so that there is no more mention of Jaqa Gambu. It was the descendants of these two men who came to rule over most of the Mongolian empire.

Senggüm's Story

After Ong Khan's decisive defect by Temujin, his son, Senggüm, fled west. Rashīd al-Dīn gives us a detailed description of Senggüm's adventurous flight:²⁴⁵

When his father was taken captive and killed, Sengün, Ong Khan's son, fled and went outwards and passed through a settlement village called *Ishiq Balghasun (AYSHYK MLGHSVN) which was at the edge of the desert and at the frontiers of Mogholistan. Then he entered the Land of Böri Tübüd that is to the land of Tibet [by that Rashīd means eastern Tibet extending itself through the present Qinghai to Gansu Province in PRC], pillaged some of the people of that land and dwelled there for some time. He devastated the countryside, and the people of Tibet assembled and cornered him so that they would seize him and he came out of that region and fled from the hands of those people, too. He arrived in the region of Khotan and Kashghar and came to a region called *Küchetü Sari Kesme (SARKASHMH). A ruler/ commander from the rulers/commanders of the Khalaj people [whose name was] Qılıch Qara who was the ruler of that region took him prisoner and killed him. It is told that that ruler had taken the wife and children of Sengün and sent them to Chinggiz Khan as [as a token] of his submission. [Thus] he became his subject and vassal. This was the end of the rulers of the Kerait people and the fortune of that dynasty.

While Senggüm was dwelling in Böri Tübüd (Tibet), he and his people apparently encountered Khalaj forces coming from India where the Delhi Sultanate had established itself at about this time. One of their leading commanders, Meḥemmed Bahtiyār, conducted an expedition into these regions and came to a city:²⁴⁶

There would be 50,000 valiant Turk horsemen, archers...It is a city of great size, and the whole of its walls are of hewn stone and [its inhabitants are an assemblage of Brahmans and Nunis [idol worshipers] and that city is under the authority of their Mihtar [chief or lord], and they hold the pagan faith [din-i tarsi-i, i.e. Christians]; and every day, at daybreak, in the cattle market of that city, about one thousand five hundred horses are sold; and all the *tangahan* horses which reach the Lakhawati country [in India] they bring from that place.... the Musalman troops being fatigued and knocked up by the march, and a large number having been martyred and disabled on the first day-he held

²⁴⁵ R/T: 292.

²⁴⁶ This quotation, is from Raverty, 1881, I: 567-568. The name of the city in question is written in various forms, for example Kar-battan KRBTN, Karar-battan KRRBTN. I also wonder whether these names could be a mistake for KRYTY to be read Kireitei or Kireidei, meaning "of the Kireit or Kerait." Z. V. Togan prefers to read them as Kerebeten and Kerbetei.

consultation with his Amirs. They came to the conclusion that it was necessary to retreat, in order that, next year, after making ample arrangements, they might return again into that country.

However they were not able to come back the next year; they all perished because the inhabitants of these regions had devastated the countryside and the returning forces had nothing to eat. Eventually only their commander survived, but he also died upon his return to his homeland.

It would seem that the forces under the Khalaj Qılıç Qara, who killed Senggüm in a place located near Yarkent, came with the intention of barring them from entering their own regions in the south. Thus like the Mamluks in Egypt, the Khalaj, who also had *mamlūk* Turks in their armies, kept the western-moving Inner Asian tribal people away from their own country. After Senggüm died in this battle, the remaining Kerait moved westwards so that we encounter them later north of the Transoxianan region, in the present Kazakhstan and from there among the Bashkorts, in the Crimea, and in Anatolia. The Kerait who remained behind were incorporated into the new order of the Mongolian World Empire. Before dealing with that (Chapter Four) let us look at the tribal organization of the Keraites so that we can relate to the changes of the “new order.”

Kerait Political Culture

Certain clans were the backbone of the khanate. These were the Jirgin, the Tübe'en and the Dongqayid.²⁴⁷ In fact the khanate itself did not depend solely on clans, and this is why we are speaking of the Kerait Khanate as having the structure of a chiefdom rather than a tribe. The foundations of the khanate were to be seen first in the ruling lineage, second in the magnitude of its supportive manpower and third in the use of the territories. Thus the Persian historian Rashīd al-Dīn states in different passages that the Kerait had greater manpower than other people in the same region, and that their ruling family was an ancient and famous one.

²⁴⁷ For a general description of these clans see Ch'en Te-chih, 1984: 6-13. On the name Jirgin see Pelliot, 1951: 55. On the Tübe'en see *ibid.*, 55-57. The editors of *MTPL* (200 n. 23) have pointed out that the relationship between the Tübe'en of the Kerait and the T'o-pa of the Tangut has not been resolved. The opinions of Chinese scholars on this issue have also varied. However, Ruth Dunell's study (1991), as mentioned above, enlightens us as to the historical connections. The stand taken in this study is to recognize the relationship between the Tübe'en and the T'o-pa; however, their tribal, that is political affiliations were independent of one another.

For the Dongqayid see Pelliot, 1951: 228. This clan name, which appears also as Tongqayid, seems to be related to *tonga* which was an old Turkic epithet used for heroes. Originally it meant a “tiger.” See Robert Dankoff and James Kelly, 1985, Vol. I: 337 No.605. Pelliot was uncertain of the etymology. It is interesting to note that his quotation from M. Baruch as *dongqayī*—avoir l'air majestueux—is close to Z. V. Togan's explanation. See Pelliot, 1951: 228-29.

The “many people” of the rulers were in fact known as the “Kerait.” The name Kerait denoted two overlapping groups: first the followers of the khan who made up his armies. These people were referred to as Kerait in our sources in a narrower sense as being distinct from the other clans. Second: the name Kerait was also a term encompassing all other groups and clans pledging allegiance to the Kerait rulers. It is this latter form with which we are more familiar from historical documents. In this case the larger group was not differentiated within itself, but was seen as distinct from other groups.

Depending on diverse factors, members of the ruling family were able to derive support from different clans. Agreement within the ruling family also meant greater support and larger armies, as the story of Ong Khan To’oril and his younger brother Jaqa Gambu illustrates.²⁴⁸ Of the Kerait clans the Dongqayid and the Tüben appear frequently in relation to Jaqa Gambu’s endeavors as we have seen earlier. This arrangement whereby members of the ruling family would seek the support of different clans, hampered the concentration of power at a center. The position of the ruler in the Kerait Khanate depended on a coalition with other members of the ruling family who enjoyed tribal support. Thus Ong Khan and his younger brother Jaqa Gambu had each a *tümen*²⁴⁹ under their command in the days when they were in agreement.²⁵⁰ Agreements came to an end because of Ong Khan To’oril’s tendency to concentrate power in his own hands. In his quest for power, he killed his younger brothers. Later on he tried to get rid of his brother Jaqa Gambu, who was not easy to kill because of the tribal support he enjoyed. Even Temüjin asked the rhetorical question, “How can I kill somebody whom I rescued twice?” It would seem that at this stage of Kerait history, a ruler could get away with killing a fellow member of the ruling family. However it was virtually impossible to kill a tribal or clan leader in the khanate with the kind of support that Jaqa Gambu enjoyed from the ranks of the Dongqayid and the Tüben. If a tribal or clan leader was killed by the ruler, the tribesmen would immediately desert this ruler with the intention of retaliation and vengeance.²⁵¹ Such an action would only contribute to a decrease in manpower and thus would have no practical

²⁴⁸ The Gambu part of the name Jaqa Gambu is explained by Pelliot (1951: 226-27) as “accomplished.” For Jaqa meaning “vast” see Pelliot, “Notes sur le ‘Turkestan’ de M.W. Barthold,” *TP* (1930). 50-51.

²⁴⁹ *Tümen* means 10,000 but it does not necessarily mean that there were exactly 10,000 persons under the command. See Doerfer, 1965 Vol. II: No.983.

²⁵⁰ For this occasion see above on the expedition for the rescue of Börte.

²⁵¹ To prevent vengeance in the after world, the Chinos were boiled by Jamugha. According to an ancient belief—with examples also from China—boiling would cause the evaporation of the spirit. See *RCK*: 42 and 80 n.183. Thus Joseph Fletcher’s understanding of early Mongolian society in which “vengeance” played such an important role is very much valid (Fletcher, 1986).

value.²⁵² In the case of Jaqa Gambu, we have an example of how this situation could be used for the advantage of a member of the ruling family. It is most probable that because of some marriage connections he was considered as “the prince” by the two clans that supported him. Therefore, he was not only a member of the ruling family but was functioning also as a clan leader. Consequently it would be not possible to kill him. One could only hope to be united with him, and this was exactly what happened in Kerait history. Jaqa Gambu could not be eliminated. The strongest moments of Ong Khan To’oril were those when he enjoyed the support of Jaqa Gambu.²⁵³ As we have seen Temüjin also rose to power in alliance with Jaqa Gambu.

In the khanate of this tribal world the ruler had to be in agreement with the clans in the periphery. We have seen the clans showing their opposition by shifting their alliances. It was an important way by which different groups were made aware of each other’s problems. Because shifting alliances gave choices, succession struggles were a legal means to power. Candidates with greater tribal or “popular” support came to power by eliminating contenders. The elimination would mean expulsion and exile. Among the pre-Chinggisid Kerait there was no “bloody tanistry” yet, as there was no state with a centralized government.²⁵⁴

In this world order where segmentarism rather than absolutism was condoned, the political structure had very precarious foundations. These were the so called ephemeral political structures. Legitimization of rule depended as in other chiefdoms on the “ruling” lineage and the redistributive abilities of the rulers. People, land and booty were the areas of pooling and redistribution.

²⁵² As we see in Appendix A only people of royal blood could be killed. See the episode of Kümüş Sijang.

²⁵³ We see this in the expedition for the rescue of Börte and in the Naiman campaign (*MNT*, §108).

²⁵⁴ The practice named “bloody tanistry” by Joseph Fletcher was widely spread in the Turco-Mongolian world in the post-Chinggisid era. See Joseph Fletcher, “Bloody Tanistry: Authority and Succession in the Ottoman, Indian Muslim, and later Chinese Empires,” a paper presented at the Conference on the Theory of Democracy and Popular Participation. Bellagio, Italy. September 13-8, 1978 and “Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire,” *HUS* 3-4(1979-80). 236-251.

In the Kerait example we sense that we are experiencing the antecedents of a practice in the tribal order which in the state formation would lead to bloody tanistry as a legitimization of “killing for power and centralization.” In the tribal order, on the other hand, the ideology was along coexistence, either in agreement or in dissent. Expulsion and exile were permitted but killing for power was not legitimate. It was regarded as murder. We can see clearly that killing the members of the ruling family had not attained political legitimization under the banner of “the continuity and welfare of the state.”

The people, variously referred to as *irge(n)*, *irge ulus* or *ulus*²⁵⁵ consisted of two different groups: the various clans, i.e. the *omogh*,²⁵⁶ and the followers and subject peoples used for “military” purposes by the ruler. The clans constituted the periphery of the khanate. They enjoyed an autonomous status and had their own lands, leaders and military organization:

At the time of Ong Khan there was Güyüg Bahader leading the Jirgin. He was the chief of *küren* of one *tümen* and his home region was at Qara’un Jidun and JYKR JLΓR [a location close to the borders of Chin China].²⁵⁷

Their support gave the khan greater bargaining power in his dealings inside and outside the khanate. They demonstrated their support by participating in raids and military operations. In return they received a share of the spoils. In accordance with the spirit of shifting alliances, our sources do not mention taxation. There is only one single passage, quoted above with a reference to taxation in the earlier times. It is quite possible that this is an interpolation of the Persian historian, rather than historical facts. Taxation can not be enforced under conditions of shifting alliances.

The backbone of the khanate were the followers (*nökör*)²⁵⁸ and the subject people.²⁵⁹ The followers and the subject peoples whose military obligations outweighed other aspects, consisted of: a) guards (*turgha’ud*)²⁶⁰ b) common soldiers (*cheri’üd*)²⁶¹ and their dependents. These were households under the direct control of the ruling family, and the khan. There is no indication of clan relations among them. In contrast to clans these military groups consisted of households that established direct relations with the center (ruling family) on an individual basis. The guards and the common soldiers as households “attached to the center” constituted the core population, i.e. the Kerait people²⁶² of the “center” called the “middle or central city,” Orta Balghasun. Until we have archeological evidence on the physical existence

²⁵⁵ The terms *irgen* and *ulus* are to be found in Doerfer, 1963, I: No.16 and 54.

²⁵⁶ For *omogh* see Lawrence Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol Turkic Pastoral Nomads*. The Hague: Mouton, 1963: 324. See also Doerfer, 1965, II: No.468 (under *urugh*)

²⁵⁷ R/A: 253.

²⁵⁸ Although there is no exact reference to the use of the term *nökör* “companion” among the Kerait context, the indication is that it was used as there are cases of the usage of the verb *nökechile*—“to be a companion.” See Haenisch, *Mangghol un Niuca Tobca’an*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1962: 150.

²⁵⁹ Later after the establishment of the state the term (*qariyatan*) is used for the subject people. However at this time period we do not encounter it yet. *Qariyatan* is a plural of *qariyatu* which occurs in an inscription from 1335. See Francis W. Cleaves, “The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1335 in Memory of Chang Ying-jui,” *HJAS* 13(1950).1-131 (p.72, line 12) where it has been translated as “subject” (p.95).

²⁶⁰ For *turgha’ud* see note 100 above. At this point there is yet no differentiation between day and night guards. Both are common terms used in the *MNT*, §170.

²⁶¹ For *cherig* see Doerfer, 1965, II: No.1079.

²⁶² The *Kereyid irgen* of *MNT*, §150.

of Orta Balghasun, this “capital” must be seen as an antecedent of the *ordo*, the mobile camp town.²⁶³

The Kerait “center” was of course much smaller, and its main inhabitants were the “thousand day guards” and the common soldiers of the “Great Middle.”²⁶⁴ Tribal armies consisting of the members of the seven clans were not part of the center. In a famous passage in the *Secret History of the Mongols*²⁶⁵ we are given the fighting order of the tribal forces and of the soldiers of the center. In this passage we can see the vital importance of the forces of the center for the Kerait ruler:

Jirgin
Tümen Tübe'en
Olon Dongqayid
Thousand Day Guards
The Great Middle (the Kerait)

We know that the Jirgin were the best soldiers and the people on whom Ong Khan To'oril could depend and they lead the way. Thanks to the fighting spirit and the loyalty of the Jirgin, Ong Khan To'oril was later able to escape. The undependable Tübe'en and the Dongqayid were stationed between the loyal clan and the center. During the course of the battle the two undependable tribal forces were easily overcome by the enemy. Only thereafter, the soldiers of the “Great Middle” were sent forward. These then were referred to as the Kerait. It is evident that the “many soldiers” of Ong Khan had to be used sparingly.

The most difficult task these societies of shifting alliances faced was the continuity of institutions. Creating new institutions or adopting them from other societies did not present a problem. Institutional continuity that would mean an end to opposition, and acceptance of a hierarchical social order presented a problem. It was that not they were against institutions, but that their institutions were not geared to building upon and concentration at a center. They preferred to bargain and to be able to change the balance of power and disperse. Therefore any centralizing tendency was anathema to clans and other corporate groups.

For a leader who wanted to build a center, of which Ong Khan To'oril and Temüjin were the leading examples, the task was not the acquisition of a following and subject people, but keeping them in that category. The followers were attached to the center voluntarily. In this choice exigencies of

²⁶³ For *ordo* see Doerfer, 1965, II: No.587. However, he does not see any relation between the *orta* (II: 587) and *ordo*, *ordu* “royal encampment.” For the mobile capital of the Mongolian emperors, see A.C. Moule, *Quinsai with other Notes on Marco Polo*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.

²⁶⁴ For this translation see *MNT*, §170.

²⁶⁵ *MNT*, §170.

the time and the availability of spoils were the decisive factors. Whenever the spoils were not worth the “attachment” the tendency would be to disperse. This is such a common theme in our sources that the phrase “people who had dispersed themselves” becomes a term.

Because the attachment was to the person of a leader with certain expectations, when there was no hope for victory, no one remained “loyal.” On one such occasion, the Kerait ruler advises a clan (in fact the Mongols in the narrow sense) that had deserted him, upon his defeat:²⁶⁶

After that the Mogholan went to join Sariq Khan, and Sariq Khan said: “From the hundred wives that I possess there is not one who has a place in my heart. Those of my wives who are intelligent, I don’t know what to say about their understanding, and they don’t have any skill or talent. From the thousand geldings that I have none has a place in my heart, either there are those who fall on their face, or they are hard to tame, or weak in body. Those that are talented and heroic, are not physically strong. In big battles they say in one mouth” Hu,! Hu!”; [but it is only] after the victory or defeat that they have been tested. Fighting with flies is hard, because they can kill if they sting. With elder and younger brothers one has to be ashamed. They may not kill, [but] they can make it intolerable.”

Under such circumstances one of the methods of keeping a large following was by dispersing somebody else’s following and taking their possessions as booty:

The Naiman people, saying that [it is] one of which the empire is great and one of which the people are many, is speaking great words. If we, relying on these their great words, setting forth and going [to find them], take their quivers [from them], would it be so difficult? If we go [to find them], would their many herds, halting [to rest], perhaps not remain behind? Would their *ordo* tents, becoming empty, perhaps, not remain behind? Would their many people, perhaps, not go out to escape to high places?²⁶⁷

The enumeration of the spoils in an order of ‘people, herds, food’²⁶⁸ shows us how people, acquisition of manpower occupied an important place in the political culture. Another way of increasing a following was by subjugating other people:

Ong Qan, setting forth against the Merki[d] people, pursuing Toγto’a Beki toward Baryujin Hollow, killing Tögüs Beki, the eldest son of Toγto’a, taking Qutuytai and Ča’alun of Toγto’a, his two daughters and his wives, spoiled his two sons, Qutu and Čila’un, together with [his] people,...²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ R/A: 200-2. See also the translation of this passage in Appendix A.

²⁶⁷ MNT, §190.

²⁶⁸ The phrase is *eme kö’üd, irge, orgha, ide’e* in Heanisch, 1962: § 162.

²⁶⁹ MNT, §157

In the above case which happened in 1198²⁷⁰ after Ong Khan To'oril's return, the sons of the neighboring Merkid chieftain were carried along among the Kerait even through battles. After their capture they were not left behind with the women, children and the old people, "baggage" (*a'urugh*),²⁷¹ which would necessitate leaving men behind to guard them. Being captured meant acknowledging the Kerait overlordship until you were freed. Only much later when the Kerait ruler Ong Khan To'oril was pillaged by a commander of the neighboring Naiman, these two young men left the related battle site with their own following:

having taken their people, separating themselves, they removed along Selengge [River], joining themselves unto their father...²⁷²

The same fate might have befallen many other captives. Captives were seen as "possessions" of the ruling family as they were members of outside clans. As Vladimirtsov has pointed out, the distribution of the captives among "ordinary people" was a later development of the "coming" order.²⁷³ It seems to be yet another innovation of the later Chinggis Khan favoring common people. What happened later to the Kerait themselves was not to be encountered in the tribal days:

Spoiling the Kereyid people, they distributed [them] unto one another so that they were not wanting unto even anyone. Distributing the Tümen Tübe'en unto one another, they together took [them] until [the quantity] was enough [for each one]. They suffered one to plunder the many Dondqayid, not suffering [it] to attain unto a whole day. They clave and parted the Jirgin *ba'atud* which had taken the bloody clothing, [but] were not able to bring [them] for every one. So destroying the Kereyid people, that winter he [i.e. Činggis Qahan] wintered at Abji'a Ködeger.²⁷⁴

The Kerait, on the other hand, seem to have retained the control of captive populations under the auspices of the leadership. The enlargement of a following by incorporation of captives was one of the most common methods used in steppe history for the formation of leadership. Each time they also denote the beginnings of inequalities in a more or less equal tribal order. Under the Kerait leadership whole tribes that were taken captive and had become subjects could be given as a grant to a "vassal" as subject people. However, such a practice was virtually impossible when one of the participating clans was involved:²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ The year of the horse (RCK: 53) from Rashīd al-Dīn.

²⁷¹ For *a'urugh* or *aghruq* see note 83 above.

²⁷² MNT, §162 and §177.

²⁷³ Vladimirtsov, 1934: 68 and 1944: 106.

²⁷⁴ MNT, §187.

²⁷⁵ R/A: 202. See Appendix A for the translation of this episode.

After that Ötegü Qorchi Buiruq Khan went towards Sariq Khan with the request that he divide [with] him the Mogholan. Sariq Khan said: "These Mogholan are like our younger brothers. We have become one. We united and have taken each other's hand. We can not give them [away]." Buiruq Khan said: "I have revived your dead spirit with "many people." For your flocks and herds, that had gone astray I stood as a shepherd at the places of encampment. I believed in you and rescued you from the enemies. But Man is as forgetful a being as the earth changes its features. From now on do not become friends with the Mongols and do not become their companions (*nöker*)" saying this he returned.

The use of the word "captive" is intentional. It aims to show that in the twelfth century the Keraites did not distinguish between an individual and a group that had been "defeated." After being defeated they were "captives"²⁷⁶ but they did not remain in a perpetual state of captivity as we understand it. It seems that two avenues were open to them: either they would be put among the fighting population²⁷⁷ and would become people subject to the ruling family, or they would be retained in the services. It seems unless one had a distinct trade, men would be forced to join the common soldiers, whereas women would become servants to be used later as part of the dowry of important brides (*ingje*).²⁷⁸

Again, when Činggis Qahan spake unto Ibaqa, having taken [her], "saying, Thy father Jaqa Gambu gave unto thee two hundred *ingjes* and [gave] unto thee both the cook Ašiγ Temür and the cook Alčiγ. Now when thou goest unto the Uru'ud people, go, giving unto me [as] remembrance of thee one hundred from thine *ingjes*, [together with] thy cook Ašiγ Temür," ...²⁷⁹

From the above passage we can conclude that men were retained for their skill or for other services in the "royal" household. However, there is no

²⁷⁶ It is significant that there are no references giving evidence of the existence of *bo'ol*, usually translated as "slave," among the Keraites. Vladimirtsov had seen in the *bo'ol* something akin to the slaves (*mancipia* or *servi*) of the early feudal age as remnants of the preceding slave society. His detailed study of this institution permeated scholarly works for a long time (*Le régime sociale des Mongols. Le féodalisme nomade*. Trad. par M. Carsov. Paris, 1948, pp. 80 ff.). However, there is now a growing consensus that Vladimirtsov's views are no longer valid. In this relation see RCK: 11 n.50 and 12 n. 53. The most recent study of the question is by Irinchen, "On Bohol in the Eleventh and Twelfth Century," in *Yüan-shih lun-ts'ung* 3(1984). 23-30 (in Chinese).

On the negation of feudalism among Mongols see Lawrence Krader, "Feudalism and the Tatar Polity," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1(1958). 76-99.

²⁷⁷ This is a situation reminding one of the "Turan troops," troops created from prisoners of war in the second World War by the Germans.

²⁷⁸ For *ingje* see Doerfer, 1965, II: No.670 and Robert Dankoff, 1982, Vol. II, No. 457 "YNJUV *yinjü* 'Pearl (*lu'lu*).' The female servants are sometimes called YNJUV "*yinjü*." See also Chapter Four note 92 below.

²⁷⁹ MNT, §208.

indication that the term “slave” was in use among the Kerait.²⁸⁰ The Kerait had developed an inclusive structure by creating a “center.” All “foreigners” were incorporated into this center under the auspices of the ruling family. However, there was an interactive dynamic between the center and the hierarchical order of the clans.²⁸¹

Political cohesion—keeping the people together—was given in the Kerait case an institutional support by redistribution of land. The introduction of this ancient nomadic institution is significant.²⁸² Under Kerait rule this practice consisted of assigning separate pastures to followers and subject peoples who made up the bulk of the guards and common soldiers. By this arrangement the population was divided into two in terms of the primary sources of their livelihood: a) the guards and the common soldiers who were assigned summer and winter pastures b) the clans who had their own traditional pastures. The names of the summer and winter pastures in the first category have come down to us. However, we have only sporadic information in regard to the pastures inhabited by the various clans. We are not in a position to comment on any differential distribution of pastures among the Kerait.

The assignment of separate pastures for the core units is very significant. It is an indication of a tendency to turn away from tribal loyalties and clan alliances based on kinship. Older clan names that appear together with pastures like the Nere’ed (Tere’ed) have been completely eradicated from the picture. This tendency will be the law (*jasagh*) under the leadership of the later Chinggis Khan. Under Chinggis Khan’s policies favoring common

²⁸⁰ As indicated above “slave” is a translation of *bo’ol* in a specific sense. The *Secret History* speaks of three distinct kinds of *bo’ol* that were prevalent among the Borjigid Mongols. For *ötegü bo’ol* “those enslaved from earlier days” or “those who have been in our service since olden times” see Doerfer, 1963, I: No.40. For *bosogh-a-yin bo’ol* “a servant of the threshold” see Cleaves, 1982: 65 (*MNT*, §137) and for *yemchü bo’ol* as “private slaves” see Cleaves, 1982:65 (*MNT*, §137).

²⁸¹ This creation of a center based on captive manpower is very similar to the creation of central government with its “county (*hsien*)” organization in ancient China. The *hsien* as the core of central government was established on “conquered” territory when in the feudal times everyone had their own lawful territories. See Derk Bodde, *China’s First Unifier*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1938.

²⁸² This practice is reflected in the so called “appanage system.” On this issue see Herbert Franz Schurmann, *The Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty. Translation of Chapters 93 and 94 of Yüan shih*. Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies, XVI. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956. For the Yüan practices see also Isenbike Togan “*The Chapter on Annual Grants in the Yüan shih*.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1973. For this practice in general see Martin Dickson, “*Sháh Tahmásh and the Úzbeks*.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1958. Zeki Velidi Togan sees the “appanage system” as an integral part of Turco-Mongolian states (1970:285-293). For a recent study on the subject see Shih Wei-min “Investigation on Annual Grants of Yuan,” in *Yüan-shih lun-ts’ung* 3(1984).144-154 (in Chinese).

people, first the companions, and later the common soldiers, were granted land to subsist on.

The assignment of separate pastures was not the only sphere where the Kerait Khanate stood out among all other tribes or chiefdoms. The passage on the granting of a whole subject tribe to a some other people brings us to the issue of “ranking” of tribes. In view of this passage we understand that the Kerait were ranked higher than the Naiman. What this actually meant, we do not know. The term “vassal” above has been used following Pelliot to denote that difference in rank.²⁸³ However before dealing with intertribal ranking let us also look more closely at the intratribal ranking among the Kerait. The organization of battle by Ong Khan To’oril is one indication of intratribal ranking.

Intratribal ranking becomes more visible with an absence of “slave clans (*ötegü boghol*).” In this stratified tribal society, as in other stratified traditions,²⁸⁴ there was no need to dominate a substratum because stratification was built into the system. Anthropologically such tribes appear as acknowledging hierarchy and organize themselves in hierarchical forms.²⁸⁵ By contrast among the non-stratified segmentary tribes of Eastern Mongolia and Manchuria²⁸⁶ tribes had more than one leader. Within these tribes the balance of power was also maintained by shifting alliances. However the domination of one tribe over another was frequently seen. Domination was achieved by the use of sheer force and it was accepted within the system by recognizing the superiority of the powerful. The powerful were able then to dominate whole clans in their status of slaves (*ötegü boghol*).²⁸⁷ Among the Kerait and other stratified tribes, on the other hand, not force but the superiority of genealogy was recognized. An example of a superior genealogy was the A-shi-na clan. More specifically the Hsiung-nu, the Türk, and the Qara-khanid ruling families continued to dominate the ruling lineages on the basis of having a superior genealogy. Nothing could change that. In an episode translated in Appendix A one of the heroes is told:

As you are of the royal line and the younger brother of the heir apparent, you wish to seize the ways and methods of our ancestors and fathers.

²⁸³ Pelliot, 1951: 243.

²⁸⁴ Based on personal communication with Thomas Barfield 25 March 1987. These were mostly of Turkic tradition.

²⁸⁵ Thomas Barfield's ideas were formulated by him in “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective,” Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.) *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*. London, New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1990 (153-182).

²⁸⁶ These are referred to Thomas Barfield as “Manchurian Candidates” (1989: 164-186).

²⁸⁷ Doerfer, 1963, I: No.40.

This aspect of higher ranking would continue into the thirteenth century, however with a change in the ruling clan. This time it was going to be the Chinggisids who were superior.

The ranking was decidedly visible in the relations of the Kerait with the outside world of the tribal communities. A careful study of the sources of this period shows that the Kerait were not only superior in terms of manpower and political power, they were also considered superior in terms of their lineage. If our vision of the twelfth century had not been foreshadowed by what we know about Chinggis Khan's lineage, it would be possible to see that the Kerait rulers represented the proper khan lineage of that time.²⁸⁸ Even in the fourteenth century, the Persian historian is apologetic about Chinggis Khan's seizure of power and khanship. The passage on the enthronement of Chinggis Khan starts with the following words: "the history of the enthronement of Chinggis Khan as "khan" who had been destined to rule after Ong Khan who was the most highly esteemed ruler and had been vanquished."²⁸⁹

Moreover, some passages of the *Secret History* make clear allusions to a royal lineage by referring to the "golden tent" and "golden saddle" of Ong Khan.²⁹⁰ In one specific instance he is even referred to as "Ong Qa'an."²⁹¹ In this connection it is important to point out that according to the available information on the marriage patterns of the Kerait ruling family, they appear as prestigious wife takers. Simultaneously with the destruction of the Kerait we see Jaqa Gambu's three daughters, i.e. Ong Khan's nieces, being given as wives to the family of Temüjin. Before this event there is only one reference to a case when Ong Khan, in distress, had given his daughter in marriage to the Merkid chieftain "as a means of presenting his face," showing that this was quite extraordinary.²⁹² There is very little information about women from the ruling family marrying outsiders.²⁹³ We know of the granddaughter of Ong Khan whom Temüjin, had requested for his son Jochi. But this request was vehemently rejected by Ong Khan's son who:

²⁸⁸ Although Paul Ratchnevsky does not look at the twelfth century from the point of steppe traditions, he also makes it a point to show that Chinggis Khan was a contender from a junior line of the Borjigid. See *RCK*: 14. Detailed geneological tables on Chinggis Khan's (Temüjin, Borjigid) ancestors can be found in the adaptation of the *Secret History* prepared by Paul Kahn (*The Secret History of the Mongols. The Origin of Chinggis Khan*. San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984, tables 1-5).

²⁸⁹ *R/T*: 292.

²⁹⁰ *MNT*, §184.

²⁹¹ See *MNT*, §150. As we do not have other examples, it is difficult to understand the significance of this term as used for Ong Khan.

²⁹² See *MNT*, §177.

²⁹³ In one specific instance Rashīd al-Dīn speaks of another daughter of Jaqa Gambu who had been given in marriage to the Tangut ruling family. She was rumored to be extremely beautiful but in spite of searches she could not be found. See not 108 above.

imagining himself to be [somebody] great, saying, “If a kinswoman of us [i.e. Kerait ruling family—I.T.] went unto them, she would stand at the door and would only look upon the back [of the tent]. If a kinswoman of them [Temüjin's family—I.T.] came unto us, she would sit at the back [of the tent] and look upon the door,”²⁹⁴

and thus led formally to the rift between “father, the khan” and his “son, which was born with *raiment*.”²⁹⁵

The words spoken by Ong Khan's son Senggüm indicate how the Kerait ruling house was evaluating the situation. As Temüjin had not become Chinggis Khan at this time, “sitting facing the seat of honor” can not be understood as showing respect to the “golden lineage of Chinggis Khan.” On the contrary, the passage seems to indicate that the family of Temüjin was not behaving in a royal manner by esteeming highly their daughters and daughters-in-law. On the contrary they were behaving like common folk who always are keen to keep the women and especially the daughters-in-law in their proper place. Later this difference in ranking is expressed with the following words by one the important associates (elders) who supported Temüjin:²⁹⁶

When we requested Ča'ur Beki, the same, indeed, despising us, would not have given [her unto us]. Now how contrariwise have they invited [us] to eat the betrothal meal? Why contrariwise would people which imagine themselves to be great invite [us] saying, ‘We shall give [her unto you]’?

It is not only a question of ranking between the two people but also between the two clans. The allusion is to Chinggis Khan's position in the junior line of the Borjigid clan. Even the Naimans, who claimed a history going back a century and a half, remarked that “the Mongyol people are ones whose scent [is] bad and whose clothing [is] dark.”²⁹⁷ Although, we need not accept all allegations of these references verbatim, they definitely do contain indications of the higher rank of the Kerait ruling house.

In another interesting passage, Chinggis Khan himself seems to allude to the higher rank of the Kerait lineage by saying the following words to Ibaqa Beki, the niece of Kerait Ong Khan:

I have not said [unto myself] that thou [art] without thine *ülige* and bosom and that [thou art] bad [as to thy] beauty and appearances. When I present unto

²⁹⁴ See *MNT*, §165.

²⁹⁵ For this phrase see *MNT*, §181. The chain of developments leading to this rift have been studied by Paul Ratchnevsky with a critical examination of the sources (*RCK*: 62-71).

²⁹⁶ *MNT*, §168.

²⁹⁷ See *MNT*, §186 and §196.

Jürchedei thee who art 'entered into [my] breast and into [my] legs' and who art 'descended' by taking place in the row ...²⁹⁸

It is noteworthy that Ibaqa Beki is seen by the later Chinggis Khan as having lowered her status by taking a place among his wives ("in the row").²⁹⁹

In fact there is another passage where we are told that Chinggis Khan was in the service of Ong Khan:³⁰⁰

Pu-hu-mu ...was one of the leaders of the Qangli tribe (*pu*). The Qangli are [descendants of] the Kao-ch'ih Country of the Han times. Pu-hu-mu's ancestor Haira Beg (Hai La) had been in the service of Kerei[t] Ong Qaghan (*k'e-lieh wang k'e-han*). When Wang Khan was destroyed, leaving his family behind, leading several thousand horsemen he went to the northwest. When our First Emperor [T'ai-tsu, i.e. Chinggis Khan] sent messengers and called him, he replied: "Earlier you, the Emperor and I, we have served together Ong Qaghan. Now that Ong Qaghan has been destroyed, I can not bear to change service" and went away. Nothing [more] was known about his whereabouts.

Similar information is given by the independent Mamluk source written by al-'Umarī who states (in its German translation):³⁰¹

...regierte einst, gehorcht von seinen Untertanen und gefolgt von seinem Adel ('*uzamā'ra 'īyatihī*) ein mächtiger Fürst namens Unk Han über ein grosses Volk. Bei ihm ging Ginkiz Han in seiner Jugend ein und aus. Unk Khan nahm ihn (schliesslich) unter sein Gefolge auf und zog ihn nahe an sich heran, und da er in ihm adlige Gesinnung und Herrschertalent erkannte, liess er ihn nur noch höher über seine unmittelbare Umgebung steigen und stellte ihn noch betonter über seinesgleichen, so dass zwischen beiden (allmählich) völliges Einvernehmen erwuchs, und sie sich in Freundschaft verbanden.

Earlier we had heard from Temüjin himself an allusion to an incident involving a time spent at Ong Khan To'oril's court in his youth, probably as a *turghaq*. According to T'u Chi's information he used to visit the Keraites quite often in his youth and had become close friends with one of them.³⁰²

²⁹⁸ MNT, §208. For a translation influenced by the assumption that her "entry" into the "row" was in fact an "ascent" due to Chinggis Khan's lofty position see Ahmet Temir, *Moğolların Gizli Tarihi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1948:139-140.

²⁹⁹ One wonders whether giving her to Jürchedei who killed her father would extinguish her "charisma" while perpetuating Jürchedei's.

³⁰⁰ *Yüan shih* 130 (Vol. 5: 3163).

³⁰¹ Klaus Lech, 1968: 93. For a detailed discussion about the probable suppression of Ong Khan in the sources see also Lech, 1968: 181-184, n. 21 and 22.

In this chapter we have already seen how information on Jaqa Gambu was also suppressed. This suppression involves also earlier history; the information on certain Kerait clans like Tere'et, and Saqayit always have lacunae in the text of the Persian historian. The Tere'et are also mentioned as having their own summer encampments (Boyle, "The Summer and Winter Camping Grounds of the Kerei," in *The Mongol World Empire. 1206-1370*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1977, pp.108-110). One wonders if we will ever know why the information on the Tere'et has been suppressed.

³⁰² T'u Chi, 50.4v and T'ang Ch'i, 1970: 92, n.1.

Thus three independent sources speak of young Temüjin's services at Ong Khan's court and the superior position of Ong Khan was later alluded to through the symbolism of his "golden" tent and saddle.

In conclusion, we can say that the Kerait Khanate owed its existence, like many others in history, to a superior lineage, greater manpower and wealth. But because they did not possess institutional means to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of the tribal populations, they remained in a precarious and ephemeral state. It was the later Chinggis Khan who managed to reverse the trend and set the beginnings of a more lasting order. However, it is doubtful whether there would be a Chinggis Khan as we know him without the Kerait experience.

From this long history of the Kerait we have seen that they were not a tribe isolated in Mongolia; on the contrary they were in constant contact with other people. In times of distress they used these connections and took their flight along routes that were familiar from historical memory. Not all the Keraites were killed; those that remained migrated into different parts of Eurasia and preserved their identity as Kerait. The Kirei among the Kazakhs, the Özbeks, the Bashkort, and the Crimean Tatars have made the name famous in its Giray form.

Epilogue to the Tribal History

The main reason that this chapter was conceived as a tribal history was the need to contextualize the Mongolian Empire. In the "Introduction" I used the metaphor of the hills on which a mountain rests to examine the zeniths of history. In this connection we have seen different hills, different tribes. The struggles among them can be summarized as struggles between stratified and non-stratified tribes. The former had built-in hierarchies, some of which showed inclinations toward centralization or state building, and the latter, the non-stratified tribes, on the other hand violently objected to this intrusion on their right to an independent existence. It is out of the struggles for a solution to this opposition within this steppe culture that Temüjin emerged as leader of the new order. In this endeavor he had also secured help from the non-tribal world in the form of merchant support.

As a result we find ourselves in a setting—that of the many actors of the twelfth century Inner Asian tribal world—which is conceptually analogous to what the Colin Renfrew calls "Peer Polity Interaction and Social Change" and defines as follows:³⁰³

³⁰³ Colin Renfrew, "Introduction," in Colin Renfrew and John F. Cherry (eds.) *Peer Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986 (pp. 1-2). I am indebted to my former student Jim Reilly for bringing this work to my attention.

When we consider most early states, for instance, we find *they do not exist in isolation* [my italics, I.T.]. On the contrary, it is possible to identify in a given region several autonomous political centers which, initially at least, are not brought within a single, unified jurisdiction. It is such autonomous territorial units, with their administrative centers which together constitute what is often termed a civilization....

.....The individual political unit- the states- are often fiercely independent and competitive. Indeed, not uncommonly, one of them may come to achieve political dominance over the others, ultimately uniting the cluster into a single larger unit frequently coterminous in its extent with that of the entire "civilization."

This description and conceptualization in relation to antiquity and city states is analogous to what we have witnessed in 12th-century Inner Asia. It is not the time frame that is important in this case but rather the methodology. Methodological problems related to earlier studies have been summarized by Colin Renfrew under the rubric of "models of dominance" which include various approaches such as diffusion, center-periphery a.s.o. and under models for endogenous change where internal factors are taken into consideration in isolation from the outside. However their approach, the "peer polity" approach is intermediary. They maintain that the process of transformation [to state] was not brought about big internal processes leading to intensification or contradictions nor to a single outside stimulus but "as a result of interaction between the peer policies." This is exactly the purpose of this chapter to see and to understand the interactions between different tribes in the twelfth century so that they lead us to the changes of the thirteenth century.

Dealing with completely different time periods and societies Colin Renfrew and I seem to have come to the same conclusion. He defines his course of action in theoretical terms, in the case of the present study it is a conclusion reached deductively on the basis of source materials in an effort to understand puzzling passages that were not understandable from our present point of view. In either case it seems we have been warned by the risks of projecting too vigorously into the past of the models of dominance of our times.

In a similar tendency, looking away from models of dominance yet perhaps in a model of negligence L. N. Gumilev³⁰⁴ has examined this period in terms of "western" neglect for eastern Christianity, in this case Nestorian Christianity. His study concentrates on the Kerait and the Naiman as two Christian tribes and deals with Chinggis Khan as the person who did away with Christian tendencies. He places the blame on the Catholic Church which cooperated later with the Mongols. Yet from the point of view put

³⁰⁴ See L. V. Gumilev, 1987.

forward in this book, Gumilev demonstrates fully the anti-local religion tendency of Chinggis Khan, preparing us into the new order.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NEW UNIVERSAL ORDER

When Temüjin was growing up, there were many other tribes besides the Kerait. The Kerait were one of those tribes that were referred to as *bülü[g]* (*pu-lo*) in Chinese transcription,¹ a term denoting a composite tribe. Persian sources referred to them as *qawm* denoting their independent character. In history they were known as having had their own rulers (*pādshāh*) and leaders.² Besides the Kerait, the Naiman who were nomadizing to the west of them in the Altai and the Black Irtysh, the Qipchaq, the Kyrghyz to the north, the Qarlūq to the west, the Önggüd, and the Tangut to the southwest were among these tribes with a history of independence.

Besides the Kerait and the Naiman, who in the twelfth century were closely linked to the Mongols, most of the others had been associated with Turks and Turkish rather than Mongols and Mongolian. Even the Kerait and the Naiman had Turkish personal names, as we know; their association with the Mongols was more in a historical, political sense. Among these tribes with a history of independence were also the Tangut. They were a mixture of diverse elements of Tibetan, Turkish, Mongolian stock.³ These tribes of independent character had greater prestige than others among Turkish peoples and among the so called “Mongolian Turks” or, better, Mongolized Turks.⁴ Within this tradition of independent rule and rulers, the social

¹ On *pu-lo* in Chinese sources, see Hilda Eczedy, “Tribe and Tribal Society in the 6th Century Türk Empire,” *Acta Orientalia* 25(1972). 245-262 (p.249). For the reconstruction of *pu-lo* as **bülü[g]* see Chapter Five, note 6.

² *R/T*: 165.

³ Ruth Wilton Dunnell: 1983: 40, 48, 16-62. On Rashīd al-Dīn’s comments on the Tanguts see note 4 below.

⁴ Information on the tribal situation is to be found in the first part of Volume I of Rashīd al-Dīn’s work. The first part in turn is divided into chapters. Below I will give a brief outline of these chapter headings.

Chapter 1. The Oghuz tribes (*R/T*: 25)

Chapter 2. Those people of the Turks who are called Moghol [i.e. Mongol] at present but whose name was not Moghol originally (*R/T*: 26 and *R/SL*: 53; the text on these peoples is to be found in *R/T*: 47-85 and *R/SL*: 92-125)

Chapter 3 Nomadic people who resembled those mentioned above, i.e. those whose name just recently became Moghol. These [former] groups had many people and numerous tribes. Those tribes and subsections that were known have been recorded here in detail: Kerait, Naiman, Öngüt, Tangut, Bekrin, Qyrqyz (*R/T*: 26 and *R/SL*: 53, the text on these peoples is to be found in *R/T*: 87-110 and *R/SL*: 126-151)

Chapter 4. Those people of the Turks whose epithet was Moghol in former times:

structure of these tribes had acquired hierarchical forms.⁵ Their leaders were referred to as Khans and they themselves were khanates. Among these the Kerait occupied an especially important place in the twelfth century. The Kerait society consisted of an upper layer personified in the ruling clan, a middle layer of followers who made up the army with commanders and common soldiers and the larger tribal layer consisting of clans at the periphery (see Chapter Three). Within this hierarchy we also see on the battle field that a military force dependent upon the center had been created and that they were being used as a mechanism of enforcement and coercion. There was as yet no institutionalization for the continuity of these cherig (military) households.

The Qonggirad, who were going to play such an important role as the consort tribe of the “Golden Dynasty,” were of the many tribes with many leaders. These multi-leader tribes were also divided into two different groups: the *Törölki (“the Natives, the Relatives, the Commoners”)⁶ and the

Section 1: the Mongolized Turks or Turks of the Mongols who were called *Törölkin who were descendants of Nüküz and Qiyan who went to Ergene Qun and who were there before the time of Dobun Bayan and Alan Qo’a (R/T: 111, 136 and R/SL: 152; the text is to be found in R/T: 112-138 and R/SL: 152-178).

Section 2: Those who were called Nirün<*nirughun* which means those who were of pure birth, that is descendants of Alan Qo’a (R/T: 139) and R/SL: 152; the text is to be found in R/T: 139-161 and R/SL: 178-197.

The term *Atrāk-e Moghol* that I have translated as Mongolized Turks is a different expression than “Turkân-e Chîn” translated as “Chinese Turks” by Jerome W. Clinton, in *The Tragedy of Sohrâb and Rostâm*. University of Washington Press, 1987, p.45. Actually what has been translated as “Chinese Turks” from the *Shāhnāme* refers to the Turks in North China and present Mongolia (lands of the Cathay), whereas “Turkân-e Moghol” does not refer to a land.

⁵ For these hierarchical forms see Barfield, 1990. However, he has a tendency to use the concept of conical clan. In this regard Sharon Baştuğ in her forthcoming article says:

As a model of Turkic tribal organization the “conical clan” has been rejected by Linder (1982: 693) and Khazanov (1984: 174) on correct empirical grounds: it requires a rigid hierarchy of lineage segments based on age seniority and a system of royal succession based on primogeniture, neither of which can be found in steppe societies.

Sharon Baştuğ, “Tribe, Confederation and the State among Altaic Nomads of the Asian Steppes,” in Korkut Ertürk (ed.), *Rethinking Central Asia* (forthcoming).

⁶ I am reading the word DRLKYN as *d/törelkin*<*törölkin* in the meaning of “naturals, natives, kinsmen.” The word seems to have meant literally people, that is those who have been born (see below). In fact Rashīd al-Dīn says that the DRLKYN were the commoner Mongols that is *Moghol-e ‘ām* (R/T: 111. The relevant passage has been translated by Doerfer, 1963, I: No.199). In other words they were the native, natural, common people, in contrast to the *nirughun*> *nirūn* that is the “backbone” who were considered of pure birth.

The form *törelki* is attested in the fifteenth century dictionary *Muqaddimat al-Adab*. See N. N. Poppe, *Mongol’skij Slovar. Mukaddimat al-adab*. Part I-II. Moskva-Leningrad, 1938:353a. It is glossed with an example of “blind by birth.” In the Ordos region the word appears as *törölki* and is glossed by Antoine Mostaert in *Dictionnaire Ordos* (New York, London: Johnson Reprint corporation, 1968: 675b) as “qui est de naissance, naturel.” In Ferdinand D. Lessing’s *Mongolian-English Dictionary* (Bloomington, Indiana: The Mongolia Society, 1973:837a) the word is glossed as “native, innate, inherent, born.” The ending in -n would make it plural. The

Nirun “Backbone.”⁷ In the fourteenth century the Qonggirad were regarded as part of the *Törölki who had been there of old; whereas Temüjin and his kinsmen were the Nirun (<nirughun “the backbone”). The Nirun were descendants of Alan Gho’a, the mythical ancestress of the Mongols and, therefore, they were regarded as sacred and noble; the *Törölki, on the other hand, had been there before Alan Gho’a. They were descendants of Nüküz and Qıyan who had participated in the passage through Ergene Qun, the mythological passage to freedom of the Türk in the sixth century.⁸ The Qonggirad were known for having the gout which was ascribed to their hastening in the passage of Ergene Qun. They rushed to freedom without waiting for the iron ore to cool down. All these “indigenous” tribes, the *Törölki, were originally Turkish tribes who had melted the iron ore in the mountain to escape from the captivity of the Jou-jan in the sixth century. The Nirun, on the other hand, were descendants of the earlier proto-Mongolian groups. In the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries the famous Uru’ud and the Mangghud as well as the Taiji’ud, Temüjin’s kinsmen, were of the Nirun,

word is also attested in the *Secret History* as *törölki=törelki*. E. Haenisch has translated the word as “Geburt, Leben” and the form “*törülkitü*” as “von Geburt” (1962:152). It occurs in the famous passage of Jamugha’s lament as *öbere törülkitü* translated as “von besonderer Geburt” by Haenisch (1941: § 201). Francis Cleaves, on the other hand, has translated the word as “nature” in the meaning of disposition (1982: § 201).

The Inner Mongolian scholar Ha-le-ch’u-lun (Qalchulun) reads the word as *törölchin* in the meaning of “relatives.” The reading as *törölchin* seems to be based on the *Hsin Yüan-shih* transcription of the word. See Ha-le-ch’u-lun, “Ha-pu-le k’e-han shih-chi k’ao (An Investigation of the Affairs of Qabul Qaghan),” in *Pian-cheng yen-chiu so nien-pao*, Vol. 10: 31-47 (p.33).

In the *Secret History* (MNT, §189) we also encounter another word from the same root that is *törölmishi* translated as “many, lowly, bad people” by Francis Cleaves (1982: 117, n.20). Doerfer (1963, I: No.199) has incorporated DRLKYN as “*?Dürlügin*” and mentions all the references for this term. He does not suggest an etymology for this term but thinks that the word might have been ending with the suffix *-gin/-kin* that denoted tribal affiliation. In that case the word would be a denominal noun from *töröl* meaning also birth, in that case *törölkin<törü-l-kin* would mean “kinsmen.” As it is known, Louis Bazin sees also a similar meaning for the word *Türk*. See his “Notes sur les mots ‘Oğuz’ et ‘Türk’,” *Oriens* 4(1953). 315-322. In contemporary Kazakh also “relatives, kinsmen” are called “*tus<tughus*” which is a deverbal noun from “*tugh-to be born*; *tughus* as a deverbal noun would literally be “birth.” I assume that *törölki* was also used in the meaning of birth meaning somebody who has been born to us, i.e. one of us that is, our kinsmen. It would seem that when these kinsmen came under the rule of other people who were considered of “pure birth” that is aristocratic, then the word acquired the meaning of commoners. In fact, in the Russian translation of Rashīd al-Dīn by Khategurov we see that DRLKYN read as *Darlakin* is explained as an equivalent of “commoner Mongols” (R/SL: 28).

On the basis of this latter form the word appears in Ratchnevsky’s (RCK: 42) and Lech’s works as “Darlekin.” Lech is also a good source for all the references to this term (1968:174 n.14).

⁷ For a list of references on this term see Lech, 1968: 174, n.16.

⁸ R/T: 111-112.

“the Backbone.” These two groups were also known as the Black Tatars, whereas yet another group was known as the White Tatars.⁹

The best known White Tatars were the Turkish Önggüd who were descendants of the earlier Shato. In the twelfth century these Önggüd were Nestorian. These tribes had their own commanders and leaders. But none of these groups, the *Törölki, the Nirun (the Black Tatars), the White Tatars or other groups mentioned above, had “rulers heading all peoples.” Rashīd al-Dīn states this very clearly:¹⁰

We have to know that all the Turkish tribes and different categories of Mongols about whom we are writing did not have one specific ruler who was so overpowering and tyrannical so that he would lead all of the tribes. Instead each people, each tribe had their own rulers and commanders who would be engaged in disputes and fights with each other.

In our sources these tribes generally appear in association with the names of their leaders, but not with khans. These tribal populations were differentiated according to “bone” (*yasun*) and “clan” (*omogh*). *Yasun* was a structural principle and a unifying factor within the tribe at large, whereas *omogh* was a dividing, distinguishing factor among the clans in a tribe.¹¹

Young Temüjin’s early life passed in a time of struggles between the Tatar, the Merkid, and his own kinsmen the Taiji’ud. These wars were mostly related to issues of vengeance (*ös*).¹² Vengeance for his father’s death, vengeance for his wife’s abduction a.s.o. During these struggles he also learnt about the life of others, about traditional values and his own preferences.¹³ However, after he associated himself with Kerait Ong Khan and became formally his vassal, both Temüjin and his adversaries were motivated not by vengeance but by tribal politics.¹⁴ By allying himself with Ong Khan, young Temüjin had made a choice for the advancement of his own goals, goals that were shared by his principal wife Börte of the Qonggirad. It was with these goals in mind that they departed from the friend of his youth, Jamugha. At that time Jamugha commanded larger forces than Temüjin. By leaving, Temüjin and Börte indicated a political decision to establish themselves independently from Jamugha. The most frequently quoted passage in relation to this departure was directly related to the reasons leading to this

⁹ On the term Black Tatar see *MTPL* in Olbricht and Pinks, 1980: 3, 6 and n.4 and 15. On the White Tatars see again Olbricht, 1980:3,6 and n.5 and also Pelliot, 1914.

¹⁰ *R/T*: 165.

¹¹ For these concepts see Krader, 1963:316-372.

¹² Fletcher, 1986.

¹³ See *RCK*: 26. Barfield (1989:193), on the other hand, sees these experiences as personal vindication against his family, patrilineal clan. There is no denial of the exclusion of the patrilineal clan; Temüjin’s actions were rewards for actions. It seems he rewarded his brothers but not others who did not stick to him. Moreover, a cluster of Borjigid would invite the presence of other clusters in other clans.

¹⁴ *RCK*: 42.

decision. According to Temüjin, Jamugha was repeating a riddlelike phrase which he did not understand and he came to consult his mother on its meaning. It was however, his wife Börte who interpreted the passage in a negative way. In the *Secret History* the passage starts with Jamugha's words:¹⁵

Let us pitch next [unto] the mountain
Let our herdmen
Attain unto a tent

Let us pitch next unto the stream
Let our shepherds and keepers of lambs
Attain unto [food for] the gullet

Temüjin...not being able to understand this his word... when Börte Üjin spake she said, "Anda Jamugha is said [to be] one who easily becometh weary. Now the time is come when he becometh weary of us. The words which Anda Jamugha hath said a little while ago are words which, then, cover a plot against us. Let us not pitch. While we continue in this movement, let us, separating ourselves well, move, then, travelling at night.

However, in the light of Jamugha's later career the same words could also have meant: "Let each of us remain by ourselves and not attempt to head others. If we pitch our tents in the mountains, then the horse herders must pitch their tents somewhere else which would be suitable for them in relation to their needs for food and water. If we pitch our tents near a stream, then the shepherds and keepers of lambs must look for food somewhere else suitable for them." In a culture where everybody knew that horses need to be watered every day but sheep do not, pitching tents at a stream would mean that the sheep herders had to occupy a separate place.¹⁶ If Jamugha had said they would take the sheep to the mountains and the horses to the stream, it would have meant that he was implying that he wanted to lead and guide them and Temüjin would have no difficulty understanding Jamugha's words. But speaking out the riddle Jamugha was implying a preference for tribal politics.

Preference for tribal politics and opposition to "unification" and "centralization" were the guiding principles for Jamugha. His later title as the Gür Khan of the "many Mongols" symbolized his opposition to any

¹⁵ *MNT*, §118.

¹⁶ Moreover sheep are always associated with mountains. For example, a Tangut proverb quoted by Ruth Dunnell (1983: 252, n.92) says:

Having sheep, [one] pastures in the mountainous regions of the Tangutland,
Having money, [one] seeks profit in trade with Chinese merchants.

The Kyrghyz epos, *Manas*, as rendered by W. Radloff ("Kös Kaman," verse 515-520) also speaks of rivers and plains as places where horses graze. W. Radloff, *Proben der Volksliteratur der türkischen Stämme Süd-Sibiriens*. V. *Der Dialect der Kara-Kirgizen*. St. Petersburg, 1885.

coherent trend toward unification: Grousset's "anti-caesar Jamugha."¹⁷ In his own words to the later Chinggis Khan he said that in what Chinggis Khan stood for there was no room for him:¹⁸

Thou hast pacified
All the nations.
Thou hast united
Every foreign realm.

The throne of *qan* hath betaken itself unto thee. In [asmuch as] the world is now become ready [for thee], were [I] a companion, of what service would I be [for thee]? Yet, of [thee, mine] *anda*,

I shall enter into thy dreams of the black night
I shall trouble thy thoughts of the bright day

I shall become

A louse of thy collar
A thorn of thine inner lapel

He had been raised by many grandmothers, coming from a rich household; thus he was not able to see matters from Temüjin's vantage point. He had thought that the two of them were known from east to west and that was sufficient. However, Temüjin had been raised under more difficult circumstances and with ambitious plans for the future. As a result not only was he surrounded by a family that stood by him with advice but also by brothers who were with him. As for Jamugha, he had lost his parents when he was young and among his grandmothers apparently he learned to heed his own wishes. He did not get an education which would compel him to choose companions who would follow his wishes. Instead his kind of socialization caused him to assume everyone's independence. He was noble by birth and he had been raised as such. Therefore he did not value the aspirations of those who were raised in modest circumstances. As a nobleman of the steppe, as a leader of the "un-united," throughout his career he had the support of the "many Mongghols," the Qonggirad, the Ikires and others.¹⁹ These were the "conservative elements of the steppe, the aristocracy of the steppe."²⁰ Even before being proclaimed Gür Khan, he tried to stop Temüjin.²¹ Later, in every case that he allied himself against Temüjin, he broke that alliance.²² He even plundered the people who had put him up as Gür Khan²³ apparently to emphasize that his position did not mean unifica-

¹⁷ Grousset, 1972: 100-102.

¹⁸ *MNT*, §201.

¹⁹ *MNT*, §141 and *RCK*: 35-36.

²⁰ *RCK*: 36,63.

²¹ *RCK*: 57.

²² *RCK*: 65, 78.

²³ *RCK*: 58.

tion or centralization, neither of political power nor of booty. This was the more remarkable as about the same time Temüjin was setting up ordinances for the control, pooling and redistribution of booty. Jamugha's efforts were not geared to win the khanship for himself, he was not acting from personal ambition.²⁴ On the contrary, just before the last decisive campaign in 1204, he and the other seven leaders of the "many Mongghol" got together and made an agreement saying:²⁵

Let us go and attack Ong Khan at night time. *Let us be ourselves rulers* and not attach ourselves to either Ong Khan or to Chinggis Khan and let us not show favors to them.

As we can see these leaders coming from different groups spoke jointly as "we, each one of us all together," and Jamugha was one of them. Jamugha and the others were not so much acting out of personal ambition but more as a joint venture. However, for many historians Jamugha Sechen remained enigmatic, elusive and undependable. When Rashīd al-Dīn quoted the old man from the Baya'ud tribe in relation to Jamugha's motivations, the quotation was meant as an example of his senseless ambition. He said: "Seche Beki of the Kiyat-jürkin tribe aspires to rule, but this is not his business. Jamuqa-sechen who continually makes people clash with one another and engages in all sorts of hypocritical tricks to advance his affairs, he too will not succeed."²⁶ Indeed this is the most apt description of his motivation, as he wanted to keep the aspirants to power separated. Therefore "his actions failed to result in any benefit" says Gumilev and adds "it is time to stop simply being surprised."²⁷ In my opinion, Jamugha's actions were geared so that they would not result in benefit to any particular group. Yet he was particular to his *anda* Temüjin, although their goals were different. Their relationship was that of *anda*, sworn brotherhood that cut across kinship lines. As numerous cases illustrate in the *Secret History*, it was a relationship between two individuals and as such was useless when confronted with political problems involving large groups. The pain and the strain arising from the insufficiency of this relationship to solve problems, especially when the *anda* relationship was between leaders, is illustrated in many dramatic poems concerning Temüjin and Jamugha. It was their personal dilemma, but they were public figures and had to abide by consensus when others were involved. Since they had made different political choices Jamugha asked to

²⁴ RCK: 65.

²⁵ RT: 287 and RCK: 71.

²⁶ Gumilev, 1987: 230-231.

²⁷ Yet Gumilev thinks that Jamugha was in Chinggis Khan's service, spying for him (1987:253). It is not conceivable why the author of *Secret History* who according to Gumilev did not like Chinggis Khan and who evidently favored Jamugha, would have the information for Jamugha's spying. If he (the author) had been skillful enough to be selective in his information, he could do the same also here.

be killed; although Jamugha could contribute toward his friend's cause in thought, he could not work with him for the same cause. They both knew it, and accepted the situation.

Temüjin's experiences with his boyhood friend Jamugha were decisive for the development of his later policies directed against tribes as political entities. In hindsight these policies can be called "detrribalization." We see them coming into effect after 1206, and as such, they were of Chinggis Khan's making. However, events in the period prior to 1206 show that an anti-tribal movement existed. We see "detrribalization" first as a voluntary movement by former tribesmen and then as a central policy under Chinggis Khan. The voluntary movement unfolded itself in two stages as people joined Temüjin not as tribes but as individuals or as small groups who had left their tribes.²⁸ In the first stage we see him being joined by men who were going to be his close associates, these were the *nöker*.²⁹ In the second stage he was joined by small groups who then formed the 13 *küriyen*³⁰ of Chinggis Khan.

In the twelfth century, Central Asian society was very fluid, whether sedentary or nomadic. Among the Inner Asian nomads, both tribalization and dissolution of tribal formations were seen. The situation was not a one-way "anarchy" as Vladimirtsov described it.³¹ On the one hand there were those like the Borjigid (Mongols) who were tribalizing; on the other hand, there were many people who were, so to say, out "on the steppe"³² and who followed a particular leader because it was beneficial to do so. On the western ends of Inner Asia, people who had broken away from tribal populations settled in the sedentary regions, mainly as mercenaries or *mamlūks*. The settled lands of East Asia did not offer such a solution. Sedentary East Asia did not possess inclusive institutions such as *mamlūk* that would absorb "itinerant" populations. As a result in East Asia, the conflicts were resolved on grand scale with invasions and conquests emerging from the north of China. In the early years of Temüjin's career, we see the birth of the retinue (*nöker*) as a social movement. If it was young Temüjin's character and abili-

²⁸ Gumilev, 1989:147.

²⁹ For *nökör* see Doerfer, 1963, I: No.388. The *nökör*-*nöker* relationship was based on personal choice and involved loyalty, but the choice was political so that conflicts of *anda* nature did not develop. Moreover, my understanding of the early *nöker* is that they were companions on equal terms. This horizontal relationship will later change into a vertical one, so that in Turkish dialects *nöker* will acquire the meaning of a servant. However, in present Mongolian dialects it is used for "spouse." It was Vladimirtsov who first studied the *nöker* institutionally (1934: 87-96 and 1944:87-146).

³⁰ For *küriyen* see Doerfer, I: No.341 (pp. 477-480) and earlier Vladimirtsov, 1934: 36-39 and 1944: 61-64.

³¹ See for the anarchy of the earlier times Vladimirtsov, 1934:62 and 1944:97.

³² The beginning parts of the *Secret History* are full of descriptions of people without leaders and in fact they are described in poetical language (*MNT*, §33-35).

ties that drew the *nöker* to him, it was the *nökers* themselves who made the first choice. This element of choice was also there when the 13 *küriyen* were formed. In a way they came to gather around Temüjin to escape from tribal loyalties. With the formation of the *küriyen* the dissatisfied members of the tribal groups were seeking solutions within the steppe society itself. Thus the peoples who joined Temüjin and contributed to the formation of the 13 *küriyen* were not an anomaly in the twelfth century Eurasia.³³

In the general setting of twelfth century eastern Inner Asia the internal political conflict was between the tribes, the *Törölki and the Nirun and khanates. This was a conflict between the political structures of non-stratified and stratified segmentary lineages.³⁴ Non-stratified segmentary lineages had many rulers whereas stratified segmentary lineages had one ruler which generally had hereditary characteristics.³⁵ In the previous chapter we have seen that tribes like the Qonggirad, Ikires, Jalayir, Uru'ud, Mangghud which had characteristics that we call "segmentary" today finally saw the solution in rallying around Temüjin. Earlier they had tried to form a confederation with their own "universal ruler" Gür Khan,³⁶ in their common cause within a contested environment³⁷ and against the predatory expansion of the chiefdom of the Kerait under Ong Khan To'oril³⁸ and against the hereditary hierarchization of the Kerait society around a center. Kerait leadership, in turn, joined these many leaders when Temüjin's predatory expansion started to threaten them.

By the time "segmentary" tribes joined Temüjin, he already had built a nucleus which was his solution to this situation of conflict. This nucleus of

³³ We do not know the reasons for this overall mobility. In addition to the dissatisfaction with existing political formations, there seems to have been population increase, climatic change.

³⁴ On segmentary lineages see Sharon Baştuğ, "The Segmentary Lineage System: A Reappraisal," Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1997 and "Tribe, Confederation and the State...", in Ertürk (forthcoming).

³⁵ Marshall Sahlins and other neo-evolutionists refer to these differences as segmentary tribes and chiefdoms. See Marshall D. Sahlins, "The Segmentary Lineage: an Organization of Predatory Expansion," in Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, *Comparative Political Systems*. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1967 (pp. 89-119). However, in the Inner Asian context we encounter as kinship groups only segmentary lineages. Their political structure may be either non-stratified (the *Törölki or Nirun) or stratified (khanates). One may even call them egalitarian as opposed to hierarchical. Some other models related to tribal formations are to be found in Khoury and Kostiner, 1990.

³⁶ On the title Gür Khan see Pelliot, 1951: 231. On the incidence see note 198 and the related text in Chapter Three above.

³⁷ Paul Buell, 1979.

³⁸ Sahlins, 1967: 95 states that confederations are only formed in a contested environment and in an uncontested environment primary segments of a tribe will show little inclination toward consolidation. In a contested environment, however, "local autonomy breaks down, on a greater or larger scale, proportionate to the amount of—and during the extent of—concerted action possible against other [tribal] societies." See also Gumilev, 1989:152 and Chapter Three below for facts.

power consisted of voluntary associations that rallied around Temüjin. First there were his *nöker* “companions.” We see them increase in numbers over the years. The first companions were later to become famous commanders, the famous “four dogs” and the “four heroes” were all from different tribes.³⁹

With his reputation of righteousness and fairness and a sense of equality among the *nöker*, he was able to attract able men and build a following. As the institution of *nöker* provides a leader with diverse strategies to build up a polity,⁴⁰ and is also inclusive by its nature, it offered an outlet and a solution to the deadlock of the conflict between chiefdoms and segmentary tribes. The *nöker* functioned on the principles of equality among participants, much like the non-stratified segmentary tribes, or the “Manchurian candidates” as Barfield calls them.⁴¹ The relationship of *nöker* also entailed loyalty, but unlike *anda* relationship it did not pose a threat to political choices. It was this basic relationship of loyalty and equality that was transferred first into the 13 *küriyen* and then into the ranks of the army of conquest.

Küriyen, sometimes also translated as *Wagenburg*, was one of the most essential organizational devices that the Mongols possessed. As a result it changed its organizational meaning over historical times. In the twelfth century *küriyen* was an enclosure for animals, tent carts were arranged in a circle so that the animals in the middle would be protected.⁴² The people who came in support of Temüjin formed such *Wagenburgs* or *küriyen* and came to be referred to as the 13 *küriyen* which were the forerunners of the later army units. Rashīd al-Dīn, recounting events related to this period, says that a *küren* meant soldiers who rotated in turns.⁴³ As we can see, Rashīd al-Dīn emphasized the military character of the *küriyen*.⁴⁴ The members of these 13 *küriyen* also came from different tribal backgrounds.⁴⁵ In the

³⁹ The four dogs were Khubilai of the Barulas tribe, Jelme of the Uriangqai, Jebe of the Taiji'ud and Sübegetei>Sübe'etei>Sübötei of the Uriangqai. The four heroes (*külü'üd*) were Bo'orchu of the Arulad, Muqali of the Jalayir, Boro'ul of the Hushin, Chila'un of the Süldüs. Of these the Uriangqai, the Süldüs, the Hushin were of the **Törölki*, the indigenous group, the Arulad, the Barulas and the Taiji'ud of the *Nirun*, “the Backbone” group called together as the Black Tatars, and the Jalayir were of the White Tatars. As we can see they came from diverse backgrounds both as tribes and as tribal groups.

For the four dogs and the four heroes see *MNT*, §209. Their tribal background is to be found in different entries of the *Secret History* and Rashīd al-Dīn's work. A more convenient guide is T'ang Ch'i's Ph.D. Dissertation of 1970.

⁴⁰ See Cornell Fleischer's forthcoming article mentioned in note 30 Chapter One.

⁴¹ Barfield, 1989: 11-12 18 and 164-186.

⁴² The incident with Jebe is a good example (*MNT*, §146).

⁴³ *R/T*: 277. For the fourteenth century, on the other hand, the Persian historian Rashīd al-Dīn describes *küriyen* as a circular structure with a center, which is reserved for the leader. The followers line around a leader in a circle.

⁴⁴ For the evolution in the meaning of *küriyen* see further below.

⁴⁵ The participants and their tribal affiliations constitute a long list of names that I will not repeat here. Sections 120, 121, 122 of the *Secret History* give a vivid description. The *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng-lu* on the other hand has also a somewhat more elaborate list (Pelliott, 1951:36-

passages where the formation of the 13 *küriyen* have been described we get a sense of the excitement of the small groups who joined Temüjin. The people who joined him were not coming as entire tribal groups; they were merely a small groups of people from each tribe. The remainder of the tribal members had remained behind. This voluntary act on the part of the participants of the 13 *küriyen*, marked the beginning of a new period. These people who had used their right of volition to join Temüjin were now becoming parts of a new organization. The composition of this new organization, the 13 *küriyen* was also new, as each *küriyen* consisted of two or more different groups. Thus, here we encounter fully the second phase of detribalization. It was also the beginning of the erosion of volition as these new members took their place in mixed fashion in units of *küriyen*.

There is yet another aspect of this organization of the *küriyen* as 13 units. Here the number 13 symbolizes the earlier Mongolian traditions with a numerical system of 3. The Tangut also used a system of three.⁴⁶ When we examine more closely the organization of Temüjin in contrast to the later Chinggis Khan we see clearly that there was a transition from a system based on 3 to a system of 4 and 10.⁴⁷ In the earlier period we encounter many passages such as “...the three Merkid with three hundred men,”⁴⁸ or “Chinggis Qahan was thirteen güre’ed [in number]—being also thirty thousand [in number],”⁴⁹ or “when he had numbered [them], [he knew that] there were two thousand six hundred. One thousand three hundred journeyed along the western side of the Qalqa [River]. One thousand three hundred [in number], the Uru’ud and the Mangghud journeyed along the eastern side of the Qalqa [River].”⁵⁰ Passages such as these show a sense of organization around 3. For the Mongols of this earlier period this is significant. 13 is symbolic of 3, as it is 12+1, thus making 12 a number that can not be divided.⁵¹ In our case it signifies a certain unity which can not be integrated further. Thus for segmentary groups where growth was not appreciated but fission was, 13 was an appropriate number. It is also symbolic in the sense that at this juncture Temüjin who had been chosen as the khan of the

37). Rashīd al-Dīn also devotes a separate entry on this issue (*R/T*: 243-244). This information has been incorporated into Z. V. Togan, *Cengiz Han*, pp. 2-3. See also *RCK*: 42.

⁴⁶ Ruth Dunnell, 1983: 230, 246, n.80. For the significance of the number 13, see Klaus Sagaster, “Bemerkungen zur Dreizehn im Mongolischen Epos,” in Klaus Röhrborn and Horst Wilfrid Brands (eds.) *Scholia. Beiträge zur Turkologie und Zentralasienkunde*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981.

⁴⁷ On the implications of these systems in later history see İsenbike Togan, “Altınordu Çözülürken: Kırım’a Giden Yol” (forthcoming).

⁴⁸ *MNT*, §111.

⁴⁹ *MNT*, §129.

⁵⁰ *MNT*, §175.

⁵¹ K. Czegledy, “On the Numerical Composition of the Ancient Turkish Tribal Confederations,” *Acta Orientalia* 25(1972).275-281.

Mongols in the narrow sense did not have any grand designs yet.⁵² Yet this was not going to last long.

In 1206, Temüjin was declared Chinggis Khan. Immediately after that he set up his “Grand Army (*yeke cherig*).”⁵³ The establishment of the army marked the transition to a decimal system as well as an emphasis on 4 instead of the former 3, yet without forsaking the 3. The ingenuity of Chinggis Khan was that he was very articulate in combining the old with the new. Changing to the new system made possible organization at a larger scale and integration at different levels, 2, 4, 6, 12, 24 and 5, 10, 50, 100, 1000, 10,000. With this transition to a decimal system then Chinggis Khan established himself firmly on Inner Asian state traditions. It is also significant that immediately he also instituted the *gui-ong*, “the viceroy.” Like the decimal system this institution had been, and would continue to be the cornerstone of the state traditions. We are familiar with the viceroy from the Khazars whom Ibn Faḍlan visited.⁵⁴ This institution which is well-known as the atabeg among the Seljuqs, was called *ulus begi* in the post-Chinggisid Central Asia and as *lala* among the Ottomans. It is to be noted that at this time there was no Mongolian term for this office; *gui-ong* is Chinese, whereas *atabeg*, *ulus begi*, and *lala* are Turkish. But the Turkish terms are the more significant as Turkish groups historically have always used a decimal system. At this moment in Chinggis Khan’s history when we encounter the prevalence of Turkish state traditions so strongly, it is very difficult to speak only of the Mongols and of the Mongolian empire. I would suggest that starting from 1206 on we should use the term “Turco-Mongolian,” or perhaps in this case speak of it as Mongolo-Turkish, which later becomes “Turco-Mongolian” when the Turkish language becomes predominant in the fourteenth century.

The transition into a new system with a different emphasis can be seen after 1206 in many spheres of Chinggis Khan’s life. While his close associates were at the beginning three (“Temüjin made Belgütei, Bo’orchu, and Jelme—all three—to follow...”),⁵⁵ later his close associates were going to be called the “four dogs” and the “four heroes” as we have seen above. In the new redistribution of offices, rewards and favors we again encounter phrases like “these four...”⁵⁶ or, speaking of the adoptive sons of his mother Chinggis Khan says: “My mother getting you four...”⁵⁷ Within this context we also should remember the four sons of Chinggis Khan, although he had more than

⁵² For a discussion of whether there was a grand design see David Morgan, *The Mongols*, Oxford, 1986 (pp. 72-73).

⁵³ Barfield, 1989: 194-195.

⁵⁴ Z. V. Togan, 1939: §100, pp. 101 and 271-271.

⁵⁵ *MNT*, §103.

⁵⁶ *MNT*, §210.

⁵⁷ *MNT*, §214.

four, and the four *ordo* for his principal wives, although he had more than four wives.⁵⁸ Especially from the case of the four principal wives who each had their own *ordo*, we know that only the mistresses of these four received their “allotments” of income. All these different allusions to four finally paved the way to the four *ulus*. Here again we see Chinggis Khan following Inner Asian state traditions with the four corners of the world, from the ancient Turkish inscriptions, or the four principal tribes constituting the Khazars, or the four corners of the felt rug on which Khans were “raised up,” i.e. enthroned without a throne.⁵⁹

The third phase of detribalization, the transformation of the old organization into a new one, was novel in terms of its reorganization of the entire society. Detribalization, scattering the tribes, also had been a favored tactic since ancient times, but it had not been done on such a large scale that even “we” were transformed. Earlier in history it was a method to be used on others and then force, coercive power had played a role. In this case this was for the most part voluntary and needed conviction or persuasion at instances when people were indecisive. Here our question is to understand how and why the people agreed to such a transformation. David Morgan summarizes the new situation saying that “Chingiz seems to have created what might be described as an artificial tribal system, in which old tribal loyalties were superseded by loyalty to the individual soldier’s new military unit. Beyond that the Mongol royal house became the ultimate focus of obedience and allegiance.”⁶⁰ In fact, this was a reorganization of the society along new, detribalized lines. However, as David Morgan points out, the changes effected structures, but not the realm of human sentiment and traditions. Loyalty, which was a structural principle among all the shifting alliances, continued to be a force within the new structures. So were the sentiments of companionship and seniority.

Army of Conquest

Looking at the army of conquest in very broad terms one could say that it incorporated the principle of hierarchy in the earlier clan structure (the seg-

⁵⁸ For the allotments, the “share,” of these sons and wives see Isenbike Togan, 1973.

⁵⁹ On these traditions see Zeki Velidi Togan, 193: 271-295, §100a; Peter Golden, “Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Chinggisid Nomads of western Eurasia,” *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* II (1978):37-76 and D. Yıldırım, 1992.

⁶⁰ One could make the argument as Paul Buell does that it was tribal in character and that the tribes of the Uru’ud, Mangghud, Jalayir, Qonggirad and Ikires were its backbone. See his unpublished dissertation, “*Tribe, Qan and Ulus in Early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yuan History*.” University of Washington, Seattle, 1977. But in view of the division of the former tribal populations into the army of conquest, my argument is that the new order developed under Chinggis Khan did not promote tribal politics. Former tribes like the ones mentioned above became participants in the new order.

mentary lineage system) in terms of the fluidity of the age groups. In the clan one would achieve higher rank—unless it was a hereditary privilege—by age, by seniority. In the army one could attain rank by merit. Both systems, the segmentary lineage and the army were open to all within their own framework of principles. Chinggis Khan's ingenuity was to retain the hierarchy between elders and youngers (*aqa* and *ini*), the underlying principle of advancement in the segmentary lineage system, and merge it with concepts of equality underlying the relationships of *anda* and *nöker*. In the army of conquest within each rank there was equality and “companionship,” as among the *nöker*, and between ranks, there was a hierarchy similar to age groups within the segmentary kinship ideology. Principles of seniority transferred themselves into ranks. However, when the whole society was organized along the principles of the army of conquest, hereditary rights of seniority were so to say, “abolished” for all the members of the army of conquest, but they remained intact with the highest command, Chinggis Khan.

In the organization of the society along a new ideology then something new was created by making use of the old. What was new were the structures, what was old were the sentiments, symbolism. This need to create something new was very much related to the bottlenecks of the pre-Chinggisid period that were especially felt in the stratification of the society into “good people (*sayin kümün*)” and the “black folk (*qara kümün*).”

Seen from the steppe point of view, or for that matter Mongolian point of view, the main objective of Chinggis Khan's detribalization policy aimed at the destruction of nodes of stratification in the steppe society. To achieve this end detribalization was carried out in four stages: 1. breaking up of tribes, 2. abandonment of volition, 3. leaving the will to highest command and 4. their mobilization into long range operations (conquests). The driving force behind this process was the aura of common goals that were being shaped by the highest command, supported by the strength of Eternal Heaven. As a result, the destruction of nodes of power in the tribal world left the highest command with an unparalleled concentration of power.

The policies were not directed at tribes *per se* but at tribes that were acquiring leadership in a more or less “Dynastic” form (Naiman, Kerait, Merkid). In such an instance the *Secret History* says:⁶¹

Then when Činggis Qahan made a decree, saying, “[We] had said, ‘Let us suffer [them] to live as [an] entire [tribe]. But the same [Merkid] have revolted.’ He made one to part the Merkid, [distributing them] unto every quarter, to the point that he extinguished [them as an entire tribe].

Tribes with more or less egalitarian structures (like the Qonggirad, Ikires, Qorulas) or tribes that had come under the dominance of other tribes (like

⁶¹ *MNT*, §198.

the Jalayir, Süldüs, Barin, Uru'ud, Mangghud, Uriangqad⁶²) did not suffer so much under the “detribalization” policies. When asked what kind a favor he wished, the Baya'ud Önggür said:⁶³

If [Činggis Qahan] suffer me to choose a favour, [it is this:] my Baya'ud brethren are scattered and dispersed in each of the divers tribes. If [Činggis Qahan] favour [me], I would collect my Baya'ud brethren. “ [Činggis Qahan] made a decree, saying, “ Yea! So collecting thy Baya'ud brethren, command thou a thousand!”

The main objective of these policies was to create a society in which individuals, irrespective of their tribal, ethnic or religious background, could participate around common goals. In this case the common goal evolved to be the common good of the steppe society. This ideal was expressed in many ways revolving around the term *ulus* “nation” or *törö* “customary law.” For each individual member of the *ulus*, on the other hand this new order meant “a career open to talent,” without restrictions on the nature of the talent.

Thus the Mongols were able to employ all the talent that agreed to work with them. Under these circumstances, detribalization policy worked and tribal populations who for the most part still depended on pastoral production for their subsistence, transformed themselves or were transformed into members of a more or less uniform army of conquest. The members of the Mongolian army of conquest differed from the former pastoral nomadic tribal populations, not in terms of their lifestyle, but in terms of their aims. Former tribesmen had rallied around diverse parochial interests, with loyalties woven around kinship and tribal affiliation. In the tribal world kinship and politics were interwoven. The members of the Mongolian army of conquest derived their livelihood from their identification with the interests of the Mongolian state and administration, symbolized by the highest command Chinggis Khan. As an outcome under the new circumstances, kinship became a more social and cultural phenomenon.⁶⁴ Politically, the former tribesmen acknowledged a role within the chain of command and their loyalties became directed towards the new leadership; first in the form of the highest command and later the dynasty. This change in the object of loyalty was expressed the fairness of Chinggis Khan. As one source stated they were using their names instead of clan names.⁶⁵ On the other hand, tribal names

⁶² On the Uriangqad see Harry Jackendoff, “The Uriangqai Connection. Some Social Study and Textual Analysis of the Secret History,” *Mongolian Studies* 4(1977).5-38.

⁶³ *MNT*, §213.

⁶⁴ In the biographies in the *Yüan shih* the tribal connection is shown as part of the cultural heritage without any political significance.

⁶⁵ Paul Ratchnevsky, “Zum Ausdruck ‘*T'ouhsia*’ in der Mongolenzeit,” in Walther Heissig (ed.), *Collectanea Mongolica*. Festschrift für Professor Dr. Rintchen zum 60. Geburtstag. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966 (p. 174).

were used as clan names thus being stripped of their political connotation and reduced to indicate only background and descent.⁶⁶

Under the Mongolian World Empire all tribal people organized along Inner Asian “hierarchical” and Manchurian “egalitarian” lines⁶⁷ came under one rule. By the policy of constant mobilization within the context of the army of conquest, people of tribal origin were removed from their own “tribal” inhibitions, concerns, politics and ideals, and became members of a new society that was based on “merit.” It was within this framework that the earlier kinship ideology in the political sphere became replaced by notions of companionship, and the new hierarchy cut across vertical lines in the army of conquest. The valor of a *ba’atur* (hero) or loyalty of a *nöker* (companion) had replaced the importance of one’s place in the lineage or the tribe. Instead of the society of the twelfth century with its division into hereditary ruling strata, commoners and captive or subject tribal populations (usually called slaves in the literature), the new society consisted of members of “Mongghol” *ulus* who would occupy a place in the society according to their merits.

The New Order

When the army of conquest was established, with Chinggis Khan as its supreme commander, it was hoped that conflicts that earlier arose from diversity would be minimized in this new more homogeneous structure. Parallel to these developments, it was hoped that the fluidity of the alliances would be abandoned. In Juvaini’s words: people were forbidden to leave their units. The ordinances involved men, but when men were subordinate to the state, women also became subordinate to the positions of their men in the army of conquest. Although Mongolian forces were very mobile, as evident from their conquest of the Eurasian continent from one end to the other, this mobility of the men and women was under the orders of the army of conquest and state. The personal mobility of the tribal populations had been replaced with the mobility of the state and its ideals. The state being more inclusive at the beginning, represented the collective ideals. However, it was no longer possible for people to join voluntarily as those associates who made up the 13 *küriyen* had done. Along with the transfer of mobility from the individual to the state, the right of the tribal people “to vote with their feet,” came also to an end. There were no more tribes with which to seek alliances. The element of volition, that was so central for the tribal world, as well as for the early associates of Temüjin, came to be reevaluated in terms

⁶⁶ Like a Lebanese or Turkish Armenian who is a U.S.A citizen today, these people would have different reserve identities and might also have conflicting loyalties. But politically they were within the confines of the “Mongghol” *ulus*.

⁶⁷ See notes 35 above and Chapter Three note 284, 285.

of “obedience.” This change in turn reinforced vertical relationships, hierarchies between the ranks of the army of conquest. On the other hand, loyalty still continued to be a central element within military units, among rank and file and towards the chain of command. The transfer of people’s loyalty to higher command, signaled the change from the earlier tribal order. The highest command, Chinggis Khan (and later his descendants), became the focus of loyalty; by the same token he also became the leader of all the previously tribal people by tribal custom (*törö*). This position was reinforced when Chinggis Khan also made it quite clear that he was favored by Eternal Heaven (Möngke Tengri) whereas Teb Tenggeri was not.⁶⁸ So he was able to concentrate political and spiritual power without being a tribal leader or a shaman. By emphasizing the fact that he derived his power from “the strength of Eternal Heaven,” Chinggis Khan had also eliminated the role of intermediary interpreters.⁶⁹ By taking his support from Eternal Heaven, he put himself above all religions and thus continued the earlier tradition of “*töreltörö*, i.e. customary principles of running a state” in a vein that can be regarded as secular.

⁶⁸ Teb Tenggeri is the epithet by which Kököchü, son of Münglig of the Qongqotan is referred to. Chinggis Khan's mother Hö'elün later married Münglig and that is why he is referred to as Münglig Echige, meaning Father Münglig. Münglig's son Kököchü took care of the spiritual side of the affairs. But with the rise of Chinggis Khan, there was a conflict between the two. This conflict is related in the *Secret History of the Mongols* (MNT §244-246). The end result of this rivalry and conflict was that Kököchü perished and Chinggis Khan emerged victorious because Eternal Heaven favored him, rather than Kököchü.

In earlier history, especially between the ninth and the twelfth centuries, that is during the rule of tribalism and localism, such an irreversible process would not be feasible. During the localist period, with different forms of tribalism, power was shared between the spiritual and political sides of life. Here with the end of Teb Tenggeri we encounter the concentration of the political and spiritual aspects in one hand.

According to Francis W. Cleaves his epithet, Teb Tenggeri, is to be understood as meaning “Lord Cunning.” His position within the Chinggisid policies can indeed give us a clue, why he was seen as Lord Cunning. Right after Temüjin had been proclaimed as Chinggis Khan, Teb Tenggeri started showing doubts as to what kind of messages he was receiving from Eternal Heaven by saying that these messages were sometimes in favor of Temüjin, sometimes in favor of his younger brother Qasar (MNT§: 244). At about the same time “the peoples of the nine tongues assembled themselves in [the service] of Teb Tenggeri” and many people left the entourage of Chinggis Khan and joined Teb Tenggeri. Even peoples subject to Temüge Odchigin, another brother, went over to Teb Tenggeri. When Temüge Odchigin requested his own people through an envoy, the envoy was insulted by “making [him] to carry his saddle on [his] back.” The seven Qongqotan, Teb Tenggeri's and his brothers made also Temüge Odchigin repent and kneel behind Teb Tenggeri. It was on the basis of these developments that Teb Tenggeri's backbone was broken. As Lev Gumilev says (Gumilev, 1987: 260):

Chinggiskhan explained that Tenggeri (heaven), disliking him, took away not only his soul, but his body as well. Afterwards, the executed man's relatives became quiet and the conflict between the spiritual and lay authorities ended in favour of the latter.

⁶⁹ There was not only Teb Tenggeri but also *beki*. *Beki* were women shamans also, but Sorqagtani Beki's name is never explained in this manner.

As a result of the system he created Chinggis Khan was able to establish a custom of functioning above every issue, party, and yet able to act like everybody else. In this endeavor his brand of shamanism was helpful. As Morgan says “Shamanism was far from being a highly structured faith, and elements of its beliefs proved capable of co-existing in a tenacious fashion with almost anything.”⁷⁰ He was the Grand Arbitrator favored by Eternal Heaven, the Qahan.⁷¹ By later generations he was going to be seen as a fusion of these two, as Eternal Arbitrator. It was by this standing as Grand Arbitrator that he felt he could bring “justice” and “order” to all people. He had, above all, non-parochial concerns. His conversations with spiritual leaders and philosophers, as well letters of his descendants sent to the Pope (Güyük), display this attitude. As a result of the understanding that he was the Grand Arbitrator, he could claim all conquered peoples and their lands⁷² as his *ulus* and then divide it up among his descendants (seed) who later came to be known as the “Golden Lineage (*Altan Urugh*).”⁷³ As such he initiated an irreversible process. The division of patrimony was not an unknown process.⁷⁴ The fact that this process was preceded by “detrribalization” made it irreversible. The element of volition that was so central to earlier structures had no room to function. As there were no more tribal leaders who would rule by consent, and as there were no shifting alliances among tribal leaders, for ordinary people who were not permitted to leave their units there was nowhere to go. Volition was not there any more even for the members of the highest command, they had to display obedience. For example in the case of Güyük we hear:⁷⁵

This inferior one, hearkening unto the words of whom, speaketh, the mouth full, [against] a person [which is his] elder brother? Let the only egg rot! He is rebelling at the bosom of the same person [which is his] elder brother.

Placing [him as] a spy
Let us make [him] to climb into the walls of
cities like mountains
Till the nails of [his] ten fingers
are worn away through rubbing.
Placing [him as] a *tamma*,

⁷⁰ Morgan, 1986: 123.

⁷¹ For rulers as arbitrators, referees see Zeki Velidi Togan, *Karahanlılar*, p.5.

⁷² The Egyptian historian al-ʿUmari says that Hülegü did not have any obligations in the lands that he conquered by the force of his sword (Lech, 1968: 103). This passage also shows us that in the inherited lands such a claim would not be possible. The inherited lands would also have their own inherited customs.

⁷³ For *urugh* that Doerfer explains as a Turkish term see Doerfer, 1965,II: No.468 (pp. 47-52).

⁷⁴ This practice is known to us from the earlier Qarakhanids and others as explained in Chapter Two above.

⁷⁵ MNT, §276.

Let us make [him] to climb into pounded
 hard walls of cities
 Till his nails of [his] five fingers
 Disappear through wear.

Here we hear from Ögedei how he chastised his disobedient son Güyük. Although this was a central question, the fate of all the princes was not going to be chastisement. Some of the princes like Batu, Khubilai and Hülegü were later going to win the right of volition with conquests of their own.

The concentration of power and authority in the hands of Chinggis Khan was achieved, on the one hand, by the development of a hierarchy that we can follow step by step and, on the other hand, by extending redistributive concepts to common people. As there were no tribal leaders, Chinggis Khan and his *noyad*, also inherited the prerogatives of the tribal leaders, such as rule by consent. What we see in the *Secret History* is a transformation of Temüjin, who used to rule by the consent of his *nököd*, to Chinggis Khan, who ruled by the consent of his *noyad*. The transformation of the *nököd* to *noyad* also marks another phase of hierarchization. While the *nököd* were “companions,” the *noyad* were commanders who would take their command from Chinggis Khan. Even within this change into vertical relationships what we see is the continuation of the element of “consent” in spite of the hierarchization of the society. Later with a greater degree of hierarchy the “consent” element will for some time be confined to the descendants of Chinggis Khan.⁷⁶

However, it was not only in the matter of “consent” that Chinggis Khan and his family and later descendants showed a “different” status. I am saying “different” but I might even use the term “privileged.” While the whole society was going through a reorganization, Chinggis Khan and his family still continued to function as a “royal” clan with hereditary rights and as such they were called the “Golden Lineage” (*Altan Urugh*).⁷⁷ But this privilege of retaining hereditary rights of inheritance was given to them by consensus as we see it at different occasions.⁷⁸ We see this trend of retaining old privileges in the sphere of inheritance, in the role of seniority irrespective of gen-

⁷⁶ As we see from the edict translated by Elizabeth Endicott-West it was not only the princes who convened at a *khuriltai*. But after half a century of rule by the 1250s the last word rested not with the *noyad*, but with the princes of the blood. See Elizabeth Endicott-West, “Imperial Governance in Yuan Times,” *HJAS* 46(1986) 2: 523-549.

⁷⁷ See note 73 above.

⁷⁸ The consensus was especially based on the collaborators whose descendants also gained inheritance rights as we can see from the distribution of “rewards” to the “meritorious colleagues.” But these rights were not absolute and could be revoked, whereas those of the members of the “Golden Lineage” could not. In case of discord, unfavorable members could only be eliminated; revoking of their rights was not possible.

der,⁷⁹ in the persistence to cling to traditions of volition, in the continued use of consent and the struggles over the principles of redistribution.

Chinggis Khan's empire, on the other hand, was unique from the standpoint of bringing a separation between political and economic ideology. It was by this separation that redistributive rights benefited the common soldiers; they would acquire booty but no power. This separation was best illustrated in the administration of the empire:⁸⁰

The business of government is a difficult business: let Ögedei administer it.
But such things as my yurt and house and the property, treasures, and troops I
have gathered together, let these be administered by Tolui

The related passage in the *Secret History* makes it explicit that Ögedei's concern should be to govern⁸¹ and that the ability to govern is more important than the continuity of succession in Ögedei's line is emphasized in the poem:

So thinking, making one of my seed to govern, not violating my decree, if you
destroy [it] not, you will not err and you will not miss. If the seed of Ögedei
be born [so void of valor that]⁸²

If one wrap it in green grass
It will not be eaten by an ox;
If one wrap it in fat,
It will not be eaten by a dog,

will there not be born among my seed [even] one [which may be] good?

This separation of the spheres of power from wealth or of politics from economics was an innovation that Chinggis Khan brought into his system.⁸³ The separation itself was not a novelty. All sedentary empires had resorted to this course. The novelty was in applying this principle to tribal populations and to redistributive economic practices that usually went hand in hand with a power-sharing ideology. In the steppe, power had been multi-faceted with an ideology of power-sharing, and wealth was to be redistributed as the nomadic lifestyle was not suitable for accumulation. Now, power could be concentrated in one hand, but wealth remained still to be redistributed. Chinggis Khan's successors did not alter the practices of redistribution as such a policy would not have found support. In fact, the whole concept of

⁷⁹ See İ. Togan "Jealousy" (forthcoming) and İnalçık, 1980: 76.

⁸⁰ Boyle, 1971:17-18. While I see this separation of the spheres as unique but find the Mongolian Empire comparable (see *Introduction*), Thomas J. Barfield thinks that it was unique on all fronts. He states that the political organization was not "a culmination of a long evolving steppe tradition but a deviation from it" (Barfield, 1989:197).

⁸¹ *MNT*, §255.

⁸² Here valor can be understood as ability.

⁸³ Barfield demonstrates the differences between the two: Manchurian and Chinggisid formations (1989: 164-186 and 187-225).

the army of conquest was built on redistributive principles. Yet it was not a complete separation. It was a ranked, stratified separation. The lower the rank the greater was the separation; the higher the rank, the greater was the interaction between the two spheres. That the ranks were open for talent and valor made both wealth and power accessible to all.

The dynasty being above all, had thus the greatest interaction between these two spheres. Yet it was not outright power-sharing as before. When his sons finally consented to cooperate and said that they will associate themselves and give their might to their father, the Khan and later to Ögedei, Chinggis Khan said to them:⁸⁴

[To go] so far as to associate yourselves, what is it? Mother Earth is broad. The rivers and waters are many. Making broad the encampments [which are] like [such as easily] separate themselves and making [you each] to rule over a realm, we shall separate you.

In other words the sons were going to have separate spheres where they could implement the redistributive practices under a monopoly of power. Yet their power was never going to be as vast as the founder of the dynasty who ruled over all the people and the conquered territories.

The separation of avenues of wealth from avenues of power was an important aspect of his legacy. Benefits went to the people and the members of the army of conquest; power to hierarchies and to high command. Up to that time the steppe traditions entailed redistributive practices and power-sharing among centers, which sometimes were many, sometimes not so many; but always there was more than one center. Power-sharing in the steppe was either lateral or lineal. So there were sometimes polities divided into eastern and western halves. At other times there was a ruler with a vice-roy more powerful than himself, a feature that came to be called dual kingship.⁸⁵ The duality was sometimes seen as an opposition between worldly and spiritual affairs. Whether lateral or lineal, power-sharing in the steppe traditions meant balancing, as these traditions did not favor absolute power. They did not do so because power was continuous whereas wealth was not. In the sown “civilized regions,” on the other hand, with accumulative and monopolistic tendencies towards power, wealth became concentrated in one center. Resources were accumulated at the center and made subordinate to it. By separating wealth and power Chinggis Khan retained the redistributive aspects of the economic practices but concentrated power in his own hands and in his family within the spirit of a general consensus. Those who did not consent had already been eliminated. In fact Chinggis Khan separated these avenues for rulers as well as for the people. They could benefit from redis-

⁸⁴ *MNT*, §255.

⁸⁵ See Chapter One note 12; Chapter Two notes 76, 124; Chapter Three note 85.

tribution by virtue of their participation in the army of conquest. People could climb the ladder of success on the basis of merit and not on the basis of wealth and thus attain power which was not backed by wealth. Because this power was not based on wealth, it had a tendency to become sheer domination in places where it was felt, especially among subject people. Among the participants of the polity, among members of the inclusive “Mongghol” *ulus* on the other hand, it was different. Because power was not based on wealth, one day a person might have power and the next day not. In theory this was a precaution against abuse of power. The Qaghan or the Khan faced a similar situation. The ruler was powerful and not powerful at the same time. In all European and Chinese reports we encounter enigmatic observations because of the power held by people other than the khan, but these power holders are seldom described as possessing great riches. That they had access to wealth is undeniable, but it was a temporary access related to holding to power. One could say that powerholders in the Mongolian World Empire had the usufruct right of wealth but did not possess it. This observation would also be true for manpower viewed as another source of wealth. Thinking of Chinggis Khan’s division of his empire, Jochi, the eldest son, who had problems with legitimacy and could not inherit the rule in his own right, was given the liberty to conquer as far as the hooves of Mongolian horses would reach in the west. Thus he was given power to acquire wealth and to redistribute it as he saw fit, with the understanding that he would rule acknowledging his own limits, that is observing the *jasagh*. When he transgressed his limits, that is the limits of power,⁸⁶ then there was a problem. In other words by acquiring volition he was forsaking his hereditary rights of rule. The situation with the other three sons, who all were legitimate successors in their own right, was different from Jochi. Ögedei had power, actually status; Tolui had wealth and he had the armies as well. Chaghadaï had neither so he could have a little bit of both in his own right in his own *ulus*, which being near the center of the empire needed to be subordinate to consensus. Thus Chaghadaï was the guardian of the *jasagh*. On the basis of the evaluation of the *jasagh* as a symbol of legitimization, Chaghadaï’s guardianship compels us to see a further derived meaning of “*jasagh*” as “rule by accepting limitations on power and wealth.” It is significant that the *jasagh* was entrusted neither to Ögedei, the Qaghan with power and status, nor to Tolui, who had Chinggis Khan’s property, treasures and troops, but to Chaghadaï who had neither wealth nor power. If we consider that “justice” also was entrusted to Shigi Khutughu, an orphan Tatar boy raised by Chinggis Khan’s mother, we see here a correlation between justice and *jasagh* that placed both in a category separate from wealth and

⁸⁶ An incident from the *Secret History* is discussed by Barfield (1989:195).

power. Seen in this light, Chinggis Khan's policies emerge clearly as well planned, not as last minute decisions.⁸⁷ They all aim at the separation of power, wealth and the divine that were so much part of the prerogatives of the pre-Chinggisid world when leadership could combine all three: sacredness, power, and wealth as we see in the case of the Naiman and the Kerait. In the Chinggisid order the *jasagh* takes the place of the divine.

When tribal people became members of an army of conquest, they were functioning in a world in which tribal redistributive ideology and practice prevailed. In fact, common soldiers could avail themselves of redistributive rights through their share in booty. Earlier in the tribal days, redistributive rights were confined to leadership. Observing Temüjin, the Taiji'ud made the point that they were accustomed to a practice in which leaders like Ong Khan would keep everything for themselves and their own men. One could even say that earlier redistribution had been selective. As we have seen Chinggis Khan changed this into institutionalized redistribution for all participants. He made a proclamation both for the pooling in of booty and its redistribution to the soldiers, to the common man. These practices were related to his separation of wealth and power and making wealth accessible to the common man obliterated the earlier ranking and structural differences among tribes. As such this was an irreversible process. It became irreversible as it changed the nature of tribes in Eurasia. In the post-Chinggisid era tribes, rather than displaying structural differences and fighting among themselves for different goals, became more uniform entities. Structurally they became alike. Also they all strove to establish themselves around a center, a khan.

The resilience of redistributive ideology is very much related to the vicissitudes of pastoral nomadism. As pastoral nomads had a high degree of mobility, there was no room for accumulation; thus acquisition was geared to giving away, as such then redistributive ideology permeated all spheres of life, leading to marriage alliances in the social sphere, and to power-sharing in the political sphere. However, when tribal people became members of an army of conquest "using their names as clan names" kinship became an issue of the social relations. Kinship ideology with its economic and political aspects was taken over by the "ideology" of the army. The principles of

⁸⁷ Yet from the moment of the first implementations, these decisions were contested among the members of the ruling family and then a compromise was reached as mentioned earlier. In fifty years time the Jochid and the Toluid branches of the family who initially were left without ruling power took over the administration of the empire in a cooperation between Batu and Möngke. This was a development which was further contested by the Chaghataids and Ögedoids, thus constituting one of the factors leading to the retribalization of the fourteenth century. The establishment of the Golden Lineage as a dynasty created a sharp distinction between the rulers and the ruled. This unchanging position of the Chinggisids was contested by the *begs* (tribal leaders) during the retribalization period.

loyalty to your superiors, and “companionship among rank and file” replaced the ideology of kinship so that people who came from different tribal backgrounds acted in a spirit of unity within their regiments. Mongolian armies serving in the frontiers of Mongolia, China, and the Middle East were carefully organized with these principles in mind. Within the army of conquest politics became an issue within a chain of command suggesting a centralization of power. This new order in the army of conquest was the *jasagh*. As the glossary to the *Secret History* tells us, *jasagh* is glossed as “army law” *chün-fa*.⁸⁸ Gradually the *jasagh* incorporated other avenues of life. Within this development social norms, customs, ways of doing things, that is *törö*, acquired the meaning of “highness”—later on *törö* acquired the meaning of “state,” as a derivation of “highness.” As is known the term *törö* in its Turkish form *töre* was used as a title for the Chinggisids, among the Kazakhs especially but also among the Uighurs in Eastern Turkestan, for example Veli Khan Töre. However, in the early period the usage of *jasagh* in juxtaposition to *törö* had a reinforcing effect for each term: the more *törö* became associated with high authority “highness,” the more inclusive *jasagh* became, incorporating aspects of life that were not necessarily associated with the army. However, we should bear in mind that under the army of conquest all aspects of life were military as there was no division between military and the civil. The following edict by Ögedei presents an illustrative example of the ranges of life that come to be part of the army of conquest:⁸⁹

Common people whether at home or in the army are prohibited from making noisy clamour... As for women who make clothes for the *chih-sun* (*jisün*) feasts, which are not in accordance with the [sumptuary] regulations and as well as [women] who are jealous, they shall be sentenced to punishment of riding a cow bareback around the regiment, and then they shall have their property collected in order that the [husband] may marry.

As each new high authority (*törö*) brought new “ordinances” into the army organization, the old term “ways, customs, usage” (*törö*) became replaced by *yosun*. Thus *jasagh* incorporated all aspects of the new world-view, especially those related to political and social aspects. In the economic sphere, as redistributive practices and ideology did not change, the known ordinances of the *jasagh* were related to the regularization of redistribution. As far as we know, there are no ordinances of the *jasagh* related to any diversion from redistributive ideology or practice. The major characteristic of the new society/order was that it was based on merit, thus creating a society open to talent, irrespective of background. It was because of these prerogatives that

⁸⁸ Here Morgan’s remarks about the importance of “those *yasas* that dealt with great affairs of state and military matters” is quite pertinent. D. O. Morgan, “The ‘Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan’ and Mongol Law in the Ilkhanate” *BSOAS* 49(1986).163-176.

⁸⁹ West, 1986: 529-30 and I. Togan, “Jealousy as an Impediment to Law and Order.”

tribesmen had agreed to forsake political autonomy and enter the ranks of the army of conquest.

The *jasagh* as “army order” could only be maintained by the mobilization of the army and conquests were successful mobilization operations. It was through military success that Chinggis Khan, and later his descendants maintained the loyalty of the army. Conquests were also important from two other points. Conquest brought booty and this outside economic support enable Chinggis Khan and his descendants to direct the balance of power away from the earlier tribal leadership. Conquests provided the new but earlier oppressed strata with opportunities to rise to the top with great vigor. In other words conquests were a means for changing the power structure of the old tribal order.⁹⁰ Conquests were also necessary to introduce changes in the prevalent land use patterns, patterns governed by customary law. According to these customs (*törö*), each tribe had its own summer and winter pastures. In a tribally organized world, following a defeat one could take people captive but not their land. Only the legitimacy of a state made this possible. However, conquest of “sedentary” lands provided tribes, chiefdoms and polities with a base of power leading to the formation of a state. Moreover, these emerging powers also could not depend on an increase of manpower through captives. Captives were not permanent but elusive. From time immemorial, central authority thrived on conquered land.⁹¹ The present Chinese term *hsien* for county originally denoted conquered land upon which authority could be extended in the face of feudal rights. Among the Mongols also conquered land was not governed by customary law (*törö*) but by *jasagh* (army law). In contrast to *nuntugh/yurt* these lands were seen as the private property of Chinggis Khan and as such they were divided (*qubi/ülüşh*) among the 4 sons. The share (*qubi/ülüşh*) of the 4 sons were known thereafter as the 4 *ulus*, meaning initially people in the 4 allotments and later used as a term for the successor states of Chinggis Khan. Although the *ulus* developed out of the private property of Chinggis Khan, the term “private property (*emchü*)” was not used for them, because at this time the Mongolian term *emchü* denoted mobile property, “household slaves, animals.” However, half a century later both the Ilkhans and the Yüan use the term *inju* for royal lands.⁹² al-^cUmarī tells that as these lands were newly conquered, they were not bound by law, custom (*jasagh*) and therefore were ruled under the arbitrary will of Hülügü who had conquered

⁹⁰ See Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “Research on African Mode of Production,” in David Seddon (ed.), *Relations of Production*. London: Frank Cass, 1978 (pp. 261-288).

⁹¹ We can also say that conquered people, captives, also provided a base for central authority; the *mamlūks* and the *yeniçeri* were all initially captives.

⁹² For these terms see note 278 and 280 in Chapter Three above. For a reading of *inju* as *ānčū* see Doerfer, 1965, II: No.670.

them.⁹³ From this passage we can reason by analogy that the same custom prevailed for Chinggis Khan and that he established his order (*jasagh*) by conquest.

While emphasizing the role of custom (redistribution) and consensus (power-sharing), the *jasagh* also took the place of the divine. As such the Chinggisid period stands out with its tendencies that we are inclined to call "secular." In the separation of the divine from wealth and power Chinggis Khan was successful. As such the *jasagh* became the new order, the world view that kept the avenues of success open to all. No one was more divine than the other; no one was better, no one was closer to the divine or sacred ancestors. For members of the "Mongghol" *ulus* avenues were open to all who took place in the new society in a hierarchical order within the confines of an army of conquest. This aspect of the *jasagh* remained uncontested until the sixteenth-seventeenth century when again divinity emerged in the cloak of saintliness (*sayyid*, *qutughtu*) gradually announcing the end of the legitimacy of the *jasagh*.

Yet another aspect of the world-view of *jasagh* was that this was a world with a center. The center was not necessarily locational as in the case of capital but more personal; this world-view required a *khan* or a *qaghan*. Whereas in the twelfth century there were many tribes, many *khans* coexisting like different encampments, after Chinggis Khan, even when retribalization occurred, tribes searched for a khan. In other words, khanship had become institutionalized. This is not to say that this did not happen before the Mongols. Before the Mongols, among different Inner Asian empires from the Hsiung-nu to the Uighurs and the Qarakhanids, there was a center, a khan. However there were also innumerable tribes without khans, with many leaders. The search for a center, for a khan, was not universal. In the aftermath of the Mongolian World Empire this urge became universal among Inner Asian people. At first this urge was satisfied within the confines of the *jasagh*. Later, after the sixteenth century, we witness disentanglement from the *jasagh*, but the center remained and was filled with charismatic personalities other than the Chinggisids. These were either tribal leaders or saints or both. This time it is not retribalization but regionalization. Commoners who established themselves as tribal leaders in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, took their positions in the center.

Here we do not have the original development of a center; the idea of a center had been developed many times. What we encounter is the need of the people to refer to a center in their political pantheon. The development of this need is a reflection of the development of the society along ways that were different from earlier times. To illustrate the development of this need,

⁹³ Lech, 1968: 103.

I would like to point out an illustrative example embodying these changes. This is the history of the word *küriyen*, the word for encampment. As discussed earlier in the twelfth century *küriyen* was an enclosure for animals; tent carts were arranged in a circle so that the animals in the middle would be protected.⁹⁴ Later towards the end of the twelfth century we see the members of *küriyen* as the major support groups associated with Chinggis Khan; these are the famous thirteen *küriyen*, the forerunners of the later army units. In the fourteenth century, on the other hand the Persian historian Rashīd al-Dīn describes *küriyen* as a circular structure with a center, which was reserved for the leader. The followers lined around a leader in a circle.⁹⁵ Thus by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the center had become indispensable.

This world-view that required a center, a Khan or Qaghan who was a descendant of Chinggis Khan, found its legitimization in the *jasagh*. The solutions that were incorporated into this world view were manyfold. In one sense the *jasagh* was inclusive from a political point of view—formations could be centralized, decentralized, in confederation or in tribal form. Ideally power would be shared, but in practice both power-sharing and a monopoly of power could be part of the *jasagh* as long as there was a consensus.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the world view of the *jasagh* was exclusive when it came to wealth. Wealth was for redistribution. There was no compromise on this issue. This was the point when the roads parted.⁹⁶ As long as ideology and practice remained redistributive, it was up to the tribesmen to accept or reject changes in the realm of power. Acceptance meant giving up local autonomy, the right of volition and accepting the central authority, in this case taking a place within the ranks of the army of conquest created by Chinggis Khan. Rejection on the other hand would mean retribalization. Chinggis Khan's detribalization policies had left this alternative open, as they did not alter redistribution. Chinggis Khan's detribalization policies were oriented toward the creation of an open society. For the sake of "open advancement" nomadic tribesmen accepted the new order and decided to forsake "power-sharing," but only as long as it paid to do so. When it did not they retribalized as in the fourteenth century and later formed confederacies. The world view of the Chinggisid *jasagh* had room for all these diverse developments except for any kind of reversal of redistributive practices and policies. In the post-Chinggisid period the roads of *aqā* and *ini* parted at this crucial issue.

⁹⁴ The incident with Jelme is a good example.

⁹⁵ *R/T*: 243.

⁹⁶ Seen from this perspective, historical Iran shared the *jasagh* world-view after the Ilkhanids.

CHAPTER FIVE

EPILOGUE

Up to this point we have followed the developments as outlined in Chapter One. The main purpose was to contextualize the Mongolian Empire. Therefore the problem was set in the framework of a diachronic comparison, stressing that at the macro level that the Mongolian Empire was not unique, but constituted one of the universalist phases in Asian and Inner Asian history. The preceding chapters have been intended to illustrate the need for a transition from the politically and economically localist, culturally particularistic and spiritually religious world order of the twelfth century to a new order where these differences were brought under a common umbrella which had universalist claims. Chapter Two outlined the setting in Asia with regard to problems of wealth and power. All Asia including the west, east and the central parts, was beset by newcomers in a process of trying to reestablish themselves in new environments. Whether to acknowledge and legitimize the use of force, authority seems to have been one of the leading concerns in urban settings. Interestingly these concerns were not only voiced by the local urbanites against the newcomers; sometimes the newcomers themselves were very much concerned with the implications of coercive power. In West Asia finally force, authority became legitimized. While Central Asia still struggled with the implications of the use of institutionalized coercive power, in East Asia legitimization of force was rejected. However it was during this period that pragmatic but not institutionalized use of authority intensified in China. China was thriving commercially but at the same time was trying to overcome the need for the institutionalization of an authority supportive of commercial interests. Commercial concerns were also the driving force in the west of Asia. The need for change was felt everywhere, but the question was how to introduce it so that it was acceptable. Debates and solutions in each case remained local and no solution was found that would encompass the whole of Asia. As we approach the end of the twelfth century we can feel the stirrings of change in all the intellectual circles of Asia.

Elsewhere in the non-urban setting of the steppes of Inner Asia not the intellectual circles but the political participants of this tribally organized world were practicing and experiencing change, but with great opposition. The bottlenecks of the tribal society and the tensions between the proponents

and opponents of change were the primary concern of Chapter Three. Thus this chapter concentrated especially on power relations in a society with mobile and meager wealth. As power was not entangled with wealth, the tensions connected with undisguised power brought about an explosion in the form of a new universalist order which was designed first for the needs of the steppe society. Traditionally Inner Asian society had been equipped to overcome such problems by the reintroduction of the institution of retinue (*nökör*). However, this time the emergence of new groups around a leader and his retinue did not remain as a local incident. In the expansion of this local incident into a world empire actors from outside were instrumental. These were the merchants of Asia, some Buddhist but mostly Muslim Uighurs in eastern Inner Asia and Muslim Central Asians in the west. The former wanted to explore the commercial possibilities of the west while the latter wanted to go to the east.

At the crossroads of the interests of two completely different groups, the merchants and the tribesmen, stood the world conqueror Chinggis Khan. Much has been written on the career of Chinggis Khan and his conquests. Recently the administration of his empire and that of his successors have also been studied and analyzed carefully. Therefore this study has not focused on the Mongolian Empire *per se*. The focus here has been on the transition period leading to the formation the Mongolian Empire. A careful examination of the circumstances leading to the formation of the empire reveals that merchants especially Muslim merchants played a crucial role.

Hence the focus here will be on the Muslim merchants, especially because the expansion of the empire followed the trade routes between the east and the west. In the setting of the changes from the twelfth to the thirteenth century the one underlying all local solutions seems to have been those related to trade and trade routes. While Muslim merchants spread themselves out along the old and new trade routes, the members of the new order, the former tribesmen also spread over the surface of Asia. The princes of the four *ulus* lined up their *ordos* in a route that would lead from Central Asia to the new capital in Qaraqorum, so that in addition to the old routes along the south of the Tianshan new routes to the north of these mountains came into use connecting Central Asia to the present Mongolia over Ili and the Altai. The mobile camp towns along these diverse routes were then manned by mostly merchants. These merchants were called “partners” *ortaq* and were acting as partners in state formation.¹

The cooperation of these two groups under the umbrella of a state mechanism had serious repercussions for Asian history. On the surface and according to our sources Muslim merchants practiced their trade and did not

¹ These aspects have been examined under separate studies. Franz Schurmann (1956), İ. Togan (1984), Allsen(1989) and Endicott-West(1989).

carry out missionary activities (except perhaps for Yünnan); yet a century later all of these regions came under the influence of Islam.² The tribesmen on the other hand, did not try to tribalize Asia, as they were detribalizing themselves within the army of conquest, yet within a century and a half they would retribalize. However, the army of conquest remained nomadic and was supported by the means and methods of the nomadic economy. As a result the regions which we may call “Transjaxartes” or beyond the Syr Darya towards the present Mongolia crossing over the Seven Rivers region, and the present Dzungaria that is regions to the north of the Tianshan became nomadized. This northern belt, where earlier there were small cities and settlements, became the core area of the princely ordos and the nodal points for the *ordo* markets (*ordu bāzār*) and came to be called “Mogholistan” in the fourteenth century. Since then these areas have been entered into the maps as “grasslands,” or the steppe.

The articulation of merchants’ activities with those of the tribesmen occurred at several levels. The first and the foremost was at a geographical level as outlined above. The second was the commercial networks that were in the heritage of Inner Asia. These networks had been used both by merchants and tribesmen. The third level were the social (kinship) networks of the tribesmen that articulated with the commercial networks of the merchants.

A closer examination of these commercial networks (illustrated in the diagrams at the end of this chapter) reveals to us that in addition to the long distance merchants who were neutral and independent,³ each of the political groups had a network of closer contacts. These contacts were sometimes peaceful and commercial and at other times warlike because of disputes and disagreements. The “peer polity interaction” among these groups and their ties to the larger commercial centers varied. It seems in terms of overland trade that it was China that was surrounded by foreign powers with access to commercial centers. Neither Chin China (Figure 1) nor Sung China (Figure 2) were directly tied to the commercial centers of overland trade. While Sung China had the advantage of expansion to the sea, Chin China had access to a varied market mechanism: the mixed economy of the Hsi-hsia (Tangut), the agricultural and artisan economy of the Sung and the nomadic economy of the tribal populations like the Kerait and the Tatar. The Uighur merchants (Figure 3) of Inner Asia, on the other hand, had quite a complex

² Even in China also we hear rumors that the Chinese emperor had converted to Islam. See Lin Yi-min, *Ali Ekber'in Hutayname adlı eserinin Çin Kaynakları ile Mukayesesi ve Tenkidi*. Taipei, 1967.

³ We know of them from various sources. See V. Minorsky *Hudūd al-ʿĀlam. The Regions of the World*. Trans. V. E. Minorsky. London: Gibb Memorial Series, 1937. Reprinted with additions, 1971. See also Minorsky, 1942; Hitti, 1987 and Yasushi Inoue, *Tun-huang. A Novel*. New York: Kodansha, 1978.

network of relationships. However they had two disadvantages. First they were under the Qarakhitai administration and second as they were not Muslims they had little access to the western markets. More importantly because of the Qarakhitai domination they were themselves not directly tied to the commercial centers. Moreover, the rivalry with the Hsi-hsia (Tangut) interrupted their trade to China. Thus neither the Sung, and the Chin nor the Uighurs were in a position to communicate directly with the major centers.

When we look at the tribal populations, that were either in chiefdom formations or were in the process of becoming one, we see that the Merkid's (Figure 4) interaction was mainly with other tribal populations without direct access to main centers of commerce. That the Naiman had great potential⁴ for commercial development is apparent from our chart (figure 5). However, they did not have direct contact with China which was a great drawback. Küchlüg of the Naiman when he made himself the successor in the old Qarakhitai kingdom, had then made a choice to forsake China and concentrate on Transoxiana and the trade with the west. The Kerait (figure 6) on the other hand, emerged as the chiefdom that had established direct contacts with diverse markets. They were in constant contact with the Chin as a sedentary commercial center, and the Hsi-hsia (Tangut) with their mixed economy provided them with shelter and help when needed. Ong Khan To'oril had traveled a few times through the lands of the Uighur to the lands of the Qarakhitai. Moreover they had Qıpchaqs as participants in their polity with whom they could maintain contacts into the Khorezmshāh realm, where Qanlı Qıpchaqs played an important role because the queen mother was one of them. Finally, being Nestorian Christians like the Naiman they had close connections with the Nestorian Christian communities in Inner Asia.⁵ Thus we can see that in terms of peer interaction and commercial networks the Keraites were in a foremost position in comparison to others.

In terms of social (kinship) networks also the Kerait had greater advantages. In Chapter Three this theme was alluded to especially in relation to the Tübe'en who were members both of the Hsi-hsia (Tangut) and of the Kerait. The story of the Kerait ruler Sarıq Khan in Appendix A makes matters more complicated giving us further details about the relationship of the earlier Mongols in the narrow sense and the Kerait when Sarıq Khan says "they are our brethren, kin." Furthermore the clan name known as Yürki among the Turks seems to have existed as Jürkin among the Kiyad and as Jirgin among the Kerait. These social, kinship networks that are seen even today among various Turkish and Mongolian groups like the Kirey, Naiman, the Baya'ut<Bayat within different political formations (nation states) was

⁴ Gumilev's argument that the Naimans were the leaders of Inner Asia at that time finds here further support.

⁵ Barthold, "History of Semirechiye"(1962:73-165) and Barthold, 1901.

much more intricate in the twelfth century and the Kerait seem to have benefited from all these networks, adding to them also marriage relations. As we see in the story of Sarıq Khan, the Naiman and the Kerait were related by marriage.

The Kerait Khanate is referred to in our sources as *qawm* in Persian and *pu-lo* in Chinese, a word usually rendered as tribe in English. *Pu-lo* reconstructed as **bülü[g]~bölüg* means “a section” in Turkish from the verb *böl*—“to divide.” Etymologically it could have been another variant of “share” (*ülüş*, *qubı*), but historically it is not attested in this original form but in its derived meaning as section. In general these tribes (*pu-lo*) did not display “kinship concern or at least no basic connection with the kinship structure.”⁶ They consisted of diverse clan groups, the *omogh* or *oba*, *obo* rendered by *hsing* in Chinese. As such historically they appear within different tribes. This is a further indication of how these clans functioned as support groups between different tribes. The Kerait Khanate was able to exploit all these networks to the highest degree. Geographically they were located in such a way as to develop as many contacts as possible. Yet the regions they inhabited were not geared to self-sufficient diversified pastoral nomadism. Therefore they were not self-sufficient economically. The Kerait seem to have combined hunting with specialized horse breeding on the plains with trade. By this exchange they would compensate for the items lacking in their economy. Thus exchange with the “outside” was an integral part of their economy. This is why we see the Kerait within such established commercial and social networks. In the khanate, the political system was there to hold together the economic system. But the exchange system was based on the social kinship and marriage networks. In the case of the disintegration of the political system the existing social networks based on kinship ties would have prevailed. It was these kinship networks that Chinggis Khan tried to

⁶ The term *pu-lo* is reconstructed as **bülü[g]* on the following grounds: The Chinese term consists of the words *pu* meaning “a section” and *lo* meaning “scattered.” See *Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary*. Revised American edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972 (12th printing), no: 5376 for *pu* and no: 4122 for *lo*. Hilda Ecsedy in her quoted article shows how the term was used for the Inner Asian tribal populations (1972:255). Sharon Baştuğ, on the other hand, says (personal communication):

the *pu-lo* were dispersed segments attached one way or another to other tribes. This is common for segmentary lineage societies, especially among Altaic peoples. Segments may become detached from their wider segmentary lineage system and join others in a number of ways. They may flee because of internal disputes and join others as a “client” tribe, or branches of a single group may be spread out ruling other polities. Dispersed sections of the Ashina, for example, ruled over different tribes. In time such groups may become incorporated into the tribal structure and genealogy of the people they have taken residence among. The Turkmen genealogies both in Turkmenistan and northern Iran provide many examples of this.

disrupt with his policies of detribalization. However before detribalization there were other factors at work.

There were especially two factors working against the Kerait ascendancy. First they were not Muslims. As Zeki Velidi Togan also mentions this was important from the Muslim merchants point of view. Nestorian Christians and Muslims had been rivals over the past centuries for trade routes and the expansion of spheres of influences. The Muslim merchants were in search of a supra-religious and supra-tribal ruler. They did not mind if this ruler was not a Muslim. The second factor against them was Ong Khan To'orils policies, so that the whole tribal world turned eventually against them (Chapter Three).

Chinggis Khan was then able to bring remedies to these drawbacks by creating a new order that would minimize these conflicts. He also fully cooperated with the Muslim merchants by putting his new order at their disposal. Finally it was Chinggis Khan who collected the benefits from the new order which flourished along the trade routes and developed into a universal order with a supra-religious and supra-tribal leader (Chapter Four). The main benefit for Chinggis Khan was that he established his sons, not his brothers, not his relatives, as the legitimate dynastic family thus setting a pattern for the ensuing centuries, in which only the Chinggisids could claim legitimate right to rule.

The Chinggisids, as mentioned earlier became symbols for a coordinating center that would function according to the priorities of the peoples of the steppe. These priorities were a) notions of a "society of open advancement" for individuals in the social sphere; b) notions of power-sharing and making room for local and regional powers in political culture; c) "redistribution" in economics and as a way of life in the ideological sphere. Chinggisids as symbols of these were revered by people like the Kerait, the Naiman and others whose khanates had been destroyed by Chinggis Khan. These people, however, continued to live and to function as clans under different political groups long after Chinggis Khan's empire came to an end. Among these the Keraites continued to live as Kirei among the Mongols, the Kazakhs, the Özbeks, and the Bashkorts. In the Crimea their name became associated with the ruling family, the Giray Khans. It is due to the flexibility of their tribal organization that they are still able to assert their identity as the Kirei in Kazakhstan, Eastern Turkestan/Xinjiang, PRC, Mongolia, Bashkortostan (Russian Federation) and Turkey, long after the Chinggisids lost their legitimacy of rule.

Figures

Bold shapes denote the main actor around whom the “peer polity interaction” is woven. Asterics (*) in the figures denote sedentary centers.




Figure 1: Chin China (1115-1234) displaying both nomadic-tribal and sedentary interaction.




Figure 2: Sung China (1127-1278) and her Inner Asian connections that were confined to the sedentary world.




Figure 3: The Kan-chou and Turfan Uighurs (9th-13th centuries) who had limited direct access to major sedentary centers.




Figure 4: The Merkid in peer polity interaction within the nomadic-tribal world.





Figure 5: The Naiman, like the Kerait, emerged from interaction with both the sedentary and nomadic world.



APPENDIX A

THE STORY OF SARIQ KHAN AS TOLD BY RASHĪD AL-DĪN IN THE SECTION ON THE TATAR

The Translation of the text has been based on the A. Alizade edition of *Jāmi' al-Tawārikh*. Vol.I. Moskva: Akademia Nauk Azerbaizhanskoj SSR., 1965 (194-204).

It is told that when Quridai Tayir [195] and Kümüş Sijang from the Alchi Tatar went on an expedition to fight against Sariq Khan, the Kerait ruler, as Quridai Tayir ventured to go forward, Kümüş Sijang said to him: "You venture to go forward, but in actual fact, you will [in this way] not have appointed *qara'ul* and *yasa'ul* and thus you will commit the error of not taking the necessary precautions. It would be better if I would go forward."

Thereupon Quridai Tayir said: "As you are of the royal line and the younger brother of the heir apparent, you wish to seize the ways and methods of our ancestors and fathers. It is better if you go alone by yourself, take your booty and do whatever you wish to do and return with your own soldiers."

[Thereupon] Kümüş Sijang [196] replied, "Without you I am not able to take booty," and sent his soldiers away. Sariq Khan collected his troops and was coming this way during his migrations, and they looted him three times and drew the troops in great numbers to the site of booty; and they all continued to follow him. Finally Kümüş Sijang pursued Sariq Khan with 300 horsemen and the soldiers of Sariq Khan thought among themselves that these enemy troops were without supply and reinforcement and therefore they attacked them bravely and separated Kümüş Sijang from his men and took him prisoner. Sariq Khan asked him "Where were you going?" He replied saying "I had heard that at the back of the [Mount] Burqan there grows good wood. I came to take wood to make arrows." Sariq Khan said: "You have been very manly as far as cutting [197] is concerned" and looked at him in distrust. Kümüş Sijang said: "You cannot look at me in distrust. And your kin, your tribesmen (*urugh*) can also not look at me in distrust. Your origins were also like theirs." Sariq Khan said: "Why do you let this noble hero talk that much? Kill him." He said: "Your sword will not work on me. But mine will work on you." Altogether they killed him and Sariq Khan said: "There are 70 sections of the Alchi Tatar. Except for Kümüş Sijang there was no valiant man [among them]. Now is the time to set upon them." At that time then he ordered his households to dwell along the river Orqan. And under moonshine he secretly [198] assembled his troops. One man from his troops escaped and informed Quridai Tayir. Quridai Tayir, on the other hand, prepared his troops and marched towards the upper reaches of the Orqan River and passed through their

[Sariq Khan's] households and reached them [i.e. Sariq Khan's troops] by the road that they had taken themselves. The soldiers in Sariq Khan's troops looked at them in disgust. All of a sudden they attacked him (Sariq Khan) in such a manner that of the 400,000 (40 *tümen*) men that he led only 40 survived; the others were all killed. In flight his wife Tarbai Qayan escaped together with Sariq Khan and came out of that [battle]. And at that situation [199] there was also Chila'un who was a commander. That woman said: "We have destroyed those above and below. If others become small in numbers, why shouldn't we? If all others are falling apart, why shouldn't we?"

Sariq Khan said: "This woman speaks the truth" and because of this he set out and came under the protection of Betekitei Ötegü Qorchi Buiruq Khan and after that from that woman at that time Il Qutuqtuy was born.¹ Sariq Khan was under the protection of these people (*qawm*). [Qorchi Buiruq Khan] gave his daughter to Qu[r]jaghush Buiruq Khan [i.e. the son of Sariq Khan]. That daughter was called Töreqaımış and she was the sister of Qajir Khan.² Qajir Khan and Sariq Khan[200] together organized their troops and led an attack upon the Tatar and rescued the Kerayijin/Kerayijin people (*ulus-e Kerayijin*) for the sake of Sariq Khan and [Qajir Khan] gave them to him. At that time Ong Khan was in captivity with this mother Ilma Khatun in the hands of the Tatar. They also rescued them. A man called Ilchitei had been very fond of Ilma Khatun. Because he was a treacherous person, he gave her back in return for silver. The detail pertaining to the children of Töreqaımış is as follows: Yula Maghus, Taitemür Taishi and there were four others whose names we do not know.

After that the Mogholan went to join Sariq Khan and Sariq Khan said: "From the hundred wives that I possess there is not one who [201] has a place in my heart. Those of my wives who are intelligent, I don't know what to say about their understanding, and they don't have any skill nor talent. From the thousand geldings that I have none has a place in my heart, either there are those who fall on their face, or they are hard to tame, or weak in body. Those that are talented and heroic, are not physically strong. In big battles they say in one mouth "Hu,! Hu!," [but it is only] after the victory or defeat that they have been tested. Fighting with flies is hard, because they can kill if they sting. With elder and younger brothers one has to be ashamed. They may not kill, [but] they can make it intolerable."

After that Ötegü Qorchi [202] Buiruq Khan went towards Sariq Khan with the request that he divide [with] him the Mogholan. Sariq Khan said: "These Mogholan are like our younger brothers. We have become one. We united and have taken each other's hand. We can not give them [away]." Buiruq Khan said: "I have revived your dead spirit with many people. For your flocks and herds that had gone astray I stood as a shepherd at the places of encampment. I believed in you and rescued you from the enemies. But Man is as forgetful a being, as the earth

¹ Probably a mistake for Il Qutur, which we encounter as the name of a commander of Ong Khan To'oril.

² Zeki Velidi Togan, *İç Asya*, p.36.

changes its features. From now on do not become friends with the Mongols and do not become their companions (*nöker*).” Saying this [to his men] he returned.³

After that Sariq Khan [203] said: “This man was not to be trusted,” and made the Mogholan to set out from the side of the mountain that is called Dala Taban. He himself set out along the same route. Then he returned from the place called TVY TAGHAJV. The Mogholan said: “Sariq Khan arrived hungry and weak” and by the way of gifts (*örügchüt*) they gave to each of his men 10 geldings and letting them dismount they showed him hospitality. Sariq Khan [then] said: “Oh! My little brothers who are Moghols. Never become *quda* (“in-laws”) with each other. As any person who is tied in this way becomes remote. But become *anda* (sworn brothers) so that you become each others elder and younger brothers. [204] Oh! My younger Moghol brothers! Until your ruler leads you, you should not pass [the time] in isolation [so that] you would not go into torturous valleys and mazes.”⁴

Implications of this story for history

This episode and the legend paraphrased in Ulrich Haarman’s study⁵ speak of Kümüş Khan, who is an adversary of the heroes of the story and is killed. In both cases Kümüş is a prince who acts in the name of a royal authority. In the Haarman episode he is the son of Altun Khan and they live in Tibet. In the episode by Rashīd al-Dīn he is a prince of the Alchi Tatar and the incident is placed near the Orkhon River.

Seeing these similar episodes we can no longer regard any of them as historical incidents. However, the fact that, that the Alchi Tatar, the Kerait and the Moghol appear together in one episode and that the Mongols and the Turks with their ruler Altun Khan, a descendant of Tatar Khan, appear in Haarmann’s episode shows how their histories and legends are intertwined. That we find two variants of the same legend among these people is an indication of their common past as Zeki Velidi Togan suggested.⁶

Then the reconstruction of the tentative history would be that the Seven Tatar⁷ had to leave their homeland in Tibet with the beautiful lake and islands

³ He means “be only friends with me.”

⁴ Pelliot (1951: 244-245) translates it: “Oh, Mongols, mes jeunes frères que vous êtes, mariez vous (*quda*) toujours les uns avec les autres, de manière que vous vous teniez loin de tout homme qui est... Soyez des *anda*, afin que vous soyez frères aînés et frères cadets les uns avec les autres. Oh, mes frères cadets de Mongols (*iniyān Moγol-i män*), pendant que vous avez un souverain *kulah-dari*, mot-a-mot, ne choisissez pas l’isolement (*halvat*), n’allez pas par une mauvaise route et une issue tortueuse.”

⁵ See Ulrich Haarman “Altun Han und Čingiz Han bei den ägyptischen Mamluken,” *Der Islam* 51(1974).1-36.

⁶ *Iç Asya*, pp. 74-84 and *Cengiz Han*, p. 23.

⁷ Haarman, 1974: 23. On Tatars see also Kljaštornyj, 1992: 90.

and heavenly horses as more and more “Turks”⁸ whom probably we can understand as Tanguts⁹ came to dominate the scene. Some of these seven Tatars moved into the west and were encountered before 1140 in the region of Khotan as mentioned in Islamic sources. Others whom we know as the Kerait and who also consisted of seven clans apparently moved from the present Qinghai region over the Altai into western Mongolia. Here the Kerait had problems with the other Tatar groups and there Kümüş Khan is again portrayed as the leader of this problematic group. The people whom we know as Mongols were also closely related to the Kerait, as one of the Tatar groups who were called Moghol. Thus in the episode preserved by Rashīd al-Dīn we encounter in historical memory the times when the Mongols had somehow lost their leaders and were closely connected to the Kerait as if they were the followers of the Kerait ruler. The same historical memory speaks also of Naiman leadership. Naiman Betekitei Qajir Khan seems, however, to be a Muslim who speaks of midday prayers.

In conclusion we may say that this episode about the Kerait ruler Sariq Khan tells us that the Kerait had been in earlier history in the Tangut region. The relationship of the Kerait clan Tübe'en to the T'o-pa of the Tangut had been noted earlier. They both go back to the earlier T'o-pa of the Northern Wei who had been active in these regions. In summary then some of the clans of the T'o-pa (Northern Wei 386-532) who were active in the Kökenor (present Qinghai) region were instrumental in the establishment of the Tangut, while others joined the Kerait. These latter moved later further north. With that we can also see the intricate networks of tribal affiliations. Tribes continued their lives as clans or as tribes but the larger political groups they joined or formed might change its name, like Toba, Kerait. In examining historical sources we have to be apprehensive whether our sources speak of the larger political group or of the continuation of this larger political group in the shape of a clan. Again it is a matter of the bone (*yasun*) as a structural principle as a uniting factor and the clan *omogh* as a dividing factor. But the issue is not clear cut, the same people may appear with the same name under different disguises being members of a fluid and flexible world.

⁸ Haarmann, 1974:26.

⁹ Dunnell, 1983:40.

APPENDIX B

THE LAMENT OF CHINGGIS KHAN AS RENDERED BY RASHĪD AL-DĪN

This translation is from Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmī' al-Tavārikh* (Bahman Karimi ed., Tehran, 1338) vol. I:284-286. A somewhat different version of this lament is to be found in the *Secret History* (§177) where Ong Khan's historical reaction appears in §178. I would like to acknowledge the assistance that was extended to me by Fatemeh Keshavarz of Washington University in St. Louis.

After that Chingiz Khan sent a person whose name was ARTY JYVN and who was from the Ildürgin people as an envoy to Ong Khan's court. This man delivered the following message:

At present I have come down Tünke Navur and Quruqa Quruqan. The grass of this region is good and our geldings have become stronger. Now Oh! Khan! Oh! Father! At that time your paternal uncle Gür Khan said to you 'You have not transmitted my elder brother Buiruq Khan's place to me and you have annihilated both of my brothers Ta[i]temür Taishi and Buqa Temür.' Because of that he forced you to run away and brought you to that pass which is called Qara'un Qabchal and surrounded you there. And you came out of there with a few men. And who brought you out except for my father? He set upon [Gür Khan] together with you and his own soldiers (*cherig*). Two men of the Taiji'ud whose name were Udur Qunan and Buqaji accompanied you with a few of their men. And from there you set out and passed through a place and a steppe which is called Qara Buqa and then passed thorough to a place called.... and through Qulatan Tülengüt and went uphill through Qabchal and [came to] Güse'ür Na'ur. There you requested Gür Khan. At that time Gür Khan was at a place called Qurban Telesüt. You forced him out of that place and put him to flight. It is not clear [whether he escaped] with 20 or 30 men. [Gür Khan then] went into the Qashin [Ho-hsi, west of the Yellow River] region. Thereafter he never came out of there nor was he ever visible. My good father thus took your *mulk* (people and land) from Gür Khan and gave it to you, and you became *anda* with my father. And the reason that I am calling you "Khan, my father" is this. Now this is my first claim (*ḥaq*) on my rights that rest with you.

[285] At another time, Oh! Khan! My father! When [from your right] what became hidden and covered and was lost to you where the sun sets [i.e. the west], in the lands of Jauqut I called at Jagambu Anda with a loud voice and made signals at him by lifting my hat and did *dilaymishi* that is I gesticulated with my arms and hands. That way I brought [back] Jagambu Anda. When I was bringing him, the enemy was sitting in ambush in retaliation. At another time, the Merkid people made Jagambu [one night] to run away. Out of generosity and humanity I rescued him. A person who brought Jagambu Anda

out of the lands of the Jauqut that is out of North China (Khitai) and who saved him from the hands of the Merkid, how could he kill him? Yet I have killed my elder brothers for your sake. If people would ask who they were, these were Seche Beki who was an elder brother of mine and Taiju Quri who was a younger brother of mine. This is another claim that I have on what belongs to me.

And also Oh! Khan! My Father! When like the sun which comes out from underneath the clouds, you came to me and when you came to me like fire spreading slowly, I did not let your hunger continue for half a day and I satiated the hunger of all of you. I also did not let your nakedness linger for a month, I clothed all of you. If they ask what does all this mean? Behind the place called Mound Qayalıq, that is where there were white poplars there is a place called Mürüjek Sü.¹ There I pitched a battle and plundered the Merkid people and took their flocks and herds and their tents (*khargāh*) and *ordos* and their nice clothing and gave them to you. I have not let you go around hungry more than half a day and I have not let you go around more than a month. This is my third claim upon you!

Then follows two more claims related to Ong Khan To'oril's raid on the Merkid after which he did not give a share from the booty to Temüjin. This happened actually after Temüjin had his four heroes go and rescue Ong Khan To'oril's people when they were captured by the Naiman commander Kökse'ü Sabraq. He ends this claim saying: "I sent....and took back your people and gave them to you. My fourth right is this" (pp.285-86) and continues:

And then from there we arrived at a place near the River Qara where Hulan BLYTATRVT [Belchigur?] is located and which is close to a mountain which is called JVRFAL Qun. There we made a covenant saying: "Like a stinging and toothful snake that puts stings and teeth in between us, we will not separate from each other until we speak with our tongue, mouth and teeth and will not stay away from each other." That means if somebody says something with or without a bad intention until we meet and discuss it and verify it, we will not give it credence, will not favor such words and will not stay away from one another. Now [due to] words that they have said with bad intentions, you separated yourself [from me] without meeting, discussing or verifying. And you based [your action] on it.

And also Oh! Khan! My father! After that on the Jurqu Mountain I was like a flying hawk and passed by Buir Navur and brought to you the KLNGAN which one catches by their feet and which are gray in color. If you ask who they are, they are the Dörben and the Tatar. And at another occasion I became a blue hawk and passed by Köke Navur and by their blackened feet I caught the blackened KLNGAN and brought them to you. If you ask who they are, they are the Qatagin, the Salji'ut and the Qongrat people. And today they are the people with whose help you are threatening me. This is another claim of mine upon you.

And also Oh! Khan! My Father! What right (*haq*) have you established on me? And what benefit came to me from you? I have all these rights and claims (*huqūq*) upon you and so much benefit I have given to you. Oh! Khan! My

¹ This is the Mürüče Se'ül of *MNT*, §177.

Father! why are you threatening me? Why don't you sit with peace of mind and comfort? Why don't you let your daughters-in-law and your sons sleep comfortably? I, your son, I never said my share (*bakhsh*) is too little, and I want more or that it is bad and I want it better.

If one of the two wheels of a cart (*gerdūn*) breaks, migration (*kūch*) is not possible. And if the ox of the chariot gets tired and the cart-driver having remained alone, loads the cart and leaves it, thieves will get it. If he does not load it and travels, the [ox] becomes ill and dies. And from the two wheels of the cart, if one breaks and the ox wants to pull, it will not be able to pull. As it pushes uphill with all of its force, its neck will be injured. And because of that it will jump up restlessly and become helpless. Like the two wheels of one cart, one of the wheels of your cart was I.

APPENDIX C

A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN KERAIT HISTORY¹

- 990 The background to the formation of the Kerait Khanate related to the establishment of the Tangut Kingdom
- 1007 Conversion to Nestorian Christianity
- 1115 <The Chin Dynasty is established in North China>
- 1124-9 The Kerait as one of the 18 tribes supporting Yeh-lü Ta-shih
- 1125 <Temüjin's great-great grandfather Qabul Khan attends coronation ceremonies at the Chin court, they were known as the Meng-ku>
- The Kerait ruler Sariq Khan (Marghuz)'s grandson To'oril is captured by the Merkid
- Sariq Khan camping along the Orkhon is defeated by the Tatars; his wife Ilma and grandson To'oril are captured by the Tatars
- Sariq Khan seeks refuge with the Naiman
- Sariq Khan's son Qurjaqus is married to a Naiman princess
- 1140 Sariq Khan is restored to power by Naiman support; dispersed people like the Mogholan again join Sariq Khan
- Sariq Khan dies and his son Qurjaqus rules at Orta Balghasun
- Qurjaqus sends his sons To'oril and Gür Khan to the frontiers
- With the death of Qurjaqus his two sons by the Naiman princess capture the capital
- To'oril also arrives at the capital and eventually kills the two half-brothers
- To'oril's brother Gür Khan takes up opposition against him because of the murder of the half-brothers
- To'oril has to flee to the Chin frontier and is away for seven years

¹ A comparable chronology of events in the life of Temüjin is to be found in the English translation of Paul Ratchnevsky's work (pp.281-283).

- 1150-60 To'oril (Ong Khan) restored to power by Yesügei
- 1165 < Probable birth of Temüjin, other possible dates being, 1155 and 1167>
- 1170 Another brother, Erke Qara forces To'oril (Ong Khan) out
- 1173 To'oril (Ong Khan) goes to Qarakhitai country
- 1174 He returns passing through the Tangut country
His restoration to power for the second time by Yesügei
His consolidation of power
- 1176 Young *turghaq* ("hostages") at his court: Jamugha and Temüjin
- 1184 Temüjin becomes To'oril (Ong Khan) 's vassal and together they undertake the Merkid campaign to rescue Temüjin's wife Börte


< fall-out between Jamugha and Temüjin>
Jagha Gambu's revolt
- late 1180's-early 1190's Ong Khan has to leave again
- 1186 Jaqa Gambu flees to Jauqut (North China)

<Temüjin enjoys independence; the Tübe'en join him and he is elected khan of the Borjigid>
- 1187-88 <Battle of Dalan Baljus; Temüjin defeated by Jamugha; Temüjin captive(?)>, Jaqa Gambu returns with Temüjin's help
- 1196 <Temüjin takes part in the Chin campaign against the Tatars>
- 1196-97 <Revolt of the Jürkin and their annihilation>
- 1196 To'oril (Ong Khan)'s return
- 1197 He is restored to power and is given the title Ong Khan (Wang-han) by the Chin authorities
- 1198 The Merkid campaign
Beginnings of *dual kingship*
- 1198-99 Ong Khan and Temüjin carry out the Naiman Campaign

<Temüjin's proposal>
Ong Khan departs at night

- Ong Khan's son Senggüm is attacked by the Naiman Kökse'ü Sabragh
 <Temüjin sends his four heroes >
 Senggüm is rescued
 Agreement for *dual kingship*
- 1200 Attack on the Taiji'ud
 (spring) <Opposition of the tribes>
 <Jamugha is elected *Gür Khan* at Alghui>
 <the Naiman and the Merkid join the opposition>
- 1201 Battle of Küyiten
- 1202 Disagreement between Ong Khan and Temüjin on the
 redistribution of booty
- 1202-3 Senggüm's daughter Cha'ur Beki is requested by Temüjin for
 his son Jochi
 Senggüm rejects the proposal for betrothal and assumes
 leadership
- 1203 Senggüm's plan to kill Temüjin is revealed to Temüjin by
 Badaï and Kishilig
 <The majority of the Monggols are still with Jamugha, and only
 those who revolt are with Temüjin>
 Tribal elders say "let us be ourselves khan."
 Ong Khan and Senggüm lose the battle against Temüjin
 Ong Khan dies; Senggüm flees to Tibet and later perishes
 there
 <Thus Temüjin inherits the Kerait rule >
- 1204 Jaqa Gambu emerges from the ranks of the Naiman and
 becomes the "Second Shaft" to Temüjin; beginnings of the
 second *dual kingship*.
 His two daughters Ibaqa Beki and Sorqaghtani Beki are wed
 to Temüjin and Tolui
 Shortly afterwards Jaqa Gambu is killed by Jürchedei and
 Ibaqa is given to him
 <end of *dual kingship*>
- 1206 At the Great Khuriltai Temüjin is declared Chinggis Khan

THE KERAIT RULING FAMILY



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**ILLUSTRATIONS
AND
MAPS**




Plate 1: The enthronement of the Seljuqid Sultan Tughrul b. Mehemmed b. Melikshāh who addressed the people concerning the separation of spiritual rule from temporal rule. Rashid al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, Topkapı Sarayı Library, *Hazine* 1654, f. 213b (photo: courtesy Topkapı Sarayı Museum, Istanbul).



Plate 2: During the wars between the Samanids and the Qarakhanids in 990 Bughra Khan, having fallen ill, leaves Bukhara and Nūh b. Manşūr returns and is met by Bukharans. Rashid al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, Topkapı Sarayı Library, *Hazine* 1653, f. 274b. (photo: courtesy Topkapı)





Plate 4: Alan Gho'a, Alan the Fair, the mythical ancestress of the Mongols shown here (above) with her husband Dobun Mergen (*MNT*, §7-10). After his death she was visited (below) by a "bright yellow man" who came through the light hole, projected his light into her belly and left as a yellow dog. As a result she gave birth to three sons. *Baysunghur Album*, Topkapı Sarayı Library, *Hazine* 2152, f. 42a (photo: courtesy Topkapı Sarayı Museum, Istanbul).




Plate 5: With the words “such sons should a father have” Chinggis Khan and his *noyad* admire the courage of Jalāl al-Dīn Khorezmshāh who jumps across the river on horseback to escape the Mongols. Upon landing on the other bank, Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn wipes his sword. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh*, Topkapı Sarayı Library, *Hazine* 1654, f. 232b (photo: courtesy Topkapı Sarayı Museum, Istanbul).



Plate 6: An encampment scene. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, Topkapı Sarayı Library, *Hazine*, 1654, f. 185b (photo: courtesy Topkapı Sarayı Museum, Istanbul).



Map 1: Chinggis Khan's empire. Adapted from M. G. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 1974, Vol. 2, p. 290.



Map 2: Asia in the twelfth century. Adapted from C. Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, 1955, p. 240.